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"CLEAR TITLE" FOR FARM PRODUCTS: CONGRESS
AND THE ARKANSAS LEGISLATURE ATTEMPT TO
SOLVE A TROUBLESOME PROBLEM
D. Fenton Adams*
Until recently the law in Arkansas, as in most other states, was
notably more protective of holders of security interests in farmers'
products than it was of creditors whose claims were secured by inven-
tory of other debtors. With the enactment in 1985 of the federal Food
Security Act,' and amendments in 19862 and 19873 of Arkansas' ver-
sion of the Uniform Commercial Code,4 the positions of those who
finance on the security of farm products have abruptly worsened,
though they remain favorites of the law to some degree. This article
considers the nature, purposes and effect of the 1985-1987 legislation.
* D. Fenton Adams-Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School
of Law. B.A., Dickinson College, 1947; LL.B., 1949, J.D., 1968, Dickinson School of Law.
1. The Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354 (1985). The Food
Security Act was omnibus legislation, dealing with many aspects of food production and mar-
keting. Only one section of it, the so-called "clear title" section (§ 1324, 7 U.S.C. § 1631
(Supp. IV 1986)), is pertinent to the subject of this article. For convenience of reference, the
expressions "Food Security Act" and "Federal Act" will sometimes be used to refer to that
section.
2. Act of May 19, 1986, No. 16 (2d Ext. Sess.) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-9-307,
-407 (1987)).
3. Act of Mar. 3, 1987, No. 108, 1987 Ark. Acts 267 (Adv. Leg. Ser.) (codified at ARK.
CODE ANN. §§ 4-9-307, -407 (1987)).
4. ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-1-101 to -9-507 (1987 & Supp. 1987).
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I. THE PRIOR LAW
To put the new legislation in perspective, it may be useful to re-
view the Arkansas law as it stood before these changes.
Assume that an Arkansas bank, Bullion Bank, makes separate
loans to Harry Holmes and Fred Farrow, two customers who reside
and do business in Arkansas. Holmes is the sole proprietor of a small
manufacturing concern, his principal product being refrigerators.
Farrow owns and operates a family farm, his principal product being
soybeans. Both loans provide the borrowers with operating funds for
their businesses. As part of each written loan agreement, the bank
requires the borrower to grant it an interest in the borrower's prop-
erty as security for the loan. The loan to Holmes is secured by his
present and future inventory of refrigerators; in Farrow's case the se-
curity is an interest in his growing crop of soybeans.
Assume, further, that before either loan is repaid, each of the
borrowers sells to a third party property securing Bullion Bank's loan.
Holmes sells and delivers several of the refrigerators that he has man-
ufactured to Carl Cooper, a retail refrigerator dealer, while Farrow
harvests his soybean crop and sells it to Stanley Smith, a broker, who
plans to resell the beans. Both buyers pay cash for their purchases
and buy without knowledge of the existence of the bank's interests
and without suspicion that the sales to them are improper in any way.
Assume that neither of the debtors turns the proceeds of his sale
over to the bank, that both debtors are in default on their obligations
to Bullion Bank, and that the bank seeks to protect itself by foreclos-
ing on its security. It learns of the sales to Cooper and Smith, and
finds that Cooper still has the refrigerators that he bought from
Holmes and that Smith still has Farrow's soybeans. The bank asserts
against Cooper and Smith a right to take possession of the refrigera-
tors and soybeans, to sell them, and to apply the proceeds of those
sales to the loan obligations of Holmes and Farrow. Are the bank's
claims valid?
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code5 would provide most
of the governing substantive law, as it would in most states.6 In the
5. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 85-9-101 to -507 (Supp. 1985) (current version at ARK. CODE
ANN. §§ 4-9-101 to -507 (1987 & Supp. 1987)).
6. Forty-nine of the fifty states have enacted the Uniform Commercial Code (also re-
ferred to in this article as the "U.C.C." or the "Code"). Louisiana has adopted portions of it,
but not Article 9. Congress enacted the U.C.C. as the law of the District of Columbia, and it
has been adopted in the Virgin Islands. U.C.C., I U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1988).
The U.C.C. is the joint product of the American Law Institute and the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. Its text, as approved by the sponsoring orga-
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terminology of Article 9 the agreements giving the bank interests in
the refrigerators and soybeans are "security agreements;" 7 the prop-
erty interests obtained by the bank through those agreements are "se-
curity interests; ' 8 and the refrigerators and soybeans covered by the
agreements are "collateral."9 Bullion Bank is termed the "secured
party,"'" and Holmes and Farrow are "debtors.""
The basic Article 9 rule defining the rights of the secured party is
found in section 9-201: "Except as otherwise provided by this Act a
security agreement is effective according to its terms between the par-
ties, against purchasers of the collateral, and against creditors."' 2
Thus, as a general rule, the rights of the bank, as provided in the
security agreements, are just as effective against third-party purchas-
ers of the collateral as they would be between the bank and its
debtors.
However, the rule does direct attention to the terms of the secur-
ity agreements. One must inquire whether those agreements author-
ize the debtors to sell the collateral. This point is underlined by
section 9-306(2): "Except where this Article otherwise provides, a se-
nizations, is termed the "Official Text." There have been a series of Official Texts, as the two
organizations have approved changes in the U.C.C.'s wording from time to time since its origi-
nal promulgation in 1951. In this article references to the Code are to the 1978 Official Text,
unless otherwise indicated.
When the Arkansas legislature enacted the U.C.C., the current Official Text was that of
1958, and the Arkansas version of the Code was generally in accord with that text. Subsequent
amendments brought it into general conformity with the 1978 Official Text by 1985. There-
fore, references in this article to the "U.C.C.," the "Code" or the "Uniform Commercial
Code" will apply not only to the 1978 Official Text but also to the corresponding sections of
the Arkansas U.C.C. as it read prior to the 1986 and 1987 legislation discussed below, unless
otherwise indicated. (In the Arkansas Code Annotated, section numbering corresponds to
that of the Official Text, except that each section number is preceded by "4-".)
7. U.C.C. § 9-102(l)(a) (1978) provides that, with certain exceptions not relevant here,
Article 9 applies "to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a
security interest in personal property or fixtures," and subsection (2) of the same section pro-
vides that "[t]his Article applies to security interests created by contract including ... chattel
mortgage." The term "security agreement" is defined as "an agreement which creates or pro-
vides for a security interest." Id. § 9-105(l)(1).
8. Id. § 1-201(37): " 'Security interest' means an interest in personal property or fixtures
which secures payment or performance of an obligation ......
9. Id. § 9-105(l)(c): " 'Collateral' means the property subject to a security interest ..
Note that the particular type of collateral involved in the hypothetical case posed in the text is
"goods," defined as including "all things which are movable at the time the security interest
attaches" and also as including "growing crops." Id. § 9-105(l)(h).
10. Id. § 9-105(l)(m): " 'Secured party' means a lender, seller or other person in whose
favor there is a security interest . .. ."
11. Id. § 9-105(l)(d): "'Debtor' means the person who owes payment or other perform-
ance of the obligation secured, whether or not he owns or has rights in the collateral .
12. Id. § 9-201 (1978) (emphasis added).
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curity interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange
or other disposition thereof unless the disposition was authorized by the
secured party in the security agreement or otherwise, and also contin-
ues in any identifiable proceeds .. .. .3
Now it may be that the security agreements did authorize sales
such as those made by Holmes and Farrow. After all, the loans fi-
nanced the debtors' business operations, and since both engaged in the
business of selling the types of products covered by the agreements,
the bank quite likely expected the debtors to obtain the funds needed
to repay their loans by selling the very products covered by the secur-
ity agreements. Since the bank's security interest "continues in any
identifiable proceeds" of the original collateral, it would seem that the
bank would be protected by its interest in those proceeds.
Indeed, in many instances where loans are made to sellers of
goods, with the borrowers' inventory serving as collateral, the lenders
do not even expect the borrowers to turn over the proceeds of each
sale for the purpose of reducing their indebtedness. Rather, the lend-
ers are willing to permit the borrowers to use the proceeds to acquire
additional inventory or to meet other expenses of their businesses, ex-
pecting the borrowers to repay their loans from the general revenues
of their businesses. The lenders contract for liens on new inventory as
13. This sentence of the Code, as originally enacted in Arkansas in 1961, was differently
worded. Act of Mar. 7, 1961, No. 185, 1961 Ark. Acts 421 (codified as amended at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-9-306(2) (Supp. 1987). The present wording was adopted by amendment in
1973. Act of Feb. 13, 1973, No. 116, 1973 Ark. Acts 345 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-
306(2) (1987)). Prior to the amendment it read: "Except where this Article otherwise pro-
vides, a security interest continues in collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other dispo-
sition by the debtor unless his action was authorized in the security agreement or otherwise,
and also continues in any identifiable proceeds .... " (emphasis added). This was one of a
number of changes in the text of Article 9, with some conforming amendments to other arti-
cles, made to bring the Arkansas U.C.C. into conformity with the 1972 Official Text of Article
9. See Note, Filing and Perfection Under the New Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 27 ARK. L. REV. 507 (1973). The words "by the debtor" were deleted from the Official
Text and the words "the disposition" substituted for "his action" in order to avoid any sugges-
tion that an unauthorized disposition of the collateral by someone other than the debtor would
divest the security interest. See Hawkland, The Proposed Amendment to Article 9 of the
UC.C.-Part I: Financing the Farmer, 76 COM. L.J. 416, 418-20 (1971). As most litigation
involving this passage of the Code does involve dispositions by debtors, and as that sort of
disposition is the subject of this article, the discussion in the text frequently refers to authoriza-
tion of disposition "by the debtor" without specific notation that the observations made are
usually equally applicable to dispositions by others.
Section 9-306(2) does not explicitly provide that an "authorized" disposition of collateral
operates to divest the security interest, but that implication is clear. See, e.g., Commercial
Credit Corp. v. National Credit Corp., 251 Ark. 541, 473 S.W.2d 876 (1971).
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it is acquired, as well as on the proceeds of all inventory. 4
Nevertheless, a secured party may well have reason not to au-
thorize the debtor's sale or other disposition of the collateral in any
general way, or at least to put restrictions on the debtor's freedom of
sale. The secured party may not have sufficient confidence in the con-
tinued vitality of the debtor's enterprise to be satisfied with a lien that
"floats" from the original collateral to new inventory as the original
collateral is sold;' 5 he may want the proceeds of each sale of any of
the original collateral applied to the reduction of the secured debt.
Moreover, he may not feel adequately protected by his security inter-
est in the "proceeds" of the original collateral. Proceeds in the form
of cash or a check payable to the debtor alone are an extraordinarily
mobile form of collateral. The debtor may be tempted to apply the
proceeds to more pressing needs than the claim of the secured party;
by the time the creditor learns that the original collateral has been
sold, the proceeds may have disappeared. A secured party may very
well believe that he will be adequately secured only if he can retain
and enforce his security interest in the original collateral until he gets
control of its proceeds. Thus, he may withhold any generalized con-
sent to sales of the collateral, instead requiring his prior consent to
specific sales, and on terms satisfactory to him. Alternatively, he may
grant a more general authorization for sales by the debtor but only on
conditions that assure him of control over the proceeds, as by requir-
ing that any payment for such collateral be made by check payable
jointly to the debtor and himself.
Business custom may also prompt the secured party to decline to
authorize sales of the collateral. Financers of farm operations have
very commonly not been willing to grant authorizations for sale of
encumbered crops or other farm inventory without the consent of the
financers to the specific sales.' 6 One must therefore inquire whether
the secured party has "authorized" any particular sale of the collat-
eral "in the security agreement." 7
14. See Dolan, Section 9-307(1): The U.CCs Obstacle to Agricultural Commerce in the
Open Market, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 706, 709 (1978).
15. For general discussion of the "floating lien" see B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10.1 (1980).
16. See Dolan, supra note 14, at 710.
17. Security agreements and financing statements frequently contain express provisions
that the security interests are to apply to "proceeds" of the collateral. The very fact that a
security interest is claimed in proceeds may be thought to imply authorization for the debtor to
sell or otherwise dispose of the collateral, especially where the original collateral is inventory of
the debtor. 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 715 (1965). That
idea was given qualified support by the Official Comments to the 1958 Official Text of the
6231987-88]
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In this connection, note that the express terms of the security
agreement are not the exclusive source of information as to its
"terms." Under the Code's general provisions in Article 1, "agree-
ment" is defined as "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their
language or by implication from other circumstances including course
of dealing and usage of trade or course of performance as provided in
this Act (Sections 1-205 and 2-208). " 1 Consent to sale of the collat-
eral by the debtor may thus be implied by reason of prior dealings
between the same parties 9 or on the basis of prevailing business prac-
tices in a locality or trade.20 While the parol evidence rule may oper-
ate to exclude some evidence of agreements which are not set forth in
the written security agreement, 21 evidence of "course of dealing" and
U.C.C., where comment 3 to § 9-306 stated that: "A claim to proceeds in a filed financing
statement might be considered as impliedly authorizing sale or other disposition of the collat-
eral, depending on the circumstances of the parties, the nature of the collateral, the course of
dealing of the parties and the usage of trade .... " Since the 1958 Official Text was the current
Official Text when Arkansas adopted the U.C.C., the quoted comment might be an indication
of legislative intent as to how § 9-306(2) should be applied in Arkansas. The quoted passage
was deleted from the comments to the 1972 Official Text and replaced with a statement that,
"[tihe right to proceeds, either under the rules of this section or under specific mention thereof
in a security agreement or financing statement does not in itself constitute an authorization for
sale," U.C.C. § 9-306 comment 3 (1972), but this change followed Arkansas' enactment of the
U.C.C. and may not be legitimate legislative history. On the other hand, the adoption in 1973
by the Arkansas legislature of the change in wording of § 9-306(2) which was effected by the
1972 Official Text, see supra note 13, may justify resort to the official comments to that text for
aid in interpretation of the rule as modified. Thus far, Arkansas cases do not treat a claim to
proceeds as authorizing the debtor's disposition of the collateral, and there are cases in other
jurisdictions, construing the Code prior to 1972, which rejected the argument that a claim to
proceeds implied that the debtor was authorized to sell the collateral. Vermilion County Prod.
Credit Ass'n v. Izzard, 111111. App. 2d 190, 249 N.E.2d 352 (1969); Overland Nat'l Bank v.
Aurora Coop. Elevator Co., 184 Neb. 843, 172 N.W.2d 787 (1969). See Dolan, supra note 14,
at 727-28; Richards, Federal Preemption of the U. CC. Farm Products Exception: Buyers Must
Still Beware, 15 STETSON L. REV. 371, 380-81 (1986).
18. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1978).
19. Id. § 1-205(1): "A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the
parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis
of understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct." Subsection (3) of the
same section provides that, "A course of dealing between parties [as well as usage of trade]
give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement." Id. § 1-205(3).
20. "Usage of trade" is defined as "any practice or method of dealing having such regular-
ity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation that it will be ob-
served with respect to the transaction in question." Id. § 1-205(2). Subsection (3) of the same
section provides that both course of dealing between parties and "any usage of trade in the
vocation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be aware give
particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement." Id. § 1-205(3).
21. Although Article 9 of the U.C.C. does not codify the parol evidence rule, it is presum-
ably applicable to written security agreements by authority of § 1-103: "Unless displaced by
the particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity. .. shall supplement its
provisions." See also U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1978) (the definition of "agreement").
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"usage of trade" is presumably admissible at least as an aid to inter-
pretation of the writing and to show terms which supplement the ex-
press terms of the writing.22
The significance of these possibilities was demonstrated in the
case of Planters Production Credit Association v. Bowles,23 a 1974 deci-
sion of the Arkansas Supreme Court. A production credit association
had a security interest in the 1971 cotton crop of one of its members,
Bowles, as security for a loan made to him that year and for indebted-
ness from prior years. The written security agreement did not ex-
pressly forbid the debtor to sell his cotton crop, but it did not
expressly authorize sale either. The debtor sold parts of his crop to
several buyers and did not turn any of the proceeds over to the associ-
ation in payment of his secured debts. The production credit associa-
tion brought suit in chancery against the debtor and the cotton
buyers, praying that the latter be required either to turn over to the
association the cotton they had bought or to pay its value to the asso-
ciation. The chancellor held in favor of the buyers on findings that
the plaintiff had for a number of years prior to 1971 followed a prac-
tice of permitting all of its borrowers, including Bowles, to sell or
otherwise dispose of collateral as they saw fit, and that by such con-
duct it had "waived its lien under the financing statement and security
agreement" covering Bowles' 1971 cotton crop.24 The Supreme Court
22. An analogy may be drawn to § 2-202 of the Code, which, though it appears in the
article dealing with sales of goods, is based on reasoning that would be equally applicable to a
written security agreement. The section provides that an integrated agreement "may not be
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but
may be explained or supplemented (a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205)
.... " The comment explains that written agreements "are to be read on the assumption that
the course of prior dealings between the parties and the usages of trade were taken for granted
when the document was phrased. Unless carefully negated they have become an element of
the meaning of the words used." U.C.C. § 2-202 comment 2 (1978).
Subsection (4) of § 1-205 appears to be a rule of construction, rather than an application
of the parol evidence rule, but it is not in conflict with the view expressed in the text. It
provides that express terms of an agreement are to be construed, wherever reasonable, as con-
sistent with applicable course of dealing or usage of trade, but that when such construction is
unreasonable, express terms control over both course of dealing and usage of trade. This sub-
section has been drawn upon in other states to nullify courses of conduct which arguably
established secured parties' consent to debtors' disposition of collateral, when the implied con-
sent contradicted express prohibitions of sale in the security agreements. E.g., Wabasso State
Bank v. Caldwell Packing Co., 308 Minn. 349, 251 N.W.2d 321 (1976); Garden City Prod.
Credit Ass'n v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668, 186 N.W.2d 99 (1971); Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank of
Memphis, 584 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979). But see Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Thomas, 77
N.M. 554, 425 P.2d 726 (1967) (discussed infra note 27).
23. 256 Ark. 1063, 511 S.W.2d 645 (1974).
24. Id. at 1066, 511 S.W.2d at 646-47.
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affirmed the judgment, saying that the question, one of first impres-
sion in Arkansas, was
whether a secured creditor may waive his security interest in col-
lateral in favor of a third party purchaser of the collateral simply
by his course of dealing with the debtor rather than by express or
written waiver under the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted in
this state. We agree with the chancellor that PCA did so ....25
The emphasis in the passage just quoted is on "course of dealing
with the debtor." But, in summing up, the court's opinion calls atten-
tion to the fact that the production credit association "had a policy
among all its member-debtors of permitting them to sell and dispose
of collateral at will and be individually responsible to [plaintiff] in
applying the proceeds of such sales to the loan indebtedness ....
Although the opinion does not expressly rely on "usage of trade" as a
justification for finding the sales to have been authorized, it would
appear that the production credit association's consistent dealings
with all of its member-debtors would fit the definition of "usage of
trade" in section 9-205 of the Code.27
25. Id. at 1067, 511 S.W.2d at 647.
26. Id. at 1073, 511 S.W.2d at 650. The court was apparently also influenced by the fact
that the lender followed a policy of refusing to comply with requests from prospective purchas-
ers of farm products for lists of its member-debtors. As to why a secured lender might legiti-
mately refuse such a request, see Meyer, The 9-307(1) Farm Products Puzzle: Its Parts and Its
Future, 60 N.D.L. REv. 401, 428 (1984).
27. See supra note 20. Two additional features of the Bowles opinion call for comment:
(1) In finding that the secured party lost its security interest by reason of ARK. STAT. ANN. §
85-9-306(2) (current version at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-306(2) (1987)) (a security interest con-
tinues in collateral despite its disposition by the debtor "unless his action was authorized by
the secured party in the security agreement or otherwise") the court observed: "Of course,
such action was not authorized except by implication in the security agreement in the case at
bar so the question boils down to whether it was authorized under the 'or otherwise' phrase."
256 Ark. at 1071, 511 S.W.2d at 649. It is submitted that under the Code provisions discussed
above, see supra text accompanying notes 18-22, the authorization can quite legitimately be
found "in the security agreement." Indeed, the court seems to concede that there was an
implied authorization in the security agreement. Its apparent assumption that the phrase "in
the security agreement" in § 85-9-306(2) refers to an express authorization in that agreement is
not consistent with the Code's definition of "agreement" in § 85-1-201(3), quoted in the text
above at note 18. (That wording has not changed since the original enactment in Arkansas of
the U.C.C.) But see Nickles, Rethinking Some U C. C. Article 9 Problems-Subrogation; Equi-
table Liens; Actual Knowledge; Waiver of Security Interests; Secured Party Liable for Con ver-
sion Under Part 5, 34 ARK. L. REV. 1, 133-36 (1980) [hereinafter Nickles, Rethinking Some
U CC Article 9 Problems].
(2) In reaching its conclusion that authorization for sale of the collateral could be found
in the "course of dealing" of the parties, the Arkansas court relied, in part, on a New Mexico
decision, Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Thomas, 77 N.M. 554, 425 P.2d 726 (1967). That case did find
such an implied authorization for sale of the collateral by the debtor, but it did so in the face of
an express provision in the security agreement which forbade sale without the secured party's
626
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The Bowles decision produced a prompt legislative reaction. By
Act 215 of 1975 the Arkansas General Assembly amended U.C.C.
section 9-306(2) by adding a sentence: "A security interest in farm
products shall not be considered waived nor shall authority to sell,
exchange or otherwise dispose of farm products be implied or other-
wise result from any course of dealing between the parties or by any
trade usage."28 The emergency clause of the amending act stated that
it was prompted by the Bowles decision.2 9 This amendment, of
course, restricts the use of trade usage and course of dealing as bases
for finding "authorization" to sell collateral in the form of "farm
products," but it does not necessarily render evidence of such facts
entirely irrelevant for purposes of interpreting security agreements,30
and it does not apply at all to security agreements covering collateral
other than farm products.
Even if the security agreement contains no authorization for sale
of the collateral by the debtor, section 9-306(2) of the U.C.C. indi-
cates that such an authorization may be found in words or conduct of
the secured party which are not part of the security agreement; au-
thority to dispose of the collateral may be found "in the security
agreement or otherwise." The principal application of the "or other-
wise" phrase would logically be to conduct of the secured party after
the security agreement has been made.3' The parol evidence rule
would present no problem there, 32 and the question would simply be
whether an expressed or implied authorization could be found.33
written consent. The New Mexico decision is inconsistent with the rule of U.C.C. § 1-205(4),
that in case of conflict between an express term and a course of dealing, the express term
controls, see supra note 22, and the decision has been criticized on that ground. E.g., Dolan,
supra note 14, at 727-28. However, the Arkansas decision is not vulnerable for that reason.
See Nickles, A Localized Treatise on Secured Transactions-Part II." Creating Security Inter-
ests, 34 ARK. L. REV. 559, 661 (1981) [hereinafter Nickles, A Localized Treatise on Secured
Transactions].
28. Act of Feb. 18, 1975, No. 215, 1975 Ark. Acts 311 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-
9-306(2) (1987)). In New Mexico the Clovis decision, 77 N.M. 554, 425 P.2d 726, was repudi-
ated by a similar statute. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-306(2) (1978). (That statute was cited in
the Bowles case, but the court's response was that Arkansas had no similar statute. Bowles,
256 Ark. at 1071-72, 511 S.w.2d at 649-50.)
29. Act of Feb. 18, 1975, No. 215, § 3, 1975 Ark. Acts 311, 312 (emergency clause).
30. The language of the amendment might allow use of course of dealing or trade usage as
aids to fixing the meaning of express terms of the security agreement which arguably relate to
authorization for disposition of the collateral by the debtor.
31. But see supra note 27 (discussion of the Bowles decision).
32. It is well established that the parol evidence rule bars only evidence of prior and
contemporaneous agreements which are inconsistent with an integration. See City Nat'l Bank
of Fort Smith v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Rogers, 22 Ark. App. 5, 732 S.W.2d 489
(1987). See also U.C.C. § 2-202 (1978) (quoted in part supra note 22).
33. Perhaps the statement in the text would be more accurate if stated as: "the question
1987-88]
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Just what section 9-306(2) means by "unless the disposition was
authorized by the secured party" has provoked difference of opinion.
This wording could mean that if the secured party has authorized the
debtor to dispose of the collateral at all, then any disposition is one
free of the security interest. Another possible reading is that if the
secured party has authorized disposition conditionally (as, for exam-
should simply be whether an expressed or implied authorization can be found to have been
expressed or implied." Some of the cases that have found U.C.C. § 1-205(4) operative to nul-
lify evidence of implied authorizations for sale of collateral, on the ground that express terms
of the security agreement control over course of dealing and trade usage, have involved con-
duct of the secured party occurring after the security agreement was made. An example is
North Central Kansas Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Washington Sales Co., 223 Kan. 689, 577 P.2d 35
(1978), where it was argued that the secured party had authorized further sales of collateral in
a manner inconsistent with the express terms of the security agreement by acquiescing in the
debtor's disposition of some of the collateral in violation of the security agreement. It appears
that all of these instances of acquiescence occurred after the security agreement was executed.
The court quoted U.C.C. §§ 1-205(4), 9-306(2) and 9-307(1), 223 Kan. at 692-93, 577 P.2d at
38, and concluded that the rationale of the New Mexican Clovis decision, 77 N.M. 554, 425
P.2d 726, was inconsistent with the intent of the framers of the Code, "particularly as ex-
pressed in the sections of the Code set forth above." 223 Kan. at 696, 557 P.2d at 41. Section
1-205(4) is logically irrelevant to conduct following the execution of a security agreement for
"course of conduct" is defined as "a sequence of previous conduct ...which is fairly to be
regarded as establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting [the parties'] expres-
sions and other conduct." (Emphasis added.) See Dugan, Buyer-Secured Party Conflicts
Under Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, 46 U. COLO. L. REV. 333, 340
(1975).
Article 2 of the U.C.C. provides that post-agreement conduct of the parties may be re-
sorted to in some circumstances as an aid to interpretation of a contract for the sale of goods,
as a "course of performance," U.C.C. § 2-208(1) (1978), though not when it contradicts an
express term of the agreement, id. § 2-208(2). But even if in conflict with express terms it may
be effective as establishing a modification of the contract or as a waiver. Id. §§ 2-208(3), 2-209.
If these provisions are applicable to Article 9 security agreements as well, they broadly author-
ize modification and waiver of contract terms after the parties reach an express agreement. It
can be argued that these Article 2 provisions are applicable, since § 9-105(4) has the effect of
adopting the definition of "agreement" in § 1-201(3), which incorporates by reference the
"course of performance" rules of § 2-208. See National Livestock Credit Corp. v. Schultz, 653
P.2d 1243 (Okla. Ct. App. 1982); Dugan, supra, at 340-41. (This reasoning has been ques-
tioned (see Dolan, supra note 14, at 728), but even if the "course of performance" rules of
Article 2 are not directly applicable to security agreements, they can legitimately be drawn
upon by analogy, as expressive of sound contract law.) See Nickles, A Localized Treatise on
Secured Transactions, supra note 27, at 662; Richards, supra note 17, at 389-91.
Some of the cases refusing to recognize post-security-agreement conduct of the secured
party as impliedly authorizing future sales by the debtor are influenced by the fact that the
security agreements in question expressly required written authorizations for disposition of
collateral. While these cases have not usually gone to the extreme of holding that nothing but
written authorization would do, they have insisted on clear oral or implied authorizations to
overcome the contracts' express limitations. See, e.g., Central California Equipment Co. v.
Dolk Tractor Co., 78 Cal. App. 3d 855, 144 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1978); Garden City Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668, 186 N.W.2d 99 (1971). But see Oxford Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Dye, 368 So. 2d 241 (Miss. 1979), which can be read as refusing to recognize any authorization
of sale except by a writing, when the security agreement requires it in express terms.
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pie, by authorizing sale on condition that the price be paid by check
payable jointly to the debtor and the secured party), the security inter-
est is divested only if the conditions of the authorization are complied
with. A third possible reading is that a security interest continues in
collateral despite the debtor's disposition of it unless the secured party
has not only authorized that disposition but also consented to give up
his security interest upon its occurrence. While there is substantial
support for the third reading,34 it adds more to the natural meaning of
the statutory language than seems justified.3" The first reading has
been defended as well,36 but it is also objectionable as reading too
34. See, e.g., North Central Kansas Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Washington Sales Co., 223 Kan.
689, 577 P.2d 35 (1978); Farmers State Bank v. Edison Non-Stock Coop. Ass'n, 190 Neb. 789,
212 N.W.2d 625 (1973); Garden City Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Lannan, 186 Neb. 668, 186
N.W.2d 99 (1971); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW UNDER THE UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 25-12, at 1066 (2d ed. 1980). The cases rely heavily on "waiver"
reasoning and find no waiver of the security interest to result from the secured party's implied
consent to the debtor's disposition of the collateral because it cannot be inferred (on the facts
of the case) that the secured party knowingly surrendered his security interest. See Dolan,
supra note 14, at 729-30; Nickles, Rethinking Some UC. C. Article 9 Problems, supra note 33,
at 108-9. See also Fisher v. First Nat'l Bank, 584 S.W.2d 515, 27 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 284 (Tex. Ct. App. 1979) (also relying on the "waiver" rationale but emphasizing a need
for the party claiming waiver to show that he has been misled); but cf Farmers State Bank v.
Farmland Foods, 225 Neb. 1, 402 N.W.2d 277 (1987). (Brown v. Arkoma Coal Corp., 276
Ark. 322, 634 S.W.2d 390 (1982) may reflect an assumption that consent to surrender the
security interest must be found, but the opinion is not clear on this point.)
U.C.C. § 9-402(7) (1978) may also be considered to support this reading of § 9-306(2). It
provides, in part, that, "[a] filed financing statement remains effective with respect to collateral
transferred by the debtor even though the secured party knows of or consents to the transfer"
and seems to imply that a security interest can continue in collateral notwithstanding a disposi-
tion by the debtor which has been authorized by the secured party. Some courts have sought
to reconcile the two subsections by reading § 9-306(2) as operating to divest a security interest
only when the secured party's consent to the disposition is clearly an authorization to dispose
of the collateral free and clear of the security interest. E.g., In re Matto's, Inc., 8 Bankr. 485
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981). And see In re Franchise Systems, Inc., 46 Bankr. 158 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1985) (purporting to follow In re Matto's, Inc., 8 Bankr. 485, but stating its holding in
narrower terms).
35. See In re Hodge Forest Industries, 59 Bankr. 801 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1986) (reasoning
that continuance of a security interest after an authorized disposition of the collateral without
refiling in the name of the transferee as debtor permits the existence of "secret liens", contrary
to the underlying policy of Article 9). Cases cited supra note 34 as relying on "waiver" reason-
ing are not supported by the statutory language, which speaks of "authorized" "disposition" of
the collateral, not "waiver" of the security interest. See Dolan, supra note 14, at 730. The
apparent conflict with § 9-402(7) (see supra note 34) can be reconciled by reading that subsec-
tion as referring to a case where the secured party's authorization of the sale of the collateral is
expressly conditioned on the transferee's taking the goods subject to the security interest. As is
argued in the text infra, at notes 38-39, expressly imposed conditions of sale ought to be effec-
tive. That appears to be the actual holding of In re Franchise Systems, Inc., 46 Bankr. 158,
with the added limitation that the effectiveness of the condition is dependent on the trans-
feree's awareness of the condition at the time of the transfer.
36. See Dolan, supra note 14, at 730 (arguing that the "unless" clause of § 9-306(2) is an
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much into the statutory text; there is little reason to believe that sec-
tion 9-306(2) was intended by the legislature to impose so stark a
choice on secured parties.37 The second reading enjoys considerable
case support 38 and seems the soundest reading of the Act.
39
"open market rule... designed to protect purchasers," and that "[p]ermitting the lender and
seller to modify it by a condition is as unjustified as permitting an entruster and bailee to
modify the rule of Section 2-403(2) by private agreement.").
37. Professor Dolan's inference that § 9-306(2) embodies an "open market rule" compara-
ble to that of § 2-403(2), see supra note 36, is not persuasive, because the rule of § 2-403(2)
appears to be an application of the estoppel principle. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying
text for a discussion of this rule. An authorization by the secured party for the debtor's dispo-
sition of the collateral gives the debtor the power to transfer the goods free of the security
interest under § 9-306(2) even though the purchaser of the collateral is unaware of the authori-
zation, as Professor Dolan recognizes in another connection. Dolan, supra note 14, at 729.
The rationale of § 9-306(2) is not that the secured party loses his security interest because he
has led the purchaser to believe that he is willing to do so; it appears to be based simply on the
fact that he has authorized the disposition.
38. In re Sunriver Farms, Inc., 27 Bankr. 655, 36 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 416
(Bankr. D. Ore. 1982); North Central Kansas Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Washington Sales Co., 223
Kan. 689, 577 P.2d 35 (1978); Farmers State Bank v. Edison Non-Stock Coop. Ass'n, 190
Neb. 789, 212 N.W.2d 625 (1973); Baker Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Long Creek Meat Co., 266 Ore.
643, 513 P.2d 1129 (1973); Southwest Washington Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Seattle-First Nat'l
Bank, 92 Wash. 2d 30, 593 P.2d 167 (1979). Some courts distinguish between an authorization
for sale by the debtor on condition that he remit the proceeds of the sale to the secured party,
and an authorization subject to such other condition as that payment for the collateral be
made by check payable jointly to the debtor and the secured party, that the buyer's draft be
honored, or that the debtor not have committed a prior default. These courts hold that non-
compliance with a condition of the first type does not prevent the buyer from taking the collat-
eral free of the security interest under § 9-306(2). Eg., North Central Kansas Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Washington Sales Co., 223 Kan. 689, 577 P.2d 35 (1978); Anon, Inc. v. Farmers
Prod. Credit Ass'n, 446 N.E.2d 656, 37 A.L.R. 4th 776 (Ind. App. 1983). Contra Southeast
Washington Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 92 Wash. 2d 30, 593 P.2d 167
(1979). See Richards, supra note 17, at 382-84.
39. If the secured party is to lose his security interest on the ground that he has consented
to the debtor's disposition of the collateral, it is logical to treat it as lost only if the disposition
is the one authorized, not merely as to the type of disposition (e.g., sale rather than gift) but
also as to compliance with conditions imposed by the secured party regarding the manner in
which the disposition is to be made. That also seems to accord with the natural reading of the
statutory language: "unless the disposition was authorized." U.C.C. § 9-306(2) (1978) (em-
phasis added). The distinction between types of conditions drawn in some cases, see supra note
38, is not inconsistent with this reading of the Code, since a condition that the debtor remit the
proceeds of the sale to the secured party is not a condition of the disposition of the collateral at
all. Argument for a broader reading of the "unless" clause of § 9-306(2) as an "open-market"
rule, see supra note 36, loses force in the light of other Code rules which protect purchasers of
collateral in many instances even though the debtors' dispositions of the collateral were not
authorized. Rules of this sort which protect buyers of encumbered goods are discussed in
detail in the following text.
Most of the cases involving controversy over the application of the "unless" clause of
U.C.C. § 9-306(2) have involved farm products collateral. Strains have developed in that con-
text because of two phenomena. First, agricultural financiers have commonly declined to au-
thorize the farmer-debtors to sell the collateral by the express terms of their security
agreements (very frequently expressly forbidding sale of the collateral without the secured
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At any rate, it is clear that if the secured party has not "author-
ized" the debtor to dispose of the collateral "in the security agreement
or otherwise," the thrust of section 9-306(2) is to enable the secured
party to pursue the collateral into the hands of purchasers and take it
in foreclosure of his security interest. 40 For purposes of further analy-
sis, let us assume that the sales by Holmes and Farrow to Cooper and
Smith were not "authorized" by Bullion Bank. Does the bank win?
Perhaps not. Despite the sweeping language of protection for the se-
cured party that appears in sections 9-201 and 9-306(2), other Code
rules command consideration. The rule of section 9-201 applies
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this Act," and that of section 9-
306(2) applies "[e]xcept where this Article otherwise provides." And
much of the rest of Article 9 consists of rules punching holes in the
impressive armor with which these basic rules appear to clothe the
secured party.4'
party's written authorization), or they have authorized sales only under specific conditions, yet
the lenders in practice have allowed the debtors to dispose of the collateral as they saw fit, until
trouble developed from particular sales; then they have insisted that the terms of the security
agreements prevented application of the "unless" clause of § 9-306(2). Second, the exemption
of farm products from the open-market rule of § 9-307(1) has forced buyers of such products
to seek protection by way of § 9-306(2)'s "unless" clause more innovatively than buyers of
other types of encumbered inventory have found necessary. See discussion in Moffatt County
State Bank v. Producers Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 598 F. Supp. 1562 (D. Colo. 1984).
40. See U.C.C. § 9-306 comment 3 (1978). Repossession of the collateral is not the only
possible remedy open to the secured party. An alternative remedy often available against the
purchaser into whose hands the collateral can be traced is an action for conversion. E.g.,
United States v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Baker Prod. Credit
Ass'n v. Long Creek Meat Co., 266 Ore. 643, 513 P.2d 1129 (1973). A conversion action will
sometimes lie as well against an auctioneer or other selling agent who participates in the
debtor's unauthorized sale of the collateral. E.g., North Central Kansas Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Washington Sales Co., 223 Kan. 689, 577 P.2d 35 (1978); First National Bank & Trust Co. v.
Atchinson County Auction Co., 10 Kan. App. 2d 382, 699 P.2d 1032 (1985). See B. CLARK,
supra note 15, § 8.4[3][c] at 8-28; Nickles, A Localized Treatise on Secured Transactions, supra
note 27, at 654-56; Van Hooser, Farm Products: Recent Legislative Changes to Section 9-307,
29 S.D.L. REV. 346, 348-49 (1984).
41. No attempt is made in this article to canvass all of the rules of Article 9 which operate
to create exceptions to the general rules protecting secured parties in U.C.C. §§ 9-201 and 9-
306(2) (1978), as many are irrelevant or only remotely related to the type of fact situation with
which this article is concerned. Article 9 includes, for example, elaborate rules for determining
priority between conflicting security interests in the same collateral, but these rules are not
pertinent to contests between secured parties and buyers of collateral. E.g., U.C.C. § 9-312
(1978). Discussion of Article 9 rules governing contests between buyers of collateral other
than goods and secured parties, see, e.g., id. §§ 9-308, 9-309, is omitted as too remotely con-
nected with the type of problem dealt with here, as is discussion of rules relating to security
interests in fixtures, id. § 9-313, accessions, id. § 9-314, and commingled and processed goods,
id. § 9-315, and special rules governing priorities where proceeds of collateral are involved,
e.g., id. § 9-306(5).
Occasionally, rules appearing in other articles of the U.C.C. can be invoked by a buyer of
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One such rule is found in section 9-301(1)(c):
Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an unperfected se-
curity interest is subordinate to the rights of...
(c) in the case of goods .... a person who is not a secured
party and who is a transferee in bulk or other buyer not in the
ordinary course of business or is a buyer of farm products in ordi-
nary course of business, to the extent that he gives value and re-
ceives delivery of the collateral without knowledge of the security
interest and before it is perfected; .... 42
The impact of this rule is difficult to grasp at first reading be-
cause, although it clearly protects some buyers of goods from some
security interests in the goods, it appears to offer such protection only
to an oddly assorted group of buyers: (1) those who are not "buyers
in ordinary course of business" and (2) those who are "buyers in ordi-
nary course of business" but only if they are buyers of "farm prod-
ucts." This selection makes more sense when the quoted passage is
read together with the rule of section 9-307(1), for the latter section
(which will be discussed at length below) grants a broader protection
to the types of buyers of goods who are left out of the coverage of
section 9-301(l)(c). Thus, the buyers not protected by the earlier sec-
tion are those who do not need its protection.43
encumbered collateral as protection against the claim of a secured party. It should be noted
that the broad rule of § 9-201 applies "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by this Act," not "this
Article." For example, § 2-403(2) has at times been useful to buyers who could not find their
protection in Article 9. E.g., Executive Financial Services v. Pagel, 238 Kan. 809, 715 P.2d
381 (1986). See Dugan, supra note 33, at 333. Such possibilities are not comprehensively
explored in this article.
42. U.C.C. § 9-301(l)(c) (1978). The words "or a buyer of farm products in ordinary
course of business" were added to Arkansas' § 9-301(l)(c) in 1973. Act of Feb. 13, 1973, No.
116, 1973 Ark. Acts 345 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-30 1(1)(c) (1987)). See supra note
13. The new language appears to have been inserted to remedy an oversight in the drafting of
the prior version of this subsection.
43. There is one apparent exception to the statement in the text. A buyer who qualifies
for the protection of § 9-301(l)(c) is protected against an unperfected security interest, without
regard to whether the security interest was created by the immediate seller of the goods or by
some prior owner. Under § 9-307(1) a buyer in ordinary course of business (other than a
buyer of farm products from a farmer) takes free of a security interest whether it is perfected or
not, whether the buyer is aware of the security interest or not, and whether he takes possession
of the collateral or not, but only if the security interest was "created by his seller." See infra
notes 55-56 and accompanying text. That leaves open the relation between a buyer in ordinary
course of business of inventory other than farm products and the holder of an unperfected
security interest which was created by a predecessor of the immediate seller and which was
enforceable against the seller. Such a buyer may be protected by the rule of § 2-403(2). See
infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text. But that rule would not necessarily apply, and if
not, the general rule of § 9-201 would probably make the security interest enforceable against
the buyer. But see Dugan, supra note 33, at 351-54 (arguing that the "created by his seller"
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The substance of section 9-301(1)(c) is that if a buyer buys goods
subject to an "unperfected" security interest and he both gives value
for them and takes possession of them without knowing of the secur-
ity interest and before it is perfected, he takes the goods free of the
security interest," and that is true even if the secured party has not
"authorized" the sale "in the security agreement or otherwise." If
Bullion Bank's security interests were "unperfected" when Holmes
and Farrow made their unauthorized sales to Cooper and Smith, since
we are assuming that both buyers gave value and received possession
of the goods purchased without knowledge of the bank's security in-
terests, they would be immune to the bank's claims to the goods.
"Perfection" is a technical term of some complexity, but on the
facts of the problem posed, it would probably45 require that Bullion
Bank have filed notices of its security interest in public offices.4 6 The
notices that are required to be filed are termed "financing statements"
in Article 9. Although the Code imposes formal requirements for
limitation in § 9-307(1) should be construed as applicable only if the security interest involved
is a perfected one; by this reading § 9-307(1) would protect the buyer).
It should be noted also that subsection (2) of § 9-301 creates a very limited exception to
the rule of § 9-301(1)(c): when a secured party who has a "purchase money security interest",
see U.C.C. § 9-107, perfects his interest by filing within 10 days after the debtor receives pos-
session of the collateral, he takes priority over a "transferee in bulk" who would otherwise be
entitled to priority under subsection (l)(c). U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1978). In Arkansas, subsection
(2) was amended in 1983 to change the time limit for filing from 10 days to 21 days. See Act of
Mar. 21, 1983, No. 561, § 2, 1983 Ark. Acts 1190 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-301(2)
(1987)).
44. Though § 9-301(1) says that the security interest is "subordinate to the rights of" the
buyer, rather than that the buyer takes the goods "free of" the security interest, the practical
effect is the same. The security interest is not enforceable against the buyer, and the buyer can
pass on his immunity to a purchaser from him, under § 2-403(1).
45. U.C.C. § 9-302(1): "A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security inter-
ests except the following: .... ." The principal alternative method of perfection is for the
secured party to take possession of the collateral, and perfection by that method normally
continues only as long as possession is retained. Id. §§ 9-302(l)(a), 9-305. In some instances,
none of much significance in the context of the cases discussed in this article, a security interest
can be perfected without either filing or possession, sometimes permanently (in the case of a
purchase money security interest in consumer goods, id. § 9-302(1)(d)), sometimes temporarily
(as in the case of certain proceeds, id. §§ 9-302(1)(b), 9-306(3)). Statutes other than the Code
may control perfection of security interests in some types of collateral. See, e.g., id. § 9-302(3)
(motor vehicles subject to certificate of title laws).
46. The security interest must also have "attached" to the collateral. Id. § 9-301(1). A
security interest attaches when
(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to agreement, or
the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description of the collat-
eral and in addition, when the security interest covers crops growing or to be grown
or timber to be cut, a description of the land concerned; (b) value has been given;
and (c) the debtor has rights in the collateral.
Id. § 9-203(1). See also id. § 9-203(2).
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such statements,47 they are not onerous. Basically, a financing state-
ment must identify the parties to the security agreement, provide ad-
dresses for both, describe the collateral by item or type, in the case of
growing crops as collateral describe the real estate where the crops are
growing or to be grown, and be signed by the debtor.48 The terms of
the security agreement need not otherwise be shown, as the purpose of
the financing statement is merely to give notice of any potential out-
standing security interest in the described collateral and give the
searcher of the record leads to sources of further information.49
As to where the filing must be made, the Official Text of the
Uniform Commercial Code offers enacting legislatures a choice of
rules;5  the Arkansas legislature has chosen the "Third Alterna-
tive."'" Under this version of section 9-401(1) the bank would have to
47. Id. § 9-402.
48. Id. § 9-402(1). Additional requirements apply to financing statements covering tim-
ber to be cut, minerals and accounts arising from their sale, and fixtures. Id. § 9-402(1), (5). In
some instances, the signature of the secured party may be substituted for that of the debtor.
Id. § 9-402(2). "A financing statement substantially complying with the requirements of this
section is effective even though it contains minor errors which are not seriously misleading."
Id. § 9-402(8). Furthermore, "any description of personal property or real estate is sufficient
whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is described." Id. § 9-110. See
United States v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 1258 (E.D. Ark. 1981).
The Arkansas U.C.C., as originally enacted, conformed to the then-current Official Text
by requiring the signatures of both the debtor and the secured party on a financing statement.
Act of Mar. 7, 1961, No. 185, 1961 Ark. Acts 421, 686 (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-
402(1) (1961) amended 1973, current version at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-402(1) (1987)). The
requirement that the secured party sign the statement was deleted by a 1973 amendment to
conform to a change in the Official Text. Act of Feb. 13, 1973, No. 116, § 1, 1973 Ark. Acts
345, 391 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-402(1) (1987)). See supra note 13.
49. U.C.C. § 9-402 comment 2 (1978).
50. Id. § 9-401(1). This subsection of the Official Text is offered to enacting legislatures in
three forms. Under all three versions filing as to collateral in the form of timber to be cut,
minerals or the like or accounts arising from their sale, or fixtures as to which fixture filing is
planned must be made in the office where a mortgage on the real estate involved would be filed
or recorded. Filing as to all other forms of collateral is required in a state central filing office
(such as the office of the state Secretary of State) under the First Alternative. Under the
Second and Third Alternative, local (county) filings are prescribed for farm equipment collat-
eral, farm products, accounts or general intangibles arising from farmers' sales of farm prod-
ucts, and consumer goods. As to all other forms of collateral, the Second Alternative calls
simply for filing in a central state office, while the Third Alternative calls for central filing plus,
in some cases, local filing. Id.
51. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-401(1) (1987):
The proper place to file in order to perfect a security interest is as follows:
(a) When the collateral is equipment used in farming operations, or farm prod-
ucts, or accounts or general intangibles arising from or relating to the sale of farm
products by a farmer, or consumer goods, then in the office of the clerk of the circuit
court and ex officio recorder in the county of the debtor's residence or if the debtor is
not a resident of this state then in the office of the clerk of the circuit court and ex
officio recorder in the county where the goods are kept, and in addition when the
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file, as to Farrow's soybean crop, in the office of the Circuit Court
Clerk of the county in which Farrow resided, and if the crop was
being grown on land in another county, then in the office of the Clerk
of the Circuit Court of that county as well.52 In the case of Holmes'
refrigerators, the bank would have to file in the office of the Arkansas
Secretary of State and, if Holmes had a place of business in only one
county of the state, then also in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit
Court of the county in which his business was located."
But let us assume that Bullion Bank had perfected its security
interests in Farrow's crop and Holmes' refrigerators by proper filings
before Cooper and Smith made their purchases. Now, is the bank on
solid ground in asserting rights to the goods which Cooper and Smith
purchased? Section 9-307(1) still has to be considered. It provides:
A buyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Sec-
tion 1-201) other than a person buying farm products from a per-
son engaged in farming operations takes free of a security interest
created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected
and even though the buyer knows of its existence.54
The term "buyer in ordinary course of business" is elaborately
defined by the Code.5 5 Its main features are as follows:
"Buyer in ordinary course of business" means a person who in
good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him is in viola-
tion of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in
the goods buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of
selling goods of that kind . . . . "Buying" may be for cash or by
exchange of other property or on secured or unsecured credit and
collateral is crops growing or to be grown, in the office of the clerk of the circuit
court and ex officio recorder in the county where the land is located;
(b) When the collateral is timber to be cut or is minerals or the like (including
oil and gas) or accounts subject to § 4-9-103(5), or when the financing statement is
filed as a fixture filing § 4-9-313 and the collateral is goods which are or are to be-
come fixtures, then in the office where a mortgage on the real estate would be filed or
recorded;
(c) In all other cases, in the office of the Secretary of State and in addition, if
the debtor has a place of business in only one county of this state, also in the office of
the clerk of the circuit court and ex officio recorder of such county, or, if the debtor
has no place of business in this state, but resides in the state, also in the office of the
clerk of the circuit court and ex officio recorder of the county in which he resides.
The Arkansas Code version of this subsection contains minor differences in style from the
previous version in the Arkansas Statutes Annotated.
52. Id. § 4 -9-401(l)(a).
53. Id. § 4 -9- 4 01(1)(c).
54. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1978).
55. Id. § 1-201(9).
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includes receiving goods or documents to title under a pre-existing
contract for sale but does not include a transfer in bulk or as secur-
ity for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt.5 6
Cooper and Smith may well qualify as "buyers in ordinary
course of business." Both paid cash. Both were unaware of Bullion
Bank's security interests and a fortiori "without knowledge that the
sale [was] in violation of the.. . security interest[s]." Both were prob-
ably acting in "good faith."" Both were buying from persons who
were "in the business of selling goods of [the] kind." And both may
have bought "in ordinary course."58 If so, are they protected from
the bank's claim by section 9-307(1)? Cooper is; Smith is not. Cooper
56. Id. The definition does not say that the buyer must have taken possession of the goods
to qualify as a "buyer in ordinary course of business," and the omission appears to have been
deliberate. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 17, § 26.6, at 693-97. However, failure of the buyer
to take possession may affect the decision whether he has bought "in good faith." See Sher-
rock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 277 A.2d 708, 9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 294 (Del.
Super. 1971), rev'd 290 A.2d 648, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 523 (Del. 1972).
57. "Good faith" is defined, in the "General Provisions" article of the U.C.C. (Article 1)
as meaning "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19)
(1978). In the "Sales" article (Article 2) there is a special definition of "good faith": "In this
Article unless the context otherwise requires. . . 'Good Faith' in the case of a merchant means
honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade." Id. § 2-103(l)(b). The applicability of this special definition to a buyer who is a
"merchant" and claims to be a "buyer in ordinary course of business" is questionable, since the
definition of "good faith" in § 2-103(l)(b) applies "[iun this Article," i.e., in Article 2, and the
definition of "buyer in ordinary course of business" appears in Article 1. Id. § 1-201(9). See
Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648, 10 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 523
(Del. 1972). However, it is tempting to read the definition of "merchant's good faith" in § 2-
103(2) into the definition of "buyer in ordinary course of business" because it is hard to see any
justification for holding merchant buyers to a stricter standard of conduct in some sales con-
texts than in others. Some courts have adopted this reading. See, e.g., Swift v. J. I. Case Co.,
266 So. 2d 379, 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972). See also B.
CLARK, supra note 15, § 3.4[1], at 3-20.
Both Cooper and Smith, in the hypothetical case discussed in the text of this article,
would be "merchants," as defined in § 2-104(1). The term includes "a person who deals in
goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction." If the Article 2 "good
faith" definition applies under § 1-201(9), they could not qualify as "buyers in ordinary course
of business" unless they observed the "reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in
[their trades]" in making their purchases. To avoid extended discussion of a topic peripheral
to the main concern of this article, such compliance is assumed.
58. Buying "in ordinary course" is not defined in the Code or its comments. It has been
suggested that the concept is similar to "ordinary course of trade," as used in the Uniform
Trust Receipts Act (one of the Uniform Acts which the U.C.C. replaced). 2 G. GILMORE,
supra note 17, § 26.6, at 695. The idea is that the sale is of a sort that the seller normally
makes in the course of his business, or which is normal for a person in his line of business to
make. See Merchants & Planters Bank & Trust Co. of Arkansas v. Phoenix Housing Systems,
21 Ark. App. 153, 729 S.W.2d 433 (1987); cf J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 34, § 25-
13, at 1069.
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is protected because he qualifies for protection under the general rule
stated in 9-307(1). Smith is not because he falls within the exception
to that rule; he bought "farm products59 from a person engaged in
farming operations."
Would Smith be protected by any other rule of Article 9? Not on
the facts we've got. As the Arkansas Code stood prior to the recent
legislation, Bullion Bank could take the soybeans from Smith and sell
them to obtain funds to apply to Farrow's loan, but the bank would
have no valid claim to the refrigerators which Cooper bought from
Holmes if Cooper qualified as a "buyer in ordinary course of
business."
Why does section 9-307(1) protect most buyers in ordinary
course from security interests created by their sellers, even if the buy-
59. The term "farm products" is defined, in the 1978 Official Text of the Code, as follows:
Goods are... "farm products" if they are crops or livestock or supplies used or
produced in farming operations or if they are products of crops or livestock in their
unmanufactured states (such as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup, milk and
eggs), and if they are in the possession of a debtor engaged in raising, fattening,
grazing or other farming operations. If goods are farm products they are neither
equipment nor inventory.
U.C.C. § 9-109(3) (1978). (In Arkansas the definition is the same, except that a sentence has
been inserted after "farming operations" by an amendment of 1971 providing that: " 'Farm
products' shall also include fish grown for sale on any fish farm." Act of Mar. 23, 1971, No.
363, 1971 Ark. Acts 881 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-109(3) (1987)). Note that, to
qualify as "farm products," goods must not only be crops, livestock or supplies "used or pro-
duced in farming operations" but also must be "in the possession of a debtor engaged in...
farming operations." See Meyer, The 9-307(1) Farm Products Puzzle: Its Parts and Its Future,
60 N.D.L. REV. 401, 405-15 (1984).
"Farm products" is one of four mutually exclusive classifications of goods collateral in
Article 9, the others being "consumer goods," U.C.C. § 9-109(1) (1978); "equipment," id. § 9-
109(2); and "inventory," id. § 9-109(4). The classification into which collateral in the form of
goods falls is significant because a number of the rules governing perfection of security inter-
ests, e.g., id. § 9-401(1) (Second and Third Alternatives); priorities, e.g., id. §§ 9-301(l)(c), 9-
307(l); and rights and remedies upon default, e.g., id. § 9-505, vary in their operation depend-
ing upon the classification of the collateral.
The critical time for classifying the collateral, with respect to any particular security inter-
est, is the time the interest "attaches" to the goods. See R. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 5-2, at 119 (2d ed. 1979); J.
WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 34, § 23-7 at 925. Unfortunately, the U.C.C. does not
clearly so provide, and even the comments can be read as indicating otherwise. See, e.g.,
United States v. Progressive Farmers Mktg. Agency, 788 F.2d 1327 (8th Cir. 1986) (relying
on comment 4 to § 9109 of the Official Text to conclude that under the Iowa U.C.C. goods are
to be classified as "farm products" or "inventory," for purposes of § 9-307(1), as of the time
they are sold, so that a sale of hogs by a commission merchant to whom they had been deliv-
ered by the farmer-debtor for sale was not a sale of "farm products" and hence not within the
"farm products" exception to § 9-307(l)).
Although in this article farm products are sometimes described as a farmer's "inventory,"
that categorization refers to economic function. For purposes of the rules of Article 9, "farm
products" are to be distinguished from "inventory."
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ers know of the security interests, but except buyers of farm products
who buy from farmers?
The general rule of section 9-307(1) is readily accounted for; it is
consistent with the historical trend of Anglo-American law over the
past century or more, a trend away from the classic doctrine of caveat
emptor, with its emphasis on security of property rights, toward pro-
tection of good faith purchasers in the marketplace. A need to pro-
mote trade has powered the trend. Although the progress of the law
has not been a smooth one, the cumulative effect of the resulting
changes has been to provide greatly increased protection for those
who purchase in good faith, without knowledge that the property
rights of third persons are being infringed. 6'
The Uniform Commercial Code codified much of the law as it
had developed in the pre-Code cases and statutes, and it pushed the
trend along. In section 2-403(2), for example, it laid down a principle
that went beyond prior law6 by providing that, "[a]ny entrusting of
possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind
gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in
ordinary course of business. ' 62 The rationale of the rule apparently is
that persons buying, in normal course of business, goods of a sort
which the seller is in the business of selling are justified in assuming
that the seller has the right to make the sales, and should be protected
in that reasonable assumption since the "entruster" can fairly be held
responsible for creating the misleading impression of the seller's right
60. See Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057
(1954).
61. See 2 S. WILLSTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW
AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES AcT, Ch. 14 (Rev. ed. 1948) (see especially § 314).
62. U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (1978). In Arkansas the corresponding subsection was, and re-
mains, identical to the Official Text, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-2-403(2) (1961) (current version at
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-2-403(2) (1987)), but the scope of this portion of the Arkansas U.C.C.
was reduced by an enactment in 1981, § 2 of which provides that
ownership of grain shall not change by reason of an owner delivering grain to a
public warehouseman. No public grain warehouseman shall sell or encumber any
grain within his possession unless the owner of the grain has by written document
transferred title of the grain to the warehouseman. Notwithstanding any provision of
the Uniform Commercial Code... to the contrary, . . . all sales and encumbrances of
grain by public grain warehousemen are void and convey no title unless such sales
and encumbrances are supported by a written document executed by the owner spe-
cifically conveying title to the grain to the public grain warehouseman.
Act of Mar. 10, 1981, No. 401, § 2, 1981 Ark. Acts 705 (codified at and quoting from ARK.
CODE ANN. § 2-17-303 (1987)). See also Note, Warehousemen-Storers of Grain-Arkansas
Stands Alone in Protecting the Rights of Depositors of Grain in Public Warehouses, 9 UALR
L.J. 699 (1986-87) (further discussion of Act 401).
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to sell.63
The general rule of section 9-307(1) can be thought of as an ap-
plication of this principle, though as a matter of legal history it is
based on precedents that antedate the rule of section 2-403(2). 64
When a secured party leaves possession of goods collateral in the
hands of a debtor who is in the business of selling such goods, buyers
from the debtor are no more likely to suspect that the sales to them
violate rights of a secured party than they are to anticipate violation
of the rights of an owner, and they ought to have the same sort of
protection against the security interest. Furthermore, the secured
party is as much responsible for creating a deceptive appearance of
the debtor's right to sell as is any other "entruster" of goods to a
"merchant who deals in goods of that kind."' 6
The protection of good faith purchasers provided by the Code
has not gone so far as to protect all such purchasers from adverse
property claims. The rule of section 2-403(2) operates only to cut off
the rights of an "entruster" 66 of the goods, and then only in favor of a
rather narrowly defined class of good faith purchasers. Similarly, the
rule of section 9-307(1) protects only a "buyer in ordinary course of
business," and the protection is against only security interests "cre-
ated by his seller." The security of property rights of owners of the
goods is protected under section 2-403(2) if they have not made or
authorized the "entrustment," and section 9-307(1) does not imperil
the security interests of persons whose interests were granted by prior
owners of the goods.
Nevertheless, the general rule of section 9-307(1) is a sweeping
one, applicable to all cases where security interests have been taken in
63. A number of cases treat the rule of § 2-403(2) as based on the principle of estoppel,
although applicable to cases where common law cases had not found estoppels. See, e.g.,
Porter v. Wertz, 68 A.D.2d 141, 416 N.Y.S.2d 254 (N.Y. App. Div., 1st Dep't 1979), aff'd, 53
N.Y.2d 696, 439 N.Y.S.2d 105, 421 N.E.2d 500 (1981) ("statutory estoppel"). Consistently
with that rationale, a lower court held that the rule does not apply unless both the entruster
and the buyer were aware that the seller was in the business of selling goods of the kind being
sold. Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, 54 Misc. 2d 168, 281 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1967).
64. Professor Gilmore considered the antecedents of § 9-307(1) to be pre-Code chattel
mortgage cases, the conditional sales acts, the Uniform Trust Receipts Act, and the various
factor's lien acts. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 17, §§ 26.2-.6.
65. See Merchants & Planters Bank & Trust Co. v. Phoenix Housing Systems, Inc., 21
Ark. App. 153, 729 S.W.2d 433 (quoting Ex parte General Motors Acceptance Corp., 425 So.
2d 464 (Ala. 1983)).
66. "Entrusting" is defined in the U.C.C. as including "any delivery and any acquiescence
in retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed between the parties to the
delivery or acquiescence and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the
possessor's disposition of the goods have been such as to be larcenous under the criminal law."
U.C.C. § 2-403(3) (1978).
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the inventory of businessmen to secure their debts, except where the
debtor is a farmer and the security interest is in his "farm products"
inventory. Why this exception? It appears originally to have been
incorporated into the section to reflect the case law prevailing at the
time the U.C.C. was drafted.67 Professor Grant Gilmore, one of the
principal draftsmen of Article 9,68 has written that pre-Code cases
had quite uniformly been ruling in favor of the holders of crop and
livestock mortgages against good faith buyers from the mortgagors,
when those sales had not been authorized by the mortgagees, "for
reasons ... never precisely articulated, ' 69 and without attempting to
explain why the rule should be different in such cases from that ap-
plied in cases involving sales of inventory by other types of
businessmen.7 °
One justification for the farm-products exception is that it is es-
sential if farmers are to obtain the credit they need to finance their
farming operations, because the major suppliers of such credit insist
on that protection. 71 That insistence, in turn, is attributed partly to
historical patterns of agricultural financing,72 partly to a concept that
farmers are less to be trusted to deal responsibly with their creditors
than other debtors, 73 and partly to the large role played by the federal
government in agricultural financing in the past half-century, a type
of financing characterized by concern for maximum protection of the
federal financing agencies displayed both by the agencies themselves
and by the federal courts.74
67. See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 17, § 26-10, at 707.
68. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 34, § 1, at 4.
69. 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 17, § 26.10, at 707.
70. See id., § 26.10, at 714.
71. See Dolan, supra note 14, at 716; Note, Agricultural Financing Under the UC.C., 12
ARIz. L. REV. 391, 411 (1970). See also Meyer, supra note 26, at 436-37.
72. Dolan, supra note 14, at 712.
73. "Essentially, the exception in 9-307 reflects a philosophy that a farmer who bor-
rows on his inventory cannot be trusted to turn over the proceeds from its sale in the
way a lender has learned to trust other businessmen to do. The buyer of farm prod-
ucts, not the lender, must take the risk that the seller does not live up to his promise.
Professor Peter Coogan, in Coogan & Mays, Crop Financing and Article 9: A Dialogue with
Particular Emphasis on the Problems of Florida Citrus Crop Financing, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV.
13, 19 (1967). See also Hawkland, supra note 13, at 418; Richards, supra note 17, at 375.
74. Dolan, supra note 14, at 720-22; Hawkland, supra note 13, at 420. Supporting argu-
ments have been that most sales of farm products more nearly resemble bulk sales than sales of
inventory; that the typical buyers of farm products are knowledgeable professionals who can
look out for themselves; and that agricultural lenders more commonly rely on the proceeds of
sales of collateral for repayment of their loans than is true of most lenders on the security of
inventory. See Clark, Uniform Commercial Code Survey: Secured Transactions, 42 Bus.
LAW. 1333, 1335 (1987); see also sources cited supra notes 71 and 73. The numerous other
discussions of the reasons for the "farm products" exception to the general rule of § 9-307(1)
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That the exception has its inconvenient side for farmers, and ag-
ricultural lenders as well, seems fairly obvious, however. The effect of
the exception is to place a risk on buyers of farm products with which
ordinary course buyers of the inventory of other businessmen need
not concern themselves. It is thus likely to make potential buyers of
farm products wary of entering into such transactions; if they do, the
prices they are willing to pay are likely to be lower than they would be
if the general rule of section 9-307(1) applied, since the buyers must
either bear the expense of investigating the farmers' titles to the goods
they offer for sale or must pay for a title of unknown quality. Fur-
thermore, these limitations on the marketability of farm products do
not stop with the first sale; resale buyers or farm products are also
subject to the claims of the agricultural lenders. 75 The net effect is not
only to hamper the farmers' ability to sell their products at favorable
prices but also to hamper their ability to repay those who financed
their operations. 6
It is also unfair to buyers in ordinary course of farm products to
compel them, in effect, to pay twice for the goods they buy. Not only
are they more vulnerable than other ordinary course buyers of inven-
tory, but they are often less capable of protecting themselves by dis-
covering the existence of security interests in the goods they buy. As
has been noted above,77 under the Arkansas U.C.C. (and under the
Codes of many other states as well)78 a person making a loan to a
businessman on the security of his inventory must usually make a fil-
include: Fry, Buying Farm Products: The 1985 Farm Bill Changes the Rules of the Game, 91
CoM. L.J. 433, 437-38 (1986); Meyer, Agricultural Credit and the Uniform Commercial Code:
A Need for Change?, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 469, 484-86 (1985); Sanford, The Reborn Farm
Products Exception Under the Food Security Act of 1985, 20 U.C.C. L.J. 3, 5 (1987); Note, The
Federalization of the Farm Products Exception Rule of U CC. 9-307(1): Anomaly or Opening
Salvo, 36 DRAKE L. REV. 115, 116-17 (1987) [hereinafter Note, The Federalization of the
Farm Products Exception]; Note, Section 1324 of the Food Security Act of 1985: Congress
Preempts the "Farm Products Exception" of Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code,
55 UMKC L. REV. 454, 456-58 (1987) (hereinafter Note, Section 1324 of the Food Security
Act]; Note, Federal Legislation Provides Protection for Buyers of Farm Products: Food Security
Act Supersedes the Farm Products Exception of UC.C. Section 9-307(1), 47 U. PIrr. L. REV.
749, 752-54 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Federal Legislation Provides Protection].
75. This follows because the buyer from the farmer takes subject to the security interest,
by virtue of the "farm products" exception to § 9-307(1), and no subsequent buyer can qualify
for the protection of that subsection because the security interest is not one "created by his
seller." See Dolan, supra note 14, at 713-14; Hawkland, supra note 13, at 419-20. But see
Dugan, supra note 33, at 345-51.
76. See Dolan, supra note 14, at 712-15.
77. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
78. The great majority of jurisdictions adopting the U.C.C. have chosen either the Second
or Third Alternative version of § 9-401(1). U.CC. § 9-401 notes, 3A U.L.A. 20 (1981 &
Supp. 1987). The only difference between the Second and Third Alternatives is that paragraph
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ing in a state office (the office of the Secretary of State in Arkansas),
with or without an additional local filing. But holders of security in-
terests in farm products need file only in county offices, perhaps only
in one such office. A buyer of farm products, particularly a resale
buyer (for example, one who buys from a broker who has acquired the
goods from the farmer who created the security interest) may not
know the source of the goods with sufficient particularity to know
where he should go to find filed financing statements covering the
products.7 9 And whether one regards this as unfair to the buyer or
not, it surely has an additional inhibiting effect on the marketability of
farm products."0
Another criticism of the farm-products exception has been that
the security it affords to agricultural financers has encouraged lax
lending and financing practices, that suppliers of agricultural credit
count on the law to protect them, rather than taking the trouble to
select borrowers with a view to their trustworthiness or attempting to
police their debtors' use of the collateral," shifting the burden of the
risk of debtor default to innocent buyers of the collateral.8 2
Discontent with the "farm products" exception of section 9-
307(1) was reflected in a large minority of states (prior to the passage
of the recent legislation discussed below) by amendments of the Codes
of those states. A study published in 1985 found that nineteen states
had modified section 9-307 or relate' sections ol the U.C.C., fourteen
of them since 1983.83 These departures from the Official Text were of
(c) of the Third Alternative requires local filing in some instances, in addition to central filing,
whereas that paragraph of the Second Alternative requires only central filing.
79. See Dolan, supra note 14, at 717-18. Livestock buyers are at a special disadvantage,
since the Packers and Stockyards Act, 7 U.S.C. § 228b(a) (1982), requires that payment be
made on the day following the sale. See Meyer, Agriculture Credit and the Uniform Commer-
cial Code: A Needfor Change?, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 469, 490 (1985); Richards, supra note 17,
at 395.
80. See Dolan, supra note 14, at 719.
81. See Note, Clear Title: A Buyer's Bonus, a Lender's Loss-Repeal of UCC § 9-307(1)
Farm Products Exception by Food Security Act § 1324 [7 US.C. § 1631], 26 WASHBURN L.J.
71, 77 (1986).
82. See H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 109, quoted infra note 136. For
other criticisms of the "farm products" exception to U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1978), see S. Rep. No.
147, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 2-3 (1985); Fry, supra note 74, at 438-39; Meyer, supra note 74, at
486-87; Richards, supra note 17, at 374-77, 395; Van Hooser, supra note 40, at 347-48; Note,
The Federalization of the Farm Products Exception, supra note 74, at 117-18; Note, Federal
Legislation Provides Protection, supra note 74, at 752-54.
83. Uchtmann, Bauer & Dudek, The UCC. Farm Products Exception-A Time to
Change, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1315, 1316 (1985). See also Meyer, supra note 26, at 433-34. The
latter article cites Arkansas as one of the 16 states that had modified the operation of § 9-
307(1) as of the Fall of 1983, but the reference is apparently to Arkansas' modification of the
rule of § 9-306(2), discussed above at notes 28-30. For other discussion of state variations
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great variety, ranging from total84 or partial8 5 repeal of the "farm
products" exception to elaborate arrangements for central filing of se-
curity interests in farm products,16 requirements that secured parties
give direct notice of their security interests to potential buyers of farm
products collateral in order to preserve the enforceability of their se-
curity interests,8 7 and requirements that buyers of farm products fol-
low specified procedures to learn of security interests in those
products and see that payments for the products were applied to se-
cured debts of which they learned, in order to take the goods free of
the security interests."8
II. THE NEW FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A. Summary of the Legislation
The "clear title" section 9 of the Food Security Act of 1985,90
overriding any contrary provision of state law, 91 decrees that (subject
to some exceptions) "a buyer who in ordinary course of business buys
a farm product from a seller engaged in farming operations shall take
free of a security interest created by the seller, even though the secur-
ity interest is perfected, and the buyer knows of the existence of such
interest. '92  For good measure, the section also provides that,
notwithstanding any contrary provision of state law (and subject to
some exceptions),
a commission merchant or selling agent who sells, in the ordinary
course of business, a farm product for others, shall not be subject
to a security interest created by the seller in such farm product
from the Official Text of the U.C.C., see Fry, supra note 74, at 442-44; Meyer, supra note 74, at
487-89; Richards, supra note 17, at 396-409; Van Hooser, supra note 40, at 349-58; Note, The
Federalization of the Farm Products Exception, supra note 74, at 118-21; Note, H.291: Ohio's
Attempt to Remedy Security Interests in Farm Products Under the U C. C., 9 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 607 (1984); Note, Section 1324 of the Food Security Act, supra note 74, at 461-63; Note,
Federal Legislation Provides Protection, supra note 74, at 761-63.
84. California. Uchtmann, Bauer & Dudek, supra note 83, at 1344.
85. Tennessee. Id.
86. E.g., Nebraska. See id. at 1332-36.
87. E.g., Illinois. See id. at 1340-43.
88. Eg., North Dakota. See id. at 1336-40.
89. "Clear title" is the popular designation of § 1324 of The Food Security Act of 1985.
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 110 (1985); Clark, Uniform Commer-
cial Code Survey: Secured Transactions, 42 Bus. LAW. 1336 (1987).
90. The Food Security Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-198, § 1324, 99 Stat. 1354, 1535
(1985) (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 1631 (Supp. IV 1986)). See supra note 1.
91. The rule explicitly applies "notwithstanling any other provision of Federal, State, or
local law." 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
92. Id. § 1631(d).
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even though the security interest is perfected and even though the
commission merchant or selling agent knows of the existence of
such interest.93
However, these broad rules do not provide as much protection as they
appear to, for the section goes on to provide, in elaborate detail, for
means by which holders of security interests in farm products can
preserve their rights to the collateral against buyers, commission
merchants and selling agents.94
First, it is provided that, "[a] buyer of farm products takes sub-
ject to a security interest created by the seller" if the buyer has re-
ceived, within a year prior to the sale, either from the secured party or
from the seller, a written notice of the security interest and the buyer
has failed to perform "payment obligations imposed on the buyer by
the secured party as conditions for waiver or release of the security
interest." 95 The notice must be "organized according to farm prod-
ucts." '96 It must contain: (1) "the name and address of the secured
party" and "the person indebted to the secured party;"9 7 (2) the social
security number or (in the case of an organization) the Internal Reve-
nue Service taxpayer identification number of the "debtor;" 98 (3) "a
description of the farm products subject to the security interest cre-
ated by the debtor, including the amount of such products where ap-
plicable, crop year, county or parish, and a reasonable description ofth roety ' 99  _3' / \ -+:.....
the pr - and (4) a statement of any "payment obligaiUo
with which the buyer is required to comply as conditions for waiver
or release of the security interest.'1o If "material changes" occur, the
93. Id. § 1631(g)(1).
94. Neither "buyer" nor "buying" is defined in the Federal Act. "Commission merchant"
is defined as "any person engaged in the business of receiving any farm product for sale, on
commission, or for or on behalf of another person." Id. § 163 1(c)(3). "Selling agent" means
,.any person, other than a commission merchant, who is engaged in the business of negotiating
the sale and purchase of any farm product on behalf of a person engaged in farming opera-
tions." Id. § 163 1(c)(8).
95. Id. § 1631(e)(1).
96. Id. § 1631(e)(1)(A).
97. Id. § 1631(e)(1)(A)(ii)(I), (II).
98. Id. § 1631(e)(1)(A)(ii)(III).
99. Id. § 1631(e)(l)(A)(ii)(IV).
100. Id. § 1631(e)(1)(A)(ii), (v). There is some slippage in the grammar of subsection
(e)(1)(A). It refers to a
written notice of the security interest organized according to farm products that-
(i) is an original or reproduced copy thereof;
(ii) contains.
(I) the name and address of the secured party;
(II) the name and address of the person indebted to the secured party;
(III) the social security number of the debtor or, in the case of a debtor doing
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notice must be "amended in writing, within three months, similarly
signed and transmitted, to reflect" those changes."0o The effectiveness
of a written notice of security interest lapses "either [on] the expira-
tion period of the statement or the transmission of a notice signed by
the secured party that the statement has lapsed, whichever occurs
first."' 2 Virtually identical provisions are made for notices to be
given to commission merchants and selling agents, in order that se-
cured parties may retain security interests which will be enforceable
against them. 1 3
Even if no such notice is received by the buyer, he may take the
goods "subject to" a security interest created by the seller (and the
same is true of a commission merchant or selling agent). That is so
only if the state in which the farm product involved was produced has
established a "central filing system" complying with the section, and
then only if certain additional events occur. A "central filing system,"
within the meaning of the Act, is one "which has been certified by"
the federal Secretary of Agriculture.' 4 The Secretary is directed to
certify a state's central filing system if he finds that it has the features
business other than as an individual, the Internal Revenue Service taxpayer identifi-
cation number of such debtor;
(IV) a description of the farm products subject to the security interest created
by the debtor, including the amount of such products where applicable, crop year,
county or parish, and a reasonable description of the property and
(iii) must be amended in writing, within three months, similarly signed and trans-
mitted, to reflect material changes;
(iv) will lapse on either the expiration period of the statement or the transmission of
a notice signed by the secured party that the statement has lapsed, whichever occurs
first; and
(v) any payment obligations imposed on the buyer by the secured party as condi-
tions for waiver or release of the security interest ....
Id. § 163 1(e)(l)(A). Taken literally, this language does not require that "payment obligations"
be contained in the notice, but the reference to such obligations makes no sense unless the
notice is required to show them. See Sanford, The Reborn Farm Products Exception Under the
Food Security Act of 1985, 20 U.C.C. L.J. 3, 20 (1987).
The subsection does not expressly require that the notice be signed by anyone. However,
an amendment filed to reflect "material changes" must be "similarly signed and transmitted,"
which suggests that the phrase "written notice" implies a signed notice, presumably signed by
the secured party or seller who is giving the notice. But cf. Note, Clear Title: A Buyer's Bonus,
A Lender's Loss-Repeal of UCC § 9-307(1) Farm Products Exception by Food Security Act
§ 1324 [7 U.S.C. § 1631], 26 WASHBURN L.J. 71, 86 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Clear Title]
(reading the Act as not requiring that an original notice be signed). Certainly, prudence would
call for the party giving the notice to sign it.
101. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. IV 1986).
102. Id. § 1631(e)(l)(A)(iv).
103. Id. § 1631(g)(2)(A), (B).
104. Id. § 1631(c)(2).
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prescribed by the Act."°5 These include: (1) provision for the filing of
"effective financing statements or notice of such financing statements"
in the office of the Secretary of State or other state designee; 10 6 (2) re-
cording by the filing officer of the times when such statements or no-
tices are filed (by date and hour);107 (3) compilation by the state filing
officer of a "master list" of all such filings;'08 (4) maintenance by the
filing officer of a list of buyers, commission merchants and selling
agents who have registered with him to indicate their interest in re-
ceiving copies of the master list or parts thereof;10 9 (5) periodic distri-
butions to those who have so registered of copies of the master list or
such parts of it as they have requested;"' and (6) provision on request
to persons not registered with the filing officer of confirmation of the
filing of financing statements or notices showing security interests cre-
ated by particular sellers of farm products."'
The filing officer must compile a "master list" which is "organ-
ized according to farm products;" and within each product category,
financing statements are to be listed in four ways: alphabetically, by
names of "debtors;" numerically, by debtors' social security or tax-
payer ID numbers; geographically, by county or parish; and chrono-
logically, by crop year." 2 As to each financing statement listed, the
master list must contain the information which is required by the defi-
nition of "effective financing statement" to be included in such a state-
ment.' '3  Persons registering as desiring to receive information
contained in the master list are given the option to receive copies of
only those portions of the master list relating to the types of farm
105. Id.
106. Id. § 1631(c)(2)(A). The Act refers to the "Secretary of State" as the state's central
filing officer, but "Secretary of State" is defined as meaning "the Secretary of State or the
designee of the State." Id. § 163 1(c)(1 1).
107. Id. § 1631(c)(2)(B).
108. Id. § 163 1(c)(2)(C).
109. Id. § 1631(c)(2)(D).
110. Id. § 163 1(c)(2)(E).
111. Id. § 1631(c)(2)(F). The statement in the text appears to be what the statutory lan-
guage means. The actual text requires that a central filing system include provision for the
Secretary of State [to furnish] to those who are not registered pursuant to (2)(D) of
this section oral confirmation within 24 hours of any effective financing statement on
request followed by written confirmation to any buyer of farm products buying from
a debtor, or commission merchant or selling agent selling for a seller covered by such
statement.
Id. The reference to "(2)(D) of this section" should probably be to "subparagraph (2)(D) of
this subsection." See editorial note following 7 U.S.C. § 1631 (Supp. IV 1986).
112. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(2)(C)(i), (ii) (Supp. IV 1986).
113. Id. § 1631(c)(2)(C)(iii).
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products in which they are interested.' 1 4
If such a central filing system exists in the state in which the farm
products sold have been produced, and a buyer of such products, or a
commission merchant or selling agent selling such products, has
failed to register with the state's central filing officer, then he will be
subject to the security interest of any secured party who has filed an
effective financing statement or notice that covers the products being
sold.'1 5 If the buyer, commission merchant or selling agent has regis-
tered, he will be subject to a security interest in the farm product
being sold only if he "receives from the Secretary of State ... written
notice" of the filing of an effective financing statement or notice cover-
ing the product being sold, and he fails to obtain a waiver or release of
the security interest from the secured party. 6 The "written notice"
here referred to may be given by the filing officer either by distribution
of a portion of the master list showing the filing or by responding to a
specific request for information on filings as to a particular seller.I17
"Financing statements," to be treated as "effective," must com-
ply with detailed requirements as to form11 which are similar to, but
not identical with, those applicable to the written notices of security
interests which secured parties and sellers may give directly to buyers,
commission merchants and selling agents. 1 9 An "effective financing
statement" is a statement, the original or a reproduced copy of which
is "signed and filed with the Secretary of State of a State by the se-
cured party"1 20 and which is also signed by "the debtor."1 '' It con-
114. Id. § 1631(c)(2)(D), (E).
115. Id. § 1631(e)(2) (buyers), (g)(2)(D) (commission merchants and selling agents).
116. Id. § 1631(e)(3) (buyers), (g)(2)(D) (commission merchants and selling agents).
"What constitutes receipt, as used in this section, shall be determined by the law of the State in
which the buyer resides." Id. § 1631(f), (g)(3).
117. Id. § 1631(e)(3)(A) [buyers], (g)(2)(D)(i) [commission merchants and selling agents]
(incorporating by reference paragraphs (c)(2)(E) and (F)). There is an inconsistency in the
wording of the act here. Subsections (e)(3)(A) and (g)(2)(D)(i) are applicable to buyers, com-
mission merchants and selling agents who have registered with the state's central filing officer,
yet they refer to a "written notice as provided in subparagraph ... (c)(2)(f)," which provides
that a central filing system must include provision for the central filing officer to furnish infor-
mation about filings as to particular sellers in response to requests of "those who are not regis-
tered pursuant to (2)(D) of this section." (Emphasis added.) Perhaps the reference to
subparagraph (c)(2)(F) in subparagraphs (e)(3)(A) and (g)(2)(D)(i) is meant to apply where
the state setting up a central filing system elects to require the central filing officer to respond
to requests for information as to filings received from registered buyers, commission merchants
and selling agents, as well as from those who are not registered.
118. Id. § 1631(c)(4).
119. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
120. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(4)(A), (B) (Supp. IV 1986).
121. Id. § 1631(c)(4)(C).
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tains: the names and addresses of the secured party and "the person
indebted to the secured party,"' 22 the social security number of the
"debtor" or the taxpayer identification number of an organizational
debtor,' 23 and "a description of the farm products subject to the se-
curity interest created by the debtor, including the amount of such
products where applicable; and a reasonable description of the prop-
erty, including county or parish in which the property is located." '124
The financing statement must be filed with the state's central fil-
ing officer, accompanied by the specified fee.125 If "material changes"
occur, a filed financing statement or notice must be amended in writ-
ing within three months. 126 A filing remains effective for five years
from the date of filing unless the statement itself indicates an earlier
termination date or the secured party files a notice of lapse; the origi-
nal five year period of effectiveness may be extended for additional
five year periods by the filing of continuation statements. 27
Presumably so that secured parties may know to whom they
should send notices of their security interests if they elect that method
of protecting themselves, 128 the "clear title" section authorizes inclu-
sion, in any "security agreement" covering a farm product, of a re-
quirement that the debtor furnish the secured party with a list of "the
buyers, commission merchants and selling agents to or through whom
[the debtor] may sell such farm product."'' 29 If the security agree-
ment contains such a requirement, and the debtor sells the collateral
to a buyer or through a commission merchant or selling agent who is
not on a list he has furnished to the secured party, the debtor is sub-
ject to a "fine" of $5,000 or "15 [%] of the value or benefit received
for such farm product . . ., whichever is greater." This fine is not
imposed if (1) he has given the secured party written notice of the
identity of the buyer, commission merchant or selling agent at least
seven days prior to the sale, or (2) he has "accounted to the secured
party for the proceeds of such sale not later than 10 days after such
sale." 130
The Act includes numerous definitions of terms, some of which
122. Id. § 1631(c)(4)(D)(i), (ii).
123. Id. § 1631(c)(4)(D)(iii).
124. Id. § 1631(c)(4)(D)(iv).
125. Id. § 1631(c)(4)(B), (H).
126. Id. § 1631(c)(4)(E).
127. Id. § 1631(c)(4)(F), (G).
128. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
129. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(h)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
130. Id. § 1631(h)(2), (3).
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have been incorporated into the preceding summary. Two key defini-
tions should be quoted, the definitions of "buyer in the ordinary
course of business" and "farm product":
The term "farm product" means an agricultural commodity
such as wheat, corn, soybeans, or a species of livestock such as
cattle, hogs, sheep, horses, or poultry used or produced in farming
operations, or a product of such crop or livestock in its un-
manufactured state (such as ginned cotton, wool-clip, maple syrup,
milk, and eggs), that is in the possession of a person engaged in
farming operations.'
The term "buyer in the ordinary course of business" means a
person who, in the ordinary course of business, buys farm products
from a person engaged in farming operations who is in the business
of selling farm products.' 32
To allow time for states to adjust their laws to the new federal
law, its effective date was postponed until December 23, 1986 (twelve
months after the date of enactment).' The Secretary of Agriculture
was directed, within 90 days after the date of enactment, to prescribe
regulations "to aid States in the implementation and management of a
central filing system."'' 34
B. Analysis of the Federal Act
There is no doubt that the "clear title" section of the Food Secur-
ity Act was aimed directly at the "farm products" exception to sec-
tion 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code. It was intended to
replace the farm products exception with a Congressionally mandated
scheme which affords some protection against perfected security in-
terests to buyers of farmers' inventory, but which stops short of giving
them as much protection as buyers of other types of inventory can
enjoy under section 9-307(1). 135
Among the reasons given for preempting the "farm products"
131. Id. § 1631(c)(5).
132. Id. § 1631(c)(1).
133. Id. § 16310).
134. Id. § 1631(i).
135. See HOUSE AGRICULTURE COMMITTEE, REPORT ON FOOD SECURITY ACT OF 1985,
H.R. REP. No. 271, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, 108, 110 reprinted in 1985 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 1103, 1212-13 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. But see Note, The Federaliza-
tion of the Farm Products Exception Rule of UC.C. 9-307(1): Anomaly or Opening Salvo?, 36
DRAKE L. REV. 115, 130-32 (1987) (arguing that congressional intent to preempt all state law
dealing with the problem, other than state laws setting up central filing systems for farm prod-
uct liens, is not clear and that a state law entirely repealing the farm products exception might
be found valid).
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exception were that it had the unhealthy trade-inhibiting effects which
have been discussed above, was unfair to purchasers of farm products
and constituted a burden on interstate commerce. 3 6 It was also ar-
gued that since some twenty states had adopted their own modifica-
tions of the "farm products" exception to section 9-307(1), the
national uniformity of the law which the Code was intended to pro-
duce had already been destroyed, and federal legislation was needed
"to restore consistency to this area of the law."'137
The federal statute bears the marks of Congressional compromise
and hasty drafting, however. The Department of Agriculture has
made an effort, in regulations under and interpretations of the Act,138
136. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 135, at 108-09:
Currently, under Section 9-307 of the [U.C.C.], a buyer of goods "in the ordi-
nary course of business" takes those goods free and clear of any security interest in
them held by a lender even if the buyer knows of the existence of that lien. The lone
exception to this general rule applies to agricultural commodities.
As originally drafted and adopted by 49 of the 50 states, the "farm products
exception" essentially permitted a lender to obtain payment from the purchaser of
agricultural commodities for any valid unpaid security interest in those goods-even
if the buyer didn't know that the lien existed.
This exception presents significant commercial problems for buyers and sellers
of farm products. With the advent of 24-hour final payment rules for some commod-
ities, there is insufficient time to check the liens and, thus, greater potential liability
for buyers. In addition, with some lenders pursuing buyers several years following
their purchases, many buyers limit who they do business with, thus restricting the
markets of farmers and inhibiting the free-flow-of-commerce in the United States.
Current State law forces innocent buyers of farm products to become unwilling
loan guarantors, in essence assuming the credit supervision responsibilities that
rightly belong with the lender who is making the profit off the loan to begin with. At
the same time, farm product buyers have no control over the lender's practice, and
receive no compensation in the form of interest to cover the risk exposure and jeop-
ardy unknowingly and unwittingly assumed.
Moreover, the current exception for farm products places an undue financial
burden on markets to which producers sell their commodities, thus reducing the eco-
nomic vitality of our nation's domestic agricultural markets. As the problem wors-
ens, it adversely affects individual farmers, as well as their markets. Farmers buy
products from other farmers, such as feeder cattle and pigs, breeding stock, grain and
hay, and potentially may be forced to pay twice for these products as their suppliers
default on secured debts. Risk exposure and actual losses from double payment are
reflected in the prices paid to farmers and are passed on other [sic.] producers in
terms of higher marketing fees and processing costs, and eventually are reflected in
higher consumer prices for meat, milk, and eggs, etc.
Additionally, there is a question of equity-is it fair to require a purchaser of
farm products to pay a second time for those commodities simply because of a finan-
cial dispute between the producer/borrower and his lender?
137. Id. at 109.
138. Federal regulations were issued in August, 1986, effective September 17, 1986, as Part
205 of Title 9 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 9 C.F.R. § 205 (1987). Part 205 consists of
one section of "Definitions", seven sections of "Regulations" and 14 sections of "Interpretive
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to clarify its meaning and operation in some respects. But the clarifi-
cations have been made cautiously, since the statute authorizes regu-
lations for the limited purpose of aiding the states to implement and
manage central filing systems, 139 and the Secretary of Agriculture is
not expressly authorized to enforce the Act other than by certifying
state central filing systems as being in conformity with it. 140
1. Definitions
One type of problem that is troublesome arises from the fact that
the Federal Act employs, but defines differently, terms which are also
terms of art in the U.C.C."4 ' "Farm products" is an example. The
U.C.C. definition is somewhat broader than that of the Federal Act.
"Farm products" in the Code includes "supplies used or produced in
Opinions." The weight to be accorded to the "Interpretive Opinions" is not clear. Federal
cases have drawn a distinction between "substantive regulations", which have the force of law
if the administrative agency issuing them has been authorized by Congress to legislate on the
subject, and "interpretative rules", which lack the force of law. Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441
U.S. 281 (1979); United States v. Walter Dunlap & Sons, Inc., 800 F.2d 1232 (3rd Cir. 1986).
Classification of an administrative rule as "substantive" or "interpretative" may be controver-
sial. Compare the majority opinion in Walter Dunlap, 800 F.2d at 1238, with the concurring
opinion at 1243-45. However, assuming that the "Interpretive Opinions" in 9 C.F.R. § 205 do
not have the force of law, they may be of persuasive authority as to the meaning of the "clear
title" section of the Food Security Act (see Sanford, The Reborn Farm Products Exception
Under the Food Security Act of 1985, 20 U.C.C. L.J. 3, 13 n.35 (1987)), and they should be,
since they are issued by an agency which has been directed to promulgate regulations gov-
erning "central filing systems", they are fairly clearly addressed to those who administer and
use such systems, and they are likely to be relied on by such persons in their efforts to adapt to
the requirements of a perplexingly drafted statute.
139. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(i) (Supp. IV 1986).
140. Id. § 1631(c)(2).
141. In addition to the defined terms discussed in the text of this article, the Food Security
Act's definition of "security interest" is "an interest in farm products that secures payment or
performance of an obligation." Id § 1631(c)(7). This may pose problems. The definition is
not expressly limited to interests created by contract, as security interests within the scope of
Article 9 of the U.C.C. are. U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (1978). Might the Federal Act definition in-
clude a statutory landlord's lien for rent on a tenant's crops, for example? If so, the definition
probably has little practical impact, since the "open-market" rules of the Federal Act refer
only to security interests "created by the seller," which appears to limit their operation to
consensual liens. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d) and (g)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). See Sanford, supra note 138,
at 17. See also infra note 367. However, there remain possibilities of contractual liens being
within the scope of the Federal Act which would clearly or arguably be excluded from the
scope of Article 9 by § 9-104 or by the more particularized definition of "security interest" in
§ 1-201(37). See Sanford, supra note 138, at 17 (raising questions of whether "true consign-
ments, entrustments, bailments, and leases" would create "security interests" within the scope
of the Federal Act, or real estate mortgages claiming crops as "rents, issues and profits.").
Since the legislative history of the Federal Act makes it clear that the dominant purpose of the
act is to overcome the pernicious effects of the "farm products" exception to U.C.C. § 9-307(1)
(see supra note 135 and accompanying text), the Federal Act definition of "security interest"
was probably intended to refer to an Article 9 security interest.
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farming operations"' 42 (such as chemicals acquired by a farmer for
the spraying of his crops), while the Federal Act definition omits ref-
erence to such "supplies."'143 Since the Federal Act definition closely
tracks the Code definition as a whole, it may be inferred that the
omission was deliberate.'" If so, this category of U.C.C. "farm prod-
ucts" is not affected by the federal legislation, and buyers in ordinary
course of business of such "farm products" from farmers would still
be subject to the "farm products" exception to section 9-307(1).
Of potentially greater significance is the difference between the
definitions in the two statutes of "buyer in ordinary course of busi-
ness." The Federal Act tracks the U.C.C. definition only part way.
Under the Code, to be a buyer in ordinary course of business, one
must not only buy in the ordinary course of business from a person
engaged in the business of selling goods of the type involved, but must
also be acting "in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to
him is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a
third party in the goods."' 45 The Federal Act definition of the term
does not say that the buyer must have bought in good faith nor that
he must be without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of third
parties; it makes no reference to the buyer's state of mind or knowl-
edge at all.'46
The legislative history of the "clear title" section of the Food
Security Act makes it clear that the omission was deliberate. The
House bill which ultimately became the Food Security Act of 1985 '"
contained a definition of "buyer in the ordinary course of business"
which did include "good faith" and "without knowledge" limitations
identical to those of the Code definition.'4 8 However, a Senate
amendment deleted the language, and a conference committee ac-
cepted the Senate's wording.149
The reason for the dropping of that part of the definition is not
clear. A possible explanation is, of course, that a policy decision was
made not to require that a buyer buy in good faith and without aware-
ness of impropriety in the sale in order to qualify for protection
142. U.C.C. § 9-109(3) (1978), supra note 59.
143. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1986); see supra text accompanying note 131.
144. See Note, Clear Title, supra note 100, at 82-83.
145. U.C.C. § 1-201(9) (1978).
146. See Federal Act definition of "buyer in ordinary course of business," 7 U.S.C.
§ 1631(c)(1) (Supp. IV 1986); supra text accompanying note 132.
147. H.R. 2100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
148. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 135, at 294-95.
149. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 447, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 486-87, reprinted in 1985 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2251, 2412.
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against security interests under the Federal Act. 5° Why Congress
should wish to protect buyers who are knowingly participating in
sales which violate the sellers' duties to secured parties is hard to im-
agine, though. The only merit of such a rule would be its simplicity of
application, but simplifying the law can hardly have been the objec-
tive of the "clear title" section as a whole, and there is no reason to
believe that it was a major consideration in the definition of this term.
A more probable explanation for the truncated definition in the
Federal Act is that the omitted language was thought unnecessary,
because it was assumed that the courts would read the definition as
requiring that the buyer act in good faith and without knowledge of
violations of property rights of third persons. Certainly nothing in the
"clear title" section affirmatively indicates a desire to protect bad faith
buyers. In laying down its general rule that buyers who, in the ordi-
nary course of business, take free of security interests created by their
sellers, the Act limits itself to saying that the rule applies even though
the security interest is perfected and "even though .. .the buyer
knows of the existence of such interest."' Knowledge of the exist-
ence of a security interest falls well short of knowledge that the rights
of the secured party are being violated, and even section 9-307(1) of
the U.C.C. protects most buyers in ordinary course of business
against security interests created by the sellers despite their knowl-
edge that the security interests exist.
Moreover, the operative rules of the Federal Act are introduced
by explicit Congressional findings that "certain State laws" inhibit
competition and obstruct interstate commerce by permitting a se-
cured lender to enforce his security interest in farm products "even if
the purchaser does not know that the sale of the products violates the
lender's security interest in the products."' 52 The concern expressed
- 150. Cf comment by the Department of Agriculture in 51 Fed. Reg. 29,449, 29,450 (1986)
(observing, in connection with the Federal Act's omission from the definition of "buyer in the
ordinary course of business" of the definition of "buying" which is included in the U.C.C.
definition of the same term, that "the phrase must have been intended to have a different
meaning since a different definition was written"). See also Meyer, Agricultural Credit and the
Uniform Commercial Code: A Need for Change?, 34 U. KAN. L. REV. 469, 491-93 (1985)
[hereinafter Meyer, Agricultural Credit]; Note, Section 1324 of the Food Security Act, supra
note 74, at 463-64; Note, Clear Title, supra note 100, at 81.
151. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
152. Id. § 1631(a)(1). The full text of the Congressional findings, id. § 1631(a), is as
follows:
Congress finds that-
(1) certain State laws permit a'secured lender to enforce liens against a pur-
chaser of farm products even if the purchaser does not know that the sale of the
products violates the lender's security interest in the products, lacks any practical
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is for the welfare of good faith purchasers of farm products, and a
Congressional explanation of the reasons for adopting legislation, in-
corporated into the legislation, is unquestionably a legitimate guide to
the intended meaning of the statute. The conclusion which seems best
to accord with probable legislative intention, then, is that the defini-
tion of "buyer in the ordinary course of business" in the "clear title"
section of the Food Security Act does include, by implication,153 re-
quirements that the buyer buy in good faith and without knowledge
that the sale violates the rights of third parties in the goods."5 4
It might be argued that the differences in the Federal Act defini-
tion of "buyer in the ordinary course of business" and that of the
U.C.C. are of no significance, no matter how the Federal Act defini-
tion is read, since the "clear title" section of the Food Security Act
does not employ the term in any of its operative rules; it appears only
method for discovering the existence of the security interest, and has no reasonable
means to ensure that the seller uses the sales proceeds to repay the lender;
(2) these laws subject the purchaser of farm products to double payment for
the products, once at the time of purchase, and again when the seller fails to repay
the lender;
(3) the exposure of purchasers of farm products to double payment inhibits free
competition in the market for farm products; and
(4) this exposure constitutes a burden on and obstruction to interstate commerce
in farm products.
Id.
The next subsection declares that: "The purpose of this section is to remove such burden
on and obstruction to interstate commerce in farm products." Id. § 1631(b).
153. But see Meyer, Congress's Amendment to the UCC: The Farm Products Rule
Change, 8 J. AGRIC. TAX'N & LAW 3, 6 (1986) [hereinafter Meyer, Congress's Amendment]
(arguing that the difference between the Federal Act definition of "buyer in the ordinary
course of business" and that of the U.C.C. indicates a Congressional choice to make buyers'
knowledge of violation of security interests immaterial and to substitute a test of whether they
have received notice of the security interests in the manner prescribed by the Federal Act).
154. It must be conceded that the portion of the Federal Act which protects commission
merchants and selling agents from liability to the secured party for participating in unauthor-
ized sales of farm products collateral (7 U.S.C. § 1631(g)(1) (Supp. IV 1986)) does not explic-
itly require that the commission merchants and selling agents act in good faith and without
knowledge that security interests are being violated either, and there is somewhat less reason
for reading in such requirements, since the Code does not deal with the liability of such agents
and the Congressional findings do not mention the problems of commission merchants and
selling agents as reasons for enactment of the law. However, such agents are required by the
Act to sell "in the ordinary course of business", and perhaps that implies that they must be
acting in good faith or at least without knowledge that secured parties' rights are being vio-
lated; unfortunately, "ordinary course of business" is not defined in the Federal Act or the
U.C.C. The Code seems more limited in scope. See supra note 58.
It is to be hoped that the courts will construe the Federal Act as incorporating "good
faith" and "without knowledge" requirements, as being consistent with the evident desire of
Congress to provide protection for the innocent.
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in the definitions subsection.'1  It is true that the precise phrase is not
used in any of the subsequent provisions of the Act. But, in view of
the legislative history of the "clear title" section, subsection (d) can-
not reasonably be read as referring to anyone but a "buyer in the ordi-
nary course of business" when it lays down its general rule protecting
"a buyer who in the ordinary course of business buys a farm product
from a seller engaged in farming operations." 156
2. Effect on the "Farm Products" Exception of
U C.C. Section 9-307(1)
Assuming that the type of buyer referred to in subsection (d) of
the "clear title" section of the Food Security Act is a "buyer in the
ordinary course of business," the impact of that subsection can be
seen to be to delete from section 9-307(1) of the U.C.C., almost com-
pletely, its "farm products" exception and to place most such buyers
of farm products on a par with other buyers in ordinary course of
business inventory. Having done that, however, the Federal Act
reverses course and sets up a different, and very complex, set of rules
creating new vulnerabilities for such buyers.
3. Direct Notification of Security Interests
First, a secured party may preserve the effectiveness of his secur-
ity interest in farm products by delivery to the buyer of a "written
notice of the security interest" which includes a statement of "pay-
ment obligations imposed on the buyer by the secured party as condi-
tions for waiver or release of the security interest." 15 7 (Such a notice
may also be given by "the seller,"' 58 though the likelihood of a seller
doing so seems negligible). If such a notice is "received" '159 by the
buyer within one year before the sale of the collateral, the notice pro-
155. See Sanford, supra note 138, at 6 n.10, 11. Mr. Sanford contends that the only opera-
tive rules which use the expression "in the ordinary course of business", subsections (d) and
(g)(1) of the "clear title" section, avoid the use of the defined term "buyer in ordinary course of
business" and therefore Congress must have intended to refer to persons who do not fit that
definition.
156. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d) (Supp. IV 1986). Mr. Sanford, see supra note 138, gives little
consideration to legislative history. His focus is on the text of the act, and he finds his clues as
to meaning almost exclusively within the four corners of the "clear title" section. On that
basis his position may be defensible. However, a statute as loosely drafted as this one cannot
be given a sensible reading without considering all legitimate clues to legislative intention.
157. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986). This device is sometimes referred to, in
commentary on the Federal Act, as "prenotification". E.g., Clark, Uniform Commercial Code
Annual Survey: Secured Transactions, 42 Bus. LAW. 1333, 1337 (1987).
158. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
159. State law (the law of the buyer's residence) defines "receipt". Id. § 1631(f).
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duces the result that the buyer, even if he is a "buyer in the ordinary
course of business,"'" "takes subject to" the security interest if "the
buyer has failed to perform the payment obligations.' ' 61
Under this rule the secured party apparently cannot prevent loss
of his security interest through an unauthorized sale merely by notify-
ing the buyer of his security interest, nor even by notifying him that
sale by the debtor is prohibited or authorized only under conditions
which are not within the buyer's control. He can protect himself
against loss of his security interest through a sale to a buyer in ordi-
nary course of business only by notifying the buyer of his security
interest and including in the notice terms as to payment, which are to
be complied with by the buyer, as conditions for waiver or release of
the security interest. These "payment obligations" must then be com-
plied with by the buyer if he is to take the goods free of the security
interest. A notice which specified no such "payment obligations"
would be ineffective against a buyer in ordinary course of business.
What are "payment obligations?" The Act does not say, but presum-
ably they may be any obligations performable by the buyer and relat-
ing to payment for the collateral which are consistent with the
security agreement, such as a requirement that the buyer make pay-
ment directly to the secured party, or that payment be made by check
payable jointly to the secured party and the seller of the collateral. 162
The purpose of this method of notification, then, is not to prevent
unauthorized sales of farm products collateral, nor to preserve the
security interest in the event of such a sale, but to ensure that the
proceeds of sales of collateral, whether authorized or not, will be ap-
plied to the secured debt. The secured party might use this device to
protect himself against damage to the value of his security, by impos-
ing "payment obligations" setting minimum prices for which collat-
eral may be sold and other terms of sale. How far the concept of
"payment obligations" can be pushed by ingenious secured parties re-
mains to be seen.
However, a secured party who wishes to employ this method of
protecting himself faces formidable problems. One is that of finding
the buyer before the sale of the collateral occurs. The Act suggests
that the secured party include in the security agreement a term obli-
gating the debtor to furnish a list of potential buyers of the collat-
160. The rule that "a buyer who in the ordinary course of business buys a farm product
from a seller engaged in farming operations shall take free of a security interest created by the
seller" applies "[e]xcept as provided in subsection (e) of this section." Id. § 1631(d).
161. Id. § 1631(e)(1)(B).
162. See Clark, supra note 157, at 1338.
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eral; 63 the secured party can then send notices to all persons on the
list. But if the debtor makes a sale to a buyer (in ordinary course of
business) whom he has not included in his list, and to whom no notice
of the security interest has been given, the debtor's offense will not
prevent the buyer from taking the goods free of the security interest.
(Of course, there is nothing in the Act to prevent the secured party
from distributing notices of his security interest more widely, 64 but
the effectiveness of the notice as to any actual buyer depends on its
having reached him.)
The Federal Act seeks to protect the secured party from loss of
his security by reason of a sale to an off-list buyer by requiring that
the debtor give the secured party advance notice of an intended sale to
such a buyer or account promptly to the secured party for the pro-
ceeds of the sale after it occurs. 165 The debtor is liable for a substan-
tial "fine" ' 16 6 in the event of his failure to do either, but it is not clear
whether this is a civil or a criminal penalty, nor whether the fine is
payable to the secured party.1 67 In any event, the deterrent effect of
the threat is questionable. 68
Another problem for a secured party who desires to employ the
direct-notification device is that of drafting a notice which meets the
requirements of the Act. His problem here is the ambiguity of the
Act's prescriptions for an effective notice.1 69
One question posed by the statutory text is that of who must be
163. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(h)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
164. See Clark, supra note 157, at 1338; Meyer, Agricultural Credit, supra note 150, at 496;
Meyer, Congress's Amendment, supra note 153, at 9-10.
165. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(h)(2)(A), (B) (Supp. IV 1986).
166. Id. § 1631(h)(3) (15% of the "benefit or value received" for the farm products or
$5,000, whichever is greater).
167. See Sanford, supra note 138, at 23; Note, Section 1324 of the Food Security Act of
1985, supra note 74, at 470-71.
168. See Meyer, Agricultural Credit, supra note 150, at 495.
169. The pertinent text of the Act is as follows:
(e) A buyer of farm products takes subject to a security interest created by the seller if-
(1)(A) within 1 year before the sale of the farm products, the buyer has received from
the secured party or the seller written notice of the security interest organized ac-
cording to farm products that-
(i) is an original or reproduced copy thereof;
(ii) contains,
(I) the name and address of the secured party;
(II) the name and address of the person indebted to the secured party;
(III) the social security number of the debtor or, in the case of a debtor
doing business other than as an individual, the Internal Revenue Service
taxpayer identification number of such debtor;
(IV) a description of the farm products subject to the security interest
created by the debtor, including the amount of such products where appli-
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identified in the notice as "the debtor." Doubtless, the answer is easy
enough in the usual case, where the same person is both the one owing
the secured debt and the owner of the collateral, but that is not invari-
ably so.1 7° If the person obligated to pay the debt and the owner of
the collateral are different persons, which of them is required to be
identified (1) by name and address and (2) by social security number
or taxpayer ID number? The Act calls for the "name and address of
the person indebted to the secured party," 171 which seems plainly to
refer to the obligor, but the following subparagraph calls for disclo-
sure of the social security number or taxpayer ID number of "the
debtor."' 12 "Debtor" is a term not defined by the Act. Is it used here
with reference to "the person indebted to the secured party," or does
it refer to the owner of the collateral? The fact that different wording
is used suggests that a different meaning is intended. However, if
"debtor" refers to the owner of the collateral, then the Act requires
identification of the obligor by name and address, but allows the
owner of the collateral to be identified only by a cryptic number. On
the other hand, if "debtor" refers to the "person indebted," then it
appears that the owner of the collateral, if another person, need not be
identified at all. Yet it would seem that if the notice is to serve its
evident purpose of warning the recipient of need to comply with
"payment obligations" in the event of his purchase of particular farm
products, it would be more important for the prospective buyer to be
informed of the identity of the owner of those products than of who
owes the secured debt, since the owner of the products is the one who
is most likely to be selling them. Perhaps the best advice that can be
cable, crop year, county or parish, and a reasonable description of the
property and
(iii) must be amended in writing, within 3 months, similarly signed and trans-
mitted, to reflect material changes;
(iv) will lapse on either the expiration period of the statement or the transmis-
sion of a notice signed by the secured party that the statement has lapsed,
whichever occurs first; and
(v) any payment obligations imposed on the buyer by the secured party as
conditions for waiver or release of the security interest; and
(B) the buyer has failed to perform the payment obligations.
7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
170. Article 9 of the U.C.C. recognizes that one person may subject his property to a secur-
ity interest to secure the debt of another, by providing, in § 9-105(l)(d), that the term "debtor"
may refer either to the owner of the collateral or to the "obligor"; that which meaning the term
has when used in an Article 9 rule depends on whether the provision in question deals "with
the collateral" or "with the obligation", and the term may refer to both "where the context so
requires". U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(d) (1978).
171. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(l)(A)(ii)(II) (Supp. IV 1986).
172. Id. § 1631(e)(1)(A)(ii)(III).
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given to anyone drafting such a notice, in any case where the person
indebted and the owner of the collateral are not identical, would be to
disclose the names, addresses, and identification numbers of both.
Some support for this conclusion maybe found in the interpreta-
tions issued by the Department of Agriculture pursuant to the direc-
tion in the Federal Act for the Secretary of Agriculture to "prescribe
regulations ... to aid States in the implementation and management
of a central filing system." '173 The Agriculture Department's regula-
tions and interpretive opinions do not discuss the Act's requirements
relating to written notices of security interests given directly to buy-
ers, since such notices operate independently of any central filing sys-
tem. But they do deal in considerable detail with what is required to
appear in an "effective financing statement" (EFS) which is centrally
filed, and much of the Act's language relating to the contents of an
EFS is identical to or closely resembles that which deals with the con-
tents of a "written notice of the security interest." Moreover, there
may be enough commonness of purpose of the two types of docu-
ments to warrant the inference that they should be read as laying
down the same requirements to the extent that they correspond
closely in wording.
With regard to identification of the debtor, the wordings of the
two parts of the "clear title" section174 are identical and present the
same problems of interpretation. The Department of Agriculture
reads the Act as requiring that an effective financing statement iden-
tify, by name, address, and social security number or taxpayer ID
number, "each person subjecting the farm product to the security in-
terest, whether or not a debtor. '
Then there is the problem of what sort of description of the col-
lateral in a direct notification will comply with the Act, which pro-
vides that the notice must contain "a description of the farm products
subject to the security interest created by the debtor, including the
amount of such products where applicable, crop year, county or par-
173. Id. § 163 1(i). As the regulations are authorized by the text of the act, they probably
have the force of law. See United States v. Walter Dunlap & Sons, 800 F.2d 1232, 1238 (3rd
Cir. 1986). The interpretive opinions may not have the force of law, id., but may nevertheless
be of persuasive authority. However, since neither the regulations nor the interpretive opin-
ions deal explicitly with the direct notifications under consideration at this point of the text of
this article, they are, at best, of persuasive authority.
174. 7 U.S.C. § 163 1(c)(4) (Supp. IV 1986) (definition of "effective financing statement");
id. § 1631(e)(1)(A)(ii) (contents of a direct notification).
175. 9 C.F.R. § 205.103(a)(4), (5) (1987). The regulation is discussed in greater detail in
the text of this article infra notes 235-39.
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ish, and a reasonable description of the property.' ' 176 This language
seems to mean that the description must be adequate to enable the
recipient of the notice to determine which particular goods are subject
to the security interest, i.e., that it would not be enough to indicate
merely the type or types of goods in which a security interest is
claimed. 177 But must the description go further?
The requirement that "the amount of such products" be shown
"where applicable" can be read as meaning that the amount of the
products must be specified when that is necessary to identify the
goods that are subject to the security interest. However, the Act ap-
pears to require that "crop year," "county or parish" and the land
with which the products are associated ("the property") always be
shown, no matter how adequately the collateral would be identified
without those entries. The reason for these requirements is not appar-
ent, 178 and a secured party might well wish to omit such details when
they were unnecessary to identify the collateral, for the more detail he
includes in his description, the more likely it is that he will have to
send out amended notifications later, as changes occur which would
render those elements of the description inaccurate. 179  Could "crop
year," "county or parish" or a description of land ever safely be
omitted?'
176. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(1)(A)(ii)(IV) (Supp. IV 1986).
177. While this reading is not unchallengeable, some support for it is found by comparing
the Federal Act language with that of the U.C.C. relating to the contents of an Article 9
"financing statement." It is quite evident from the text of the Federal Act as a whole and its
legislative history that the draftsmen were writing a statute designed to modify the effect of the
U.C.C. and were conscious of its language. A departure from U.C.C. terminology, therefore,
at least suggests an intent to produce a different rule. In the U.C.C. a "financing statement" is
required to contain "a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral."
U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1978) (emphasis added).
178. Identifications of "crop year" and "county or parish" would be desirable in an EFS,
since the central filing officer is required to prepare a master list of filings which is organized by
"crop year" and by "county or parish." 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(2)(C)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986). There is
no comparable requirement relating to direct notices of security interests, and even as to an
EFS, the only imaginable purpose of a land description is to aid in the identification of the
goods subject to the security interest.
179. See discussion of the amendment requirement infra notes 256-64 and accompanying
text.
180. See Meyer, Agricultural Credit, supra note 150, at 497; Meyer, Congress's Amend-
ment, supra note 153, at 11. The U.C.C. is no help here. A Code financing statement is
required to include "a description of the real estate concerned" only "[w]hen the financing
statement covers crops growing or to be grown," U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1978); or where it covers
"timber to be cut or covers minerals or the like (including oil and gas)" or certain accounts or
fixtures, id. § 9-402(1) and (5). No description of the land is required as to farm products in
general, and even in the case of crops no land description is needed if the crops have already
been harvested.
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Agriculture Department interpretations of the "clear title" sec-
tion of the Food Security Act are less helpful here, for several reasons.
The Act's language dealing with descriptions of collateral in an EFS is
not identical with that concerning a direct notification of security in-
terest, although there is a close resemblance.181 Moreover, the admin-
istrative interpretations are based on an assumption that an EFS must
contain enough information to enable the central filing officer to com-
pile a master list complying with the Act, in addition to identifying
the goods subject to the security interest,18 2 but "master list" require-
ments are irrelevant to direct notifications. Finally, the Act's defini-
tion of an "effective financing statement" calls merely for substantial
compliance with its specifications and indicates that an EFS may be
adequate "even though it contains minor errors that are not seriously
misleading," '183 but no similar language appears in the paragraphs
dealing with direct notifications. Given these uncertainties as to the
reliability of Agriculture Department regulations and interpretive
opinions relating to effective financing statements, the prudent course
for a secured party drafting a direct notice of his security interest
would be to take the statutory language quite literally, and to include
"crop year," "county or parish" and a land description in any such
notice.
That advice does not solve all of the secured party's problems,
however, for there are ambiguities in the statutory language. What is
meant by "crop year," for example? The phrase most naturally sug-
181. An "effective financing statement" is required to contain "a description of the farm
products subject to the security interest created by the debtor, including the amount of such
products where applicable; and a reasonable description of the property, including county or
parish in which the property is located ...." 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(4)(D)(iv) (Supp. IV 1986).
A "written notice of the security interest" given by the secured party or seller directly to a
buyer must contain "a description of the farm products subject to the security interest created
by the debtor, including the amount of such products where applicable, crop year, county or
parish, and a reasonable description of the property .... Id. § 1631(e)(1)(A)(ii)(IV).
Comparing the two passages, note that an EFS is not expressly required to show "crop
year," while a direct notification is. Furthermore, "county or parish" is mentioned in the
definition of an EFS as part of the "reasonable description of the property" requirement,
whereas the description required in a direct notification appears to call for description of
"county or parish" in addition to a "reasonable description of the property." Finally, the
language applicable to an EFS is explicit that the land described, and the county or parish
designated, is that on which "the property" (presumably meaning the farm product involved)
"is located", whereas the specifications for a direct notification do not expressly indicate what
"property" must be reasonably described. Quite possibly these differences in wording are of
negligible significance, but one cannot be sure that the courts will find no difference in
meaning.
182. See infra text accompanying notes 240-249.
183. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(4)(I) (Supp. IV 1986).
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gests the year that an annual crop such as wheat or soybeans is grown,
but "farm products" includes animals, animal products (such as
eggs), and plants that require more than one year to mature and
which may be severed from the ground at varying times. How many
of these have "crop years," and how are their "crop years" to be de-
termined? Agriculture Department interpretations treat this term, as
applied to a "master list" or EFS, as applicable to all farm products,
and as meaning: with respect to crops grown in soil, "the calendar
year in which it is harvested or to be harvested;"' 84 with respect to
animals, "the calendar year in which they are born or acquired;"', 5
and, with respect to poultry and eggs, "the calendar year in which
they are sold or to be sold.' 8 6 While these are by no means the only
possible readings of "crop year," the interpretations are the best gui-
dance available for drafters of direct notifications.
The "county or parish" specification and the "reasonable de-
scription of the property" called for also present difficulties of inter-
pretation. "[T]he property" presumably means the land with which
the described farm products are associated, for the phrase would be
redundant if it referred to the goods subject to the security interest, 87
and a "reasonable description" of it surely could be something less
than a legal description. 88 But what land must be described: that on
which the products were produced, the land on which they are lo-
cated at the time the notification is given, that on which they are ex-
pected to be located at the time of sale, or something else? The
Agriculture Department reads the Act as requiring that the "county
or parish" designated in an EFS be that "where the product is or is to
be produced,"' 8 9 and this may be persuasive authority for the mean-
ing of the similar language regarding the contents of a direct notifica-
tion, as to both the "county or parish" to be designated and the land
to be described.
Even that much help is not available as to another requirement
for a "written notice of the security interest:" it must be "organized
184. 9 C.F.R. § 205.107(a)(1) (1987) (regulation).
185. Id. § 205.107(a)(2) (regulation).
186. Id. § 205.107(a)(3) (regulation).
187. Agriculture Department interpretations so assume with regard to the similar language
applicable to effective financing statements. See 9 C.F.R. § 205.207 (1987) (interpretive opin-
ion). See also Meyer, Congress's Amendment, supra note 153, at 11.
188. See Agriculture Department interpretive opinion, supra note 187. Cf U.C.C. § 9-110
(1978): "[A]ny description of ... real estate is sufficient whether or not it is specific if it
reasonably identifies what is described."
189. 9 C.F.R. § 205.207(c) (1987) (interpretive opinion).
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according to farm products,"1 90 a requirement not appearing in the
definition of an "effective financing statement;" and what it means is
anything but clear. "[O]rganized according to farm products" proba-
bly means "organized according to types of farm products," but no
guidance is offered in the statutory text as to what type-categories are
to be used, nor with regard to how the notice is to be "organized."
Suppose that a secured party has a security interest arising from a
single security agreement in the wheat and soybean crops of his
farmer-debtor, all being grown on the same farm. Must a notice of
that security interest be divided into two parts: one perhaps labeled
"Wheat" and giving all the information required to identify the par-
ties, describe the collateral and show any "payment obligations im-
posed on the buyer" as to the wheat collateral, then another part
headed "Soybeans" which repeats all of the same information as to
the soybean collateral? Could he use a single heading, "Wheat and
Soybeans," or simply "Crops," so as to make that duplication of in-
formation unnecessary? 91
Perhaps the requirement that the notice be "organized according
to farm products" was included with a particular type of case in
mind: that where a firm engaged in agricultural financing sends out
to potential buyers a blanket notice of all of its security interests, in
numerous types of farm products owned by many different debtors,
hoping by a single notice to protect all of its security interests. Such a
document might be quite inadequate to alert a buyer to the existence
of a security interest in any particular collateral unless it were organ-
ized in some way that would enable the reader to find his way through
the mass of detail to that which affects him, and organization of the
notice by types of farm products could be helpful for this purpose.
However, it is but a small step toward the goal, and to impose it on all
secured parties giving notices of their security interests, as the Act
appears to do, goes further than necessary to address the problem.192
190. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
191. See Meyer, Agricultural Credit, supra note 150, at 496.
192. The Food Security Act employs the expression "organized according to farm prod-
ucts" in another context. The "master list" which the officer in charge of a state "central filing
system" is required to compile reflecting all current filings of "effective financing statements"
must be "organized according to farm products." 7 U.S.C. § 163 1(c)(2)(C)(i) (Supp. IV 1986).
There the requirement makes eminent sense. Hundreds or thousands of financing statements
may be on file, and if anyone checking the master list to learn whether there has been a filing as
to particular farm products is to locate the relevant information without a tremendous expen-
diture of time, the list has to be organized in such a way as to lead him to the information he
seeks. Organization of the list according to farm products is one step in that direction. The
goal is further promoted by requirements that, within each product category, financing state-
ments be listed alphabetically, by debtors' names; numerically, according to the debtors' social
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Nevertheless, the Act is specific that the notice must be "organ-
ized according to farm products." The safer course for the draftsman
of such a notice is apparently to divide the document by headings,
each of which designates a single type of farm product, and under
which all information the Act requires to be shown which is relevant
to that type of farm product, including "payment obligations," is set
forth. The highly detailed breakdown of farm product types which
the Department of Agriculture has provided for use in "effective fi-
nancing statements" and "master lists" 193 is probably a reliable guide
to farm product categories.
How forgiving of error (or intentional misdescription) is the Fed-
eral Act? In defining an "effective financing statement," the Act
states that a document can fit the definition if it "substantially com-
plies with the requirements of this subparagraph even though it con-
tains minor errors that are not seriously misleading."' 194 But no such
tolerance is suggested by the language dealing with the contents of a
"written notice of the security interest."1 95 If the description of the
collateral is too narrowly drawn to cover all of the farm products
subject to the security interest, it seems obvious that it will be ineffec-
tive to subject the buyer to the security interest as to collateral left out
of the description. But does the error invalidate the notice even as to
the collateral that is described? Suppose the description is over-
broad, covering farm. products which are not subject to the security
interest. (A secured party might be tempted to indulge in over-broad
description in order to simplify the task of description or to avoid
inadvertent omission of collateral.) Is the notice then ineffective
security or taxpayer ID numbers; geographically, by counties or parishes; and chronologically,
by crop years. Id. § 1631(c)(2)(C)(iii). The organization according to farm products serves
the further purpose of making it possible for the filing officer to comply with requests from
buyers to be furnished with copies of portions of the master list relating only to the types of
farm products in which they are interested. Id. § 1631(c)(2)(D), (E). The Department of
Agriculture has issued regulations and interpretive opinions giving filing officers guidance as to
how to comply with these requirements. 9 C.F.R., pt. 205 (1987). This includes a list of the
farm products categories to be used. Id. § 205.206 (interpretive opinion).
However, the requirement of organization of a written notice of security interest "accord-
ing to farm products" serves little purpose unless the notice covers numerous farm products.
Even then it is of dubious value, since there is no requirement that the notice be further subdi-
vided according to debtors' names or in any other manner. The relevance of Agriculture De-
partment interpretations of what "organized according to farm products" means in the context
of a "master list" to the meaning of the same language in relation to a written notice of secur-
ity interest is doubtful at best.
193. Id. § 205.206(a) (interpretive opinion).
194. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(4)(I) (Supp. IV 1986).
195. See Note, Clear Title, supra note 100, at 86 (asserting that Congress intended to man-
date strict compliance).
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against the buyer as to any of the described collateral? Some highly
creative judicial construction of this statute is called for. 196
Finally, the secured party who employs the direct notification
method of protecting his security interest must keep in mind the re-
quirement that the buyer have received notice of the security interest
within one year prior to the sale.' 97 If the security interest is still
attached to particular farm products when the effectiveness of a prior
notification approaches its one year limit, a new notice is required. 198
Application of the" 1 year" time limit may be difficult as well, because
of the Federal Act's failure to define the term "sale." 199
The direct notification, or "prenotification, ' ' 200 method of pro-
tecting a security interest is thus rather hazardous, although it has
been reported that this method has in fact been employed by many
agricultural lenders attempting to adapt to the new rules of the Food
Security Act,20' probably, in many instances, because they had little
choice.2 °2
4. Indirect Notification of Security Interests
The alternative method, termed here the method of "indirect no-
tification," is available only where the state in which the farm prod-
ucts collateral is produced has a "central filing system" certified by
196. Other problems of interpretation relating to written notices of security interests are
discussed supra note 100. In connection with the question of whether the notice must be
signed, and if so by whom, it has been suggested that both the debtor and the secured party
should sign, to avoid potential problems. Sanford, supra note 138, at 20.
197. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(1)(A) (Supp. IV 1986).
198. See Note, Clear Title, supra note 100, at 85-86; Meyer, Agricultural Credit, supra note
150, at 498 (commenting also on the ambiguity of the "lapse" provisions of 7 U.S.C.
§ 1631(e)(1)(A)(iv) (Supp. IV 1986)); Meyer, Congress's Amendment, supra note 153, at 13.
199. See Sanford, supra note 138, at 19-20.
200. Although the term "prenotification" is sometimes used in commentary on the "clear
title" section of the Food Security Act to refer to the direct notification method of protecting a
security interest (see supra note 157), the term seems inapt, since both of the methods of notifi-
cation contemplated by the Act are usually ineffective unless the buyer receives notification of
the security interest before the sale. That this is so with regard to indirect notification, see
infra text at note 212.
201. See Clark, supra note 157, at 1338.
202. Professor Clark reports that the Comptroller of the Currency has instructed bank
examiners to treat agricultural loans as unsecured, even if the banks' security interests are
perfected under the U.C.C., if the lenders have not protected their security interests under the
Food Security Act as well. Id. at 1337. Yet, as of the time of his writing (early in 1987) only
ten states had obtained federal certifications for their central filing systems. Id. at 1339, n. 20.
Some of them were probably not in actual operation. Giving direct written notices of their
security interests was thus the only available prudent course of action for many secured
parties.
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the Secretary of Agriculture as complying with the Federal Act.2"' It
involves the secured party's filing of notice of his security interest (an
"effective financing statement" or "notice" thereof) with the central
filing system and, usually, the central filing officer's informing the
buyer of the filing, either by distributing to the buyer a summary of
filings which lists that of the secured party2" or by his informing the
buyer of the filing in response to the buyer's request for information
about filings as to a particular seller's farm products.20 5 (A central
filing made by the secured party is, by itself, sufficient to protect the
security interest against a buyer who fails to register with the central
filing officer as a person interested in receiving periodic summaries of
filings.) 20 6
This method of notification differs from the direct notification
method, not only in its more roundabout routing, but also, it appears,
in its basic purpose. Whereas a direct notification seems to be of no
value to the secured party at all unless it includes a statement of "pay-
203. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1986). There is a question as to the conclusiveness of
certification by the Department of Agriculture that a state central filing system complies with
the Act. The Act might be read as meaning that a state system must both be certified by the
Secretary of Agriculture and in fact be organized and operated in conformity with the statu-
tory requirements for a "central filing system". See Sanford, supra note 138, at 12. The De-
partment of Agriculture reads the Act that way. 9 C.F.R. § 205.214(a) (1987) (interpretive
opinion):
The requirements for a system in subsection (c) are written as the definition of the
term 'central filing system,' so that failure of a system to meet any such requirement,
either at the time of its establishment or later, will mean that it is not a 'central filing
system' as defined.
Thus, even though a state has a federally certified central filing system, the secured party has
filed a proper financing statement in the prescribed manner, and the buyer has received notice
of the filing from the central filing officer, there could be litigation over the applicability of
subsection (e)(2) or (3) of the "clear title" section. See id. § 205.214(b); Sanford, supra note
138, at 12-13.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 104 et seq.
205. Id. The inclusion of this alternative method of a buyer's being given notice of a cen-
tral filing is confusing. The Federal Act requires the central filing officer to furnish informa-
tion as to filings with respect to particular sellers or farm products, on request, only "to those
... not registered pursuant to (2)(D)" (emphasis added). 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(2)(F) (Supp. IV
1986). Such persons are subject to the security interests of secured parties who filed effective
financing statements, whether or not they received notices of the filings, under subsection
(e)(2). See 9 C.F.R. § 205.208(b) (1987) (interpretive opinion). Inquiries to central filing of-
ficers by such persons about filings as to particular farm products, before they buy, would be
prudent behavior. However, if a buyer has registered with a state central filing officer to re-
ceive copies of master lists, he need not worry about filings as to goods he buys as a buyer in
ordinary course of business unless he has actually received notice of such filings from the cen-
tral filing officer. Why would such a buyer make inquiry of the central filing officer about
particular filings covering goods he plans to buy? It would seem that he could only prejudice
his own security by doing so.
206. See supra text accompanying note 115.
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ment obligations" with which the buyer must comply in order to ob-
tain the goods free of the security interest, there is no indication in the
text of the Act that an "effective financing statement" must include
any statement of such payment obligations. Nor is there any indica-
tion that, if such obligations are shown in the financing statement, the
central filing officer must include such information in his master list
or in information given about filings in response to specific requests.
Under the indirect notification rules, the effectiveness of the security
interest appears to be preserved against the buyer, even if he is a buyer
in ordinary course of business, if the secured party has filed a proper
notice of the existence of his security interest and the central filing
officer has informed the buyer of the filing, giving him only the infor-
mation required by the Act, unless the buyer, on his own initiative,
contacts the secured party and secures a waiver or release of the se-
curity interest from him.2°7
The rationale of these rules is hard to fathom. Under the general
protective rule of subsection (d) of the "clear title" section of the
207. The required contents of an "effective financing statement" are specified by 7 U.S.C.
§ 1631(c)(4)(D) (Supp. IV 1986). See supra text accompanying note 120 et seq. They do not
include any requirement that the financing statement include a statement of "payment obliga-
tions" with which the buyer must comply "as conditions for waiver or release of the security
interest," as subsection (e)(l)(A)(v) does in specifying the form required for a direct notifica-
tion of security interest. Even if the financing statement does show such conditions, the central
filing officer is not required to include them in the information he supplies about the filing in
his "master list," copies of which are sent to registered buyers. See id. § 1631(c)(2)(C)(iii),
which requires merely that the master list contain, as to each listed financing statement, "the
information referred to paragraph (4)(D)" [sic.]. And a registered buyer "takes subject to" a
security interest if he "receives from the Secretary of State ... written notice as provided in
subparagraph (c)(2)(E) [i e., a copy of the master list or portion thereofl ... that specifies both
the seller and the farm product being sold by such seller as being subject to an effective financ-
ing statement or notice" (id. § 1631(e)(3)(A)), unless the buyer secures a waiver or release of
the security interest from the secured party (id. § 1631(e)(3)(B)).
There is a reference to performance of "payment obligation" in the portion of the Act
dealing with indirect notification. Subparagraph (e)(3)(B) indicates that a registered buyer
who has received notice of the filing of an EFS showing a security interest will take the collat-
eral subject to the security interest if he "does not secure a waiver or release of the security
interest specified in such effective financing statement or notice from the secured party by
performing any payment obligation or otherwise." (Id.) (emphasis added). That language sug-
gests to one commentator that the drafters of the Act meant to require that an EFS show
"payment obligations" in much the same manner as is required of a direct notification and also
meant to require that master lists show such payment obligations, with which the buyer is
required to comply in order to free the goods of the security interest. See Fry, Buying Farm
Products: The 1985 Farm Bill Changes the Rules of the Game, 91 COM. L.J. 433, 446 n.83
(1986). However, it appears that the commentator does not consider that language an ade-
quate basis for finding any such requirements implied. See id. at 446 n.83, 448. The words "or
otherwise" rob the reference to performance of payment obligations of much of the significance
that might be read into it if it stood alone.
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Food Security Act, a buyer in ordinary course of business of farm
products from a person engaged in farming operations "shall take free
of a security interest created by the seller, even though ... the buyer
knows of the existence of such interest. ' 20 8 Yet he "takes subject to" a
security interest if he has been notified of its existence through the
central filing system machinery.2 Why should knowledge of the se-
curity interest be irrelevant when such knowledge is acquired through
means other than a central filing system, while mere notification of
the existence of such an interest is enough to subject the buyer to the
interest when such notice has come via the central filing system?
Perhaps there are two ideas at work here. First, if the secured
party has gone to the trouble and expense of making a central filing,
in the elaborate form prescribed by the Act, it is probably because he
is worried about a real risk of his debtor's making sales of the collat-
eral in violation of the security agreement. Thus, a buyer notified of
such a filing should so much suspect the likelihood that the sale vio-
lates the rights of the secured party that he does not deserve protec-
tion as an innocent purchaser of the collateral. Second, a notice given
the buyer through the central filing system will inform him not merely
of the existence of the security interest but also of where he can obtain
further information about his seller's freedom to sell; the notice will
include the name and address of the secured party. One who knows
merely of the existence of a security interest may not know where to
find out more about it.
But if that is the rationale of the indirect notice provisions, why
would it not also be a satisfactory rationale for the direct notification
provisions, that is, why is not a direct notification effective to protect
the security interest if it discloses the existence of the security interest
and gives the name and address of the secured party? Why must a
direct notification also specify "payment obligations" to be satisfied
by the buyer?
Setting aside speculation about the policies underlying the notifi-
cation machinery set up by the Federal Act, there are some problems
of interpretation of the passages dealing with the indirect notification
method which may worry a secured party who seeks to employ it.
An apparent inconsistency in the Act is that, although it ex-
pressly states that a direct notification, to be effective against a buyer,
must have been received by him within one year prior to the sale,210
208. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d) (Supp. IV 1986).
209. Id. § 1631(e)(3).
210. Id. § 1631(e)(1)(A).
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the provisions dealing with indirect notification do not specify that
the buyer must have received notification of the filing of the security
interest within any particular period of time before the sale. Indeed,
the Act does not say that the notification must have been received by
the buyer before the sale.21' The Act will probably be read as subject-
ing a registered buyer to a security interest by reason of his having
received notification of it from the filing officer only when he has re-
ceived notification before the sale.212 As to how long such a notifica-
tion would remain effective, the answer is not certain. It may remain
effective until the central filing officer issues a new list of filings, with
respect to the farm products involved, which purports to be a com-
plete listing of all current filings affecting farm products of that type.
A Department of Agriculture regulation dealing with distributions of
the master list, or portions of it, authorizes the central filing officer,
after distributing a list of current filings, to make supplementary dis-
tributions showing only changes from the previous distribution but
requires, if this is done, that "cumulative supplements.., be distrib-
uted often enough that readers can find all the information given to
them for any one crop year in no more than three distributions. '21 3
Since a buyer searching for recorded filings as to particular farm
products is thus invited to look back no further than the most recent
cumulative supplement, a listing appearing in an earlier distribution
and not shown in the most recent cumulative supplement or its sup-
plements should not be treated as effective against the buyer.
A point on which the Federal Act is unclear is whether a pro-
spective buyer of farm products could immunize himself against the
operation of the indirect notification rules by registering with the fil-
ing officer as interested in receiving copies of portions of the master
list, but asking only for a portion or portions dealing with types of
farm products which he has no expectation of buying. The Act
clearly contemplates that prospective buyers may request only por-
tions of the master list dealing with specified types of farm products,
and that in the event that they do so the central filing officer is to send
211. Id § 1631(e)(3).
212. The obvious purpose of distribution of copies of the master list to buyers is to enable
them to discover security interests in the farm products involved before they buy the products.
This is assumed by the Department of Agriculture interpretations of the Act. See 9 C.F.R.
§ 205.213(b) (1987) (interpretive opinion referring to the "purpose for which the information
is supplied" as being to enable "[a]ny buyer of a farm product, commission merchant, or sell-
ing agent querying a master list or system operator about a prospective seller of a farm product
[to learn] whether that seller has subjected that product to a security interest .... (emphasis
added)).
213. Id. § 205.105(c).
1987-88] 669
UALR LAW JOURNAL
them only the portions requested. 214 Could the buyer then safely buy
farm products of other types and count on immunity from security
interests in those products, arguing that he never received copies of
the master list showing security interests in those products, but, as he
was "registered" with the central filing officer, he was not subject to
the security interests for failure to register? The "clear title" section
of the Food Security Act is susceptible to that reading, because sub-
section (e)(2) subjects a buyer to centrally filed security interests if
"the buyer has failed to register with the Secretary of State ... prior
to the purchase of the farm products.1215 It does not expressly re-
quire that he have registered to receive copies of portions of the
master list dealing with the farm products he actually buys in order to
avoid this rule. A possible answer is that in such a case the buyer
does not qualify as a "buyer in the ordinary course of business," be-
cause he does not buy in good faith, and he is therefore not protected
by the general rule of subsection (d). As argued above,2 16 the Act
probably should be read as incorporating a "good faith" requirement
for "ordinary course" buying, by implication. However, the Depart-
ment of Agriculture has reached the conclusion that the ploy will not
work by another route, saying in an interpretive opinion that,
"[r]egistrants will be deemed to be registered only as to those portions
of the master list for which they register ... 217
Could a buyer "beat the system" by registering with the central
filing officer just before the sale and buying before the next distribu-
tion of copies of the master list, so as not to have received notification
of the filing of any financing statement relating to the farm products
being purchased? Nothing in the text of the Act forbids it. One must
hope that the definition of "buyer in the ordinary course of business"
will be read as incorporating a requirement that the buying be in good
faith. 218
What the secured party must file, in order to take advantage of
the central filing system notification mechanism, is an "effective fi-
nancing statement" (EFS) or a "notice of" such a statement.2" 9 The
term "effective financing statement" is elaborately defined 220 and con-
stitutes a document which would give a prospective buyer of farm
214. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(2)(E) (Supp. IV 1986).
215. Id. § 1631(e)(2)(A).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 151-54.
217. 9 C.F.R. § 205.208(e) (1987).
218. See supra text accompanying notes 150-56.
219. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
220. Id. § 1631(c)(4).
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products enough information not only to warn him of a claimed se-
curity interest in those particular goods but also to lead him to the
secured party and debtor for further information.22 "Notice of" an
EFS, on the other hand, is not defined in the Act, and since such a
"notice" may apparently be filed in lieu of the filing of the financing
statement itself, the Act seems to open the possibility of some less
informative sort of filing complying with the Act. However, if a "cen-
tral filing system" is to qualify under the Act, it must include provi-
sion for compilation by the central filing officer of a "master list"
which contains, as to each filing, the same sort of information that an
effective financing statement is required to supply.2 22 Furthermore,
the distributions to registered buyers must include that informa-
tion.2 2 3 So, the Act seems to imply that a "notice of" an "effective
financing statement" must contain the same information as the financ-
ing statement.
The Department of Agriculture has tried to make sense of the
Act's authorization of the filing of a "notice of" an EFS, in interpre-
tive opinions, by reading the Act as requiring that the EFS itself be
filed somewhere ("wherever State law requires")224 but permitting
"notice of" that filing to the central filing officer by transmission (per-
haps even by telephone)22 of enough of the information contained in
the filed statement to enable the central filing officer to compile an
adequate master list.22 6 Evidently the thought is that it would be con-
sistent with the purposes of the Act for a state to accommodate se-
cured parties by authorizing them to make local filings of "effective
financing statements" (perhaps in the nearest county courthouses).
The local filing officers would then inform the central filing officer of
the filings, giving him enough information about the contents of the
statements filed to enable him to perform his own duties of compiling
a master list and sending copies of it to registered buyers. However,
the Act seems to mean, and the Department of Agriculture as-
sumes,2 2 7 that the secured party is not protected unless the central
filing officer actually receives that information.
221. See summary of requirements for an "effective financing statement," supra text ac-
companying notes 118-27.
222. See 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1986).
223. Id. § 1631(c)(2)(E).
224. 9 C.F.R. § 205.203 (1987).
225. Id. § 205.204(a).
226. Id. § 205.203.
227. Id.
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The Federal Act's definition of "effective financing statement"22
resembles, but is not identical with, the requirements for an effective
direct notification of security interest. 229 Some of the differences be-
tween the two sets of requirements are obviously due to the differing
uses to be made of the documents, one to be filed in a public office, the
other to be sent directly to buyers. As noted above,23 ° there also ap-
pears to be a difference in the underlying purposes of the two types of
notification, which calls for a direct notice of a security interest to
show "payment obligations" imposed on the buyer as conditions of
his obtaining the goods free of the security interest, whereas no such
requirement applies to an EFS. For some reason, an EFS must be
signed by the "debtor" as well as the secured party, 3 while a direct
notice of security interest apparently need be signed only by the per-
son giving the notice.2 32  And, for undecipherable reasons, a direct
notice must be "organized according to farm products," no similar
228. The definition is as follows:
(4) The term "effective financing statement" means a statement that-
(A) is an original or reproduced copy thereof;
(B) is signed and filed with the Secretary of State by the secured party;
(C) is signed by the debtor;
(D) contains,
(i) the name and address of the secured party;
(ii) the name and address of the person indebted to the secured party;
(iii) the social security number of the debtor or, in the case of a debtor
doing business other than as an individual, the Internal Revenue Service tax-
payer identification number of such debtor;
(iv) a description of the farm products subject to the security interest cre-
ated by the debtor, including the amount of such products where applicable; and
a reasonable description of the property, including county or parish in which the
property is located;
(E) must be amended in writing, within 3 months, similarly signed and filed, to
reflect material changes;
(F) remains effective for a period of 5 years from the date of filing, subject to
extensions for additional periods of 5 years each by refiling or filing a continuation
statement within 6 months before the expiration of the initial 5 year period;
(G) lapses on either the expiration of the effective period of the statement or
the filing of a notice signed by the secured party that the statement has lapsed, which-
ever occurs first;
(H) is accompanied by the requisite filing fee set by the Secretary of State; and
(I) substantially complies with the requirements of this subparagraph even
though it contains minor errors that are not seriously misleading.
7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(4) (Supp. IV 1986).
229. Compare id. § 163 1(e)(1), quoted in note 169 supra.
230. See supra text following note 161.
231. "Signed" is not defined in the Federal Act, an omission that may cause difficulties.
See Sanford, supra note 138, at 13.
232. See supra note 100.
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requirement being applicable to an EFS.2 33 Beyond these require-
ments, however, the two parts of the Act lay down requirements of
form which are defined in nearly identical terms and present much the
same problems of interpretation. Fortunately, the draftsman of an
"effective financing statement" is aided in his task by Department of
Agriculture regulations and interpretations, which appear to be au-
thorized by the "clear title" section of the Food Security Act. 3
Among the questions addressed by the regulations are those of
who must be identified in the financing statement as the "debtor" and
how he is to be identified. The regulations call for the "[n]ame and
address of each person subjecting the farm product to the security
interest, whether or not a debtor, 2 35 despite the fact that the text of
the Act calls for the "name and address of the person indebted to the
secured party; '236 and, the regulations require inclusion of the
"[s]ocial security number or, if other than a natural person, IRS tax-
payer identification number, of each such person, 237 though the stat-
ute calls for such numerical identification of the "debtor. ' 23  As the
Department reads the Act, in a case where the secured debt is owed
by one person but the collateral is owned by another, the EFS would
have to contain full identifications of both, a sensible reading which
cuts through the difficulties posed by inept statutory language.239
As to the description of the collateral to be provided in an EFS,
the guiding principles of the Department's reading of the Act appear
to be that the statement must describe the collateral in such a way as
(a) to identify the particular goods which are subject to the security
interest, and (b) to make possible preparation by the central filing of-
ficer of a "master list" of filings which complies with the Act. Since
the master list must be "organized according to farm products, ' '2 °
the financing statement must identify the collateral by "[f]arm prod-
uct name, '24 and the Department supplies a list of farm product
233. See supra text accompanying notes 190-92.
234. "The Secretary of Agriculture shall prescribe regulations ... to aid States in the im-
plementation and management of a central filing system." 7 U.S.C. § 1631(i) (Supp. IV 1986).
235. 9 C.F.R. § 205.103(a)(4) (1987).
236. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(4)(D)(ii) (Supp. IV 1986); supra note 228.
237. 9 C.F.R. § 205.103(a)(5) (1987) (emphasis added).
238. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(4)(D)(iii) (Supp. IV 1987); supra note 228.
239. See also 9 C.F.R. § 205.213(b) (1987). This question also affects the question of who
should sign the EFS as "debtor." The prudent course would be for the secured party to per-
suade all persons identified as debtors to sign. See Sanford, supra note 138, at 14.
240. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(2)(C)(i) (Supp. IV 1986).
241. 9 C.F.R. § 205.103(a)(2) (1987) (regulation). See also 9 C.F.R. § 205.106 (1987) (reg-
ulation). Mr. Sanford, supra note 138, at 14, reads these regulations as requiring that any
proceeds of collateral which are also farm products be described in the EFS by farm product
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names from which the choice should be made.242 The master list,
within each product category, must be organized "geographically by
county or parish; ' 243 therefore, the financing statement must list
"[e]ach county or parish in the [state where the filing is to be made]
where the farm product is produced or to be produced."' 2" The
master list must be organized "by crop year. "245 Hence, even though
the Act does not expressly require that an EFS show crop year, the
financing statement must show "[c]rop year unless every crop of the
farm product in question, for the duration of the EFS, is to be subject
to the particular security interest." '246 Beyond these specific require-
ments, the test of sufficiency is the adequacy of the description of any
farm product which is "subject to the security interest ... to distin-
guish it from other such product owned by the same person or per-
sons but not subject to the particular security interest.1 247 Thus, for
example, if the secured party claims a security interest in all of a
named type of product owned by a particular person in a designated
county or parish, the location of the collateral need not be more par-
ticularly described, but if only part of such goods are subject to the
security interest, the description must indicate which part is subject to
the security interest.248 Similarly, the amount of the goods subject to
the security interest need not be specified unless the description given
would, without such specification, include farm products to which the
security interest does not apply.24 9
The indirect notification method of protecting a security interest
has the advantage for the secured party of requiring that he give only
one notice, by filing one EFS with the filing officer designated by state
law, rather than sending notices to all potential buyers of the collat-
eral.25 ° However, it has the disadvantage that the filing is only the
name as well, Le., that a simple claim to "proceeds" of collateral will not do if the proceeds are
themselves farm products.
242. 9 C.F.R. § 205.206 (1987). Oddly, this list appears in an "Interpretive Opinion,"
rather than in a "Regulation."
243. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(2)(C)(ii)(III) (Supp. IV 1986).
244. 9 C.F.R. § 205.103(a)(3) (1987) (regulation).
245. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(2)(C)(ii)(IV) (Supp. IV 1986).
246. 9 C.F.R. § 205.103(a)(1) (1987) (regulation) (emphasis in original). See also id.
§ 205.107 (regulation defining "crop year").
247. Id. § 205.103(a)(6) (regulation).
248. Id. § 205.207(c) (interpretive opinion). For further discussion of the location-descrip-
tion requirement see Sanford, supra note 138, at 15.
249. See 9 C.F.R. § 205.207(b) (1987) (interpretive opinion).
250. Furthermore, the filing remains effective for a period of five years and its effectiveness
can be continued by refiling or by filing a continuation statement. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(4)(F)
(Supp. IV 1986).
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first step toward protection of the security interest, for the filing does
not, of itself, operate as notice to any buyer who has registered with
the central filing officer. Its effectiveness against a registered buyer
depends on the buyer's having been notified of the filing by the central
filing officer, either by sending to him, and the buyer's "receipt ' 251 of,
a copy of the portion of the master list which shows the particular
filing or by informing the buyer of the filing in response to an inquiry
from the buyer.25 2 Since copies of the master list are required to be
distributed to registered buyers only "regularly as prescribed by the
State, ' 253 the secured party must accept the risk that a sale may occur
before the buyer receives his notice of the secured party's filing and
that the buyer will therefore take the goods free of the security inter-
est despite the filing. 254 Another risk for the secured party arises from
the possibility that the central filing officer will fail to list the filed
financing statement in his master list, or will record it incorrectly.
The secured party, rather than the buyer, apparently bears the burden
of such errors.2 5
251. "What constitutes receipt, as used in this section, shall be determined by the law of
the state in which the buyer resides." 7 U.S.C. § 1631(f) (Supp. IV 1986). It follows that if a
buyer who registers with a state's central filing officer lives in another state, his "receipt" of a
notification from the central filing officer will depend on the definition of "receipt" embodied
in the law of the buyer's state, not that of the state of the central filing system with which he
has registered. For a discussion of potential problems arising from this rule, see Sanford, supra
note 138, at 22-23.
252. See supra text accompanying notes 116-17. This feature of the "clear title" section of
the Food Security Act differs notably from the effect of filing a financing statement under the
U.C.C. A properly drawn and filed Code "financing statement" perfects the security interest
and gives the secured party the benefits that flow from perfection, whether the rival claimant is
aware of the filing when his interest in the goods arises or not. It is thefiling that perfects the
security interest. On the other hand, a Code filing which is made in good faith in an improper
place or not in all places required by Article 9 is nevertheless "effective with regard to collat-
eral covered by the financing statement against any person who has knowledge of the contents
of such financing statement." U.C.C. § 9-401(2) (1978).
253. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(2)(E) (Supp. IV 1986). An Agriculture Department interpretive
opinion asserts that "distribution must be timely to serve its purpose" and that the "frequency
of such distribution must be a consideration in review for certification" but recognizes that the
states have "discretion to choose the interval between distributions." 9 C.F.R. § 205.208(f)
(1987).
254. The Agriculture Department interpretive opinion cited in the preceding note observes
that "whatever interval a State chooses will inevitably make possible some transactions in
which security interests are filed in the system but registrants are not subject to them." Id. See
also Note, Clear Title, supra note 100, at 91 (suggesting that "pre-notification will be an ideal
alternative" in the interim, a suggestion not likely to be of much comfort to a secured party
who is unaware of an impending sale).
255. An Agriculture Department interpretive opinion observes that, "Legislative history of
the Section shows that buyers, commission merchants, and selling agents are not intended to
be liable for errors or other inaccuracies generated by the system," citing Senate and House
debates. 9 C.F.R. § 205.208(g) (1987). See also Note, Clear Title, supra note 100, at n. 164.
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Additional risks for the secured party seem to lurk in the Federal
Act's provisions regarding amendment of EFS filings to reflect "mate-
rial changes. '256 The Act includes in the definition of "effective fi-
nancing statement" a requirement that the statement "be amended in
writing, within [three] months, similarly signed and filed, to reflect
material changes." '257 The Act does not define "material changes."
The Department of Agriculture interprets the phrase as referring to
"whatever change would render the master list entry no longer in-
formative as to what is subject to the security interest in question. 258
An example might be a case where, under the terms of the security
agreement, the secured party was granted a security interest if "all
livestock now or hereafter owned by debtor." Suppose the debtor's
only livestock at the time of the filing by the secured party of his EFS
consisted of cattle, which were adequately described in the EFS, and
the debtor subsequently acquired some hogs as well; presumably, an
amendment of the EFS would have to be filed, describing the hogs as
security for the debt, in addition to the debtor's cattle.259 A problem
that might arise here is that the secured party might be unaware of
the change in the character of the collateral and therefore would fail
to make timely filing of an amendment. Would a registered buyer of
the new collateral take subject to the security interest? The Depart-
ment of Agriculture's interpretations hedge on the question, pointing
out that "the Section is silent as to the consequences, ' 2 ° but sug-
gesting that legislative history points in the direction of placing the
burden of this risk on the secured party.2 6'
Another question is whether, if the secured party does file an
amendment within three months after the change occurs, his security
interest in the collateral described in the amendment (but not de-
scribed in the EFS originally filed) is enforceable against a registered
buyer who buys the new collateral before the amendment has been
filed, or before he is notified by the filing officer of that filing.2 62 Given
256. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(4)(E) (Supp. IV 1986).
257. Id. "Similarly signed" evidently requires that both the secured party and the debtor
sign the amendment, a requirement that could cause trouble for the secured party. See San-
ford, supra note 138, at 15-16.
258. 9 C.F.R. § 205.209(a) (1987).
259. Mr. Sanford, supra note 138, at 16, suggests that amendments would also be required
where locations of collateral change or collateral is transferred to a new owner.
260. 9 C.F.R. § 205.209(b) (1987).
261. See id.
262. The published regulations and interpretive opinions of the Department of Agriculture
do not deal with this question.
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the general pro-buyer orientation of the "clear title" rules,263 it seems
unlikely that the intent of the rule on amendment of filed financing
statements was to subject the buyer to the security interest in these
circumstances. It would give the amendment a retroactive effect
which the original financing statement did not have.
Assuming that is so, what is the effect of a late filing of an
amendment? To read the Act as meaning merely that the buyer does
not become subject to the security interest unless he receives notice of
the amendment before he buys ignores the fact that the Act sets a
specific three-month deadline for such a filing. To give that time limit
effect, the Act seemingly must be read as meaning that the amend-
ment never becomes effective as notice to registered buyers, if it is
filed more than three months after the material change occurs; or,
more drastically, that the original financing statement becomes inef-
fective at the expiration of three months after a material change oc-
curs unless an amendment reflecting the change has been filed within
that time. (The same problem arises in connection with direct notifi-
cations of security interests, for identical language requiring amend-
ments to reflect material changes appears in the subsection dealing
with such direct notifications.) 264
On the other hand, the Act seems to subject the buyer to one type
of risk, which develops when farm products collateral moves from its
state of origin to another state, where it is sold by the debtor. If the
state in which the farm products were "produced" has a "central fil-
ing system" certified as complying with the Federal Act, and if the
secured party has properly filed an EFS in that state, but the buyer
has not registered with the central filing officer of that state prior to
his purchase of the collateral, it appears that he "takes subject to [the]
security interest. 2 65 It is entirely possible that the buyer will be una-
ware of the state of origin of the collateral, and thus not able to regis-
ter with the filing officer of that state, prior to the sale.266 Despite the
fact that one of the stated reasons for Congressional enactment of the
"clear title" section of the Food Security Act was to correct the injus-
tice produced by subjecting a buyer to a security interest when the
buyer "lacks any practical method for discovering the existence of the
263. See supra text accompanying note 261.
264. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. IV 1986). See Meyer, Agricultural Credit, supra
note 150, at 497.
265. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(2) (Supp. IV 1986).
266. The buyer may also have a problem of determining where particular farm products
were "produced," even if he knows all of the relevant facts. See Sanford, supra note 138, at 21.
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security interest, 2 6 7 the wording of the statute seems to compel the
result that the buyer takes subject to the security interest in these
circumstances.268
5. Effect on U.C.C. Rules Other Than Section 9-307(1)
One point that is clear from the statutory text and its legislative
history269 (but which may not be so clear to financers of agricultural
operations) is that, despite the use of confusingly similar terminology
in both statutes, a filing conforming to the "clear title" section of the
Food Security Act is not the equivalent of a filing under Article 9 of
the Uniform Commercial Code. It does not "perfect" a security inter-
est, within the meaning of that term in Article 9, nor does it give the
secured party as protected a status as he would have if he did perfect
his security interest under Article 9. The Federal Act's filing system
is superimposed on the Article 9 system for perfection of security in-
terests and has the limited purpose of enabling the secured party to
enforce his security interest against buyers of farm products from his
debtor (and against commission merchants and selling agents who sell
the products for the debtor).
When collateral takes the form of any type of property that is not
within the definition of "farm products," as the Federal Act defines
that term, the Federal Act does not alter the operation of Article 9 of
the U.C.C. at all. Even if "farm products" are involved, the secured
party must "perfect" his security interest in accordance with Article 9
in order to gain rights against persons other than buyers of those
products, such as "lien creditors" 270 and other secured parties claim-
267. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1986) (the statement of findings prompting the enact-
ment of the "clear title" section, quoted supra note 152).
268. See 9 C.F.R. § 205.210(b) (1987) (interpretive opinion); Note, Clear Title, supra note
100, at 94-95.
269. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 135, at 110 (commenting on the House bill which
ultimately became the Food Security Act of 1985):
The bill is intended to preempt state law (specifically the so-called "farm prod-
ucts exception" of [U.C.C.] Section 9-307) to the extent necessary to achieve the
goals of this legislation. Thus, this Act would preempt state laws that set as condi-
tions for buyer protection of the type provided by the bill requirements that the buyer
check public records, obtain no-lien certificates from the farm products sellers, or
otherwise seek out the lender and account to that lender for the sale proceeds. By
contrast, the bill would not preempt basic state-law rules on the creation, perfection
or priority of security interests.
(Although the bill was considerably amended before its final passage, none of the changes
made after this House Report was filed suggests an intent that would invalidate the final sen-
tence of the passage quoted.)
270. A "lien creditor" is "a creditor who has acquired a lien on the property involved by
attachment, levy or the like;" the term also includes "an assignee for benefit of creditors from
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ing rights in the same collateral.271  That may require filing, but it will
the time of assignment, and a trustee in bankruptcy [a secured party's bete noire] from the date
of the filing of the petition or a receiver in equity from the time of appointment." U.C.C. § 9-
301(3) (1978). As a general rule, "an unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights
of... a person who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected." Id. § 9-
301(l)(b). An exception is made in favor of a secured party who has a "purchase money
security interest;" such a secured party can gain priority over a lien creditor who has become
such while the security interest was unperfected if the secured party files within a certain
period after the debtor receives possession of the collateral. Under the 1978 Official Text this
period is ten days. Id. § 9-301(2). Under the Arkansas Code, as a result of a 1983 amend-
ment, the period is 21 days. Act of March 21, 1983, No. 561, 1983 Ark. Acts 1190 (codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-301(2) (1987)).
271. U.C.C. § 9-312 contains an elaborate set of rules governing priorities among conflict-
ing security interests in the same collateral. Arkansas amendments have produced some de-
partures from the Official Text. See, e.g., Act of April 2, 1987, No. 560, 1987 Ark. Acts 1565
(Adv. Leg. Ser.) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-312 (Supp. 1987)); supra note 270.
One commentator has found a circular-priority problem in the interaction between the
Food Security Act and the U.C.C. See Note, Clear Title, supra note 100, at 93-94. Assume
that First Bank makes a loan to Farmer and takes a security interest in his farm products.
First Bank perfects its security interest under the U.C.C. but fails to protect its security inter-
est against buyers under the Federal Act. Second Bank then makes a loan to Farmer, taking a
security interest in the same farm products, failing to perfect its security interest under the
U.C.C. but giving Buyer direct notification of its security interest under the "clear title" sec-
tion of the Food Security Act. Farmer sells his products to Buyer, who is a buyer in ordinary
course of business; the sale violates the terms of both security agreements, and neither bank
receives any of the proceeds. Under the Federal Act Buyer would take the goods subject to
Second Bank's security interest but not subject to First Bank's security interest. However,
under the U.C.C., §§ 9-301(l)(a) and 9-312(5)(a), First Bank's security interest is entitled to
priority over that of Second Bank. The writer of the Note concludes that First Bank has
priority over Second Bank but Buyer has priority over First Bank, and Second Bank has prior-
ity over Buyer. See Note, Clear Title, supra note 100, at 94. The commentator suggests that
there are a number of possible solutions but recommends that secured parties avoid the prob-
lem by protecting themselves fully under both acts. See id. No doubt that is good advice, and
there is a vexing problem in this fact situation, but it does not seem to be a problem of circular
priorities in claim to the goods sold, if the Federal Act can be taken literally. As far as the
goods are concerned, Second Bank has a good claim to them, unless the buyer satisfied the
"payment obligations" shown in Second Bank's direct notification of security interest, but
First Bank has no claim to the goods, against Buyer or Second Bank, for the Federal Act
provides that the buyer takes "free of" First Bank's security interest. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d)
(Supp. IV 1986). The problem relates to the proceeds of the collateral. Both banks probably
have security interests in the proceeds under U.C.C. § 9-306(2), and First Bank may well have
priority over Second Bank in claim to the proceeds. (Under the U.C.C. § 9-306(3) First
Bank's security interest in the proceeds is treated as perfected, at least temporarily, and possi-
bly permanently, since its security interest in the original collateral was perfected. Under
U.C.C. § 9-312(5)(a) First Bank's perfected security interest has priority over Second Bank's,
if Second Bank's interest in the proceeds was unperfected.) Yet, to take the goods free of
Second Bank's security interest under the Federal Act, Buyer must satisfy the "payment obli-
gations" imposed by Second Bank in its notification of its security interest. 7 U.S.C.
§ 1631(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1986). Since such payment obligations are likely to call for payment to
Second Bank, could Buyer safely comply with them if First Bank had the prior claim to the
proceeds of the collateral? And if Buyer paid First Bank instead, would he take the goods free
of Second Bank's security interest under the Federal Act?
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be filing of a "financing statement" complying with the requirements
of Article 9 of the Code,27 2 and filing in the place or places specified
by the Code.273
On the other hand, the Federal Act clearly nullifies the "farm
products" exception of section 9-307(1) of the U.C.C. almost entirely,
and it appears also to alter the operation of section 9-301(1)(c).274 In
the discussion of that provision above,2 75 it was observed that the op-
eration of the rule is to immunize buyers of goods from "unperfected"
security interests in those goods, even if they are not buyers in ordi-
nary course of business, if the buyers both give value and receive de-
livery of the goods without knowledge of the security interest.
However, the "clear title" section of the Food Security Act, in its
subsection (e), provides that, "[a] buyer of farm products takes subject
to a security interest created by the seller" in the circumstances de-
scribed in that subsection, none of which requires that the buyer actu-
ally know of the security interest. And, nothing in the wording of the
272. An "effective financing statement" under the Federal Act differs from a "financing
statement" which satisfies the requirements of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code in at
least the following respects:
(1) An EFS must be signed by both the secured party and the "debtor." 7 U.S.C.
§ 1631(c)(4)(B), (C) (Supp. IV 1986). A Code financing statement must be signed by "the
debtor" but not by the secured party, as a general rule. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1978). In some
circumstances it can be signed by the secured party instead of the debtor. Id. § 9-402(2).
(2) An EFS must contain not only the "name and address of the person indebted to the
secured party" but also the social security number or taxpayer ID number of the "debtor." 7
U.S.C. § 163 1(c)(4)(D)(ii), (iii) (Supp. IV 1986). The U.C.C. requires only the name and mail-
ing address of the debtor in a financing statement. U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1978).
(3) An EFS must contain "a description of the farm products subject to the security
interest." 7 U.S.C. § 163 1(c)(4)(D)(iv) (Supp. IV 1986). This means a description adequate to
identify the particular goods subject to the security interest. See supra text accompanying
notes 240-49. A U.C.C. financing statement may describe the collateral specifically, but it is
enough for it to indicate "the types ... of collateral." U.C.C. § 9-402(1) (1978).
(4) An EFS "must be amended.., within 3 months.., to reflect material changes." 7
U.S.C. § 1631(c)(4)(E) (Supp. IV 1986); see supra text at notes 256-64. The U.C.C. permits
amendment of a filed financing statement "by filing a writing signed by both the debtor and the
secured party" but does not require amendment within any particular time after changes oc-
cur, and apparently the only penalty for failure to file such an amendment is that a security
interest in collateral not described in the original filing is not perfected by filing until an
amendment containing such a description is filed. U.C.C. § 9-402(4) (1978). See also Note,
Clear Title, supra note 100, at 82.
273. The place of filing for farm products under the Arkansas U.C.C. is a county office, or
perhaps more than one county office (see supra text accompanying notes 50-52), whereas filing
of an EFS under the Food Security Act must be with the "Secretary of State" of the state in
which the farm products have been or are to be produced. 7 U.S.C. § 163 1(c)(4)(B), (e)(2), (3)
(Supp. IV 1986).
274. See Meyer, Congress's Amendment, supra note 153, at 7; Note, Section 1324 of the
Food Security Act, supra note 74, at 471.
275. See supra text at notes 42-44.
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subsection suggests that the security interest must be "perfected"
under Article 9 to be effective against the buyer.21 6 The subsection
refers to "[a] buyer," and since the preceding subsection speaks of "a
buyer who in the ordinary course of business buys," subsection (e)
presumably means "any buyer." Furthermore, the subsection subor-
dinates a buyer to "a security interest created by his seller," without
express limitation to perfected security interests, and there is no rea-
son to believe that the omission was inadvertent, since the immedi-
ately preceding subsection shows awareness of the concept of
perfection. Where "farm products" collateral is concerned, then, it
appears that by operation of subsection (e) of the Federal Act, the
holder of an unperfected security interest will sometimes be able to
enforce that interest against a buyer who was entirely unaware of the
security interest when he took possession of and paid for the goods.
There is also a question regarding the effect of the Federal Act on
section 9-306(2) of the U.C.C. The earlier discussion of this Code
section2 7 7 brought out that the Code rule operates to divest a security
interest in collateral when the debtor sells or otherwise disposes of the
collateral, if the disposition has been "authorized by the secured party
in the security agreement or otherwise." The question of when a dis-
position of collateral has been so "authorized" has provoked a good
deal of litigation, particularly with regard to farm products collateral.
Does the Federal Act change the operation of this rule?
To some extent, it appears that it does. As previously sug-
gested,278 the provisions of paragraph (e)(1) of the "clear title" section
of the Food Security Act-those dealing with the direct notification
device for protection of a security interest-seem to nullify prohibi-
tions of sale of the collateral which may appear in a security agree-
ment, as well as some conditions imposed on the debtor's freedom of
sale by the secured party, when the secured party elects to employ the
direct notification method of protecting his security interests. The
only conditions which can remain effective against a buyer in ordinary
course of business to whom such notification is given, it seems, are
conditions regarding payment which can be complied with by the
buyer.279 The Federal Act thus overrides, to a substantial degree, the
276. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e) (Supp. IV 1986).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 13-39.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 157-62.
279. The statement probably needs qualification in a case where the secured party has not
only given direct notification but also made a proper central filing and the buyer has either
failed to register with the central filing officer or has received notice of the filing from the
central filing officer after registering. By operation of paragraphs (2) and (3) of subsection (e)
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affirmative rule of U.C.C. section 9-306(2) that a security interest
"continues in collateral notwithstanding sale . . . thereof by the
debtor," when the sale has not been "authorized."
Does the Act go further and nullify, wholly or partially, the im-
plication of U.C.C. section 9-306(2) that if the buyer's disposition of
the collateral was "authorized in the security agreement or other-
wise," the security interest is divested by the disposition? One com-
mentator on the "clear title" section of the Food Security Act has
argued that it does, or at least that it causes a security interest in farm
products to continue in the collateral and makes the interest enforcea-
ble against a buyer of the collateral despite an authorization for the
debtor's sale which is found in an "implied waiver" arising from the
secured party's dealings with the debtor.280 The basis for this conclu-
sion is the declaration of subsection (e) of the Federal Act that, "[a]
buyer of farm products takes subject to a security interest created by
the seller if" the direct notification or indirect notification rules of the
subsection have been satisfied, without providing that this rule applies
only to "unauthorized" sales.28 While the wording of subsection (e),
standing alone, may suggest such a reading, it is hard to accept when
the "clear title" section is read as a whole and in the light of its his-
tory. The section itself shows that Congress was concerned about the
plight of a buyer who buys without knowledge "that the sale of the
products violates the lender's security interest in the products. 282
Legislative history indicates that Congress meant to displace Code
rules only to the extent necessary to give some protection to such a
of the "clear title" section, the buyer would probably take the goods "subject to a security
interest created by his seller" in any case where the sale was unauthorized unless he negotiated
a release of the security interest from the secured party, since paragraphs (2) and (3) do not
require that the financing statement or any notice given to the buyer by the central filing officer
inform him of conditions with which he must comply in order to obtain the goods free of the
security interest. See discussion of this difference between direct and indirect notifications in
the text supra following note 206.
280. See Sanford, supra note 138, at 9-10.
281. Id. The argument is that the direct notification provisions of paragraph (e)(1) state
the exclusive method by which a buyer can be freed from a security interest of which he has
been given direct notification (namely, by complying with the payment obligations set forth in
the notice), and that, although the parts of subsection (e) dealing with central filing systems are
more ambiguous, they can be read as meaning that the only way a buyer who has received
indirect notification of a security interest can take free of the interest is by obtaining an explicit
waiver or release of the security interest from the secured party. Furthermore, Mr. Sanford
argues, "Unless the conflicting results under Section 9-306(2) are preempted, the [Food Secur-
ity Act] will not have accomplished its presumed goal in creating order, certainty, and simplic-
ity in this area of the law." Id. at 10.
282. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(a) (Supp. IV 1986).
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buyer.283 The sounder interpretation of subsection (e) thus seems to
be that the subsection makes a buyer "subject to" a security interest
only where there would be a continuing security interest under
U.C.C. rules, and therefore that neither the divesting effect of section
9-306(2) nor the courts' determinations of what constitutes an author-
ization of sale under that subsection are overridden by the Federal
Act.
2 8 4
6. Protection of Commission Merchants and Selling Agents
The foregoing analysis of the "clear title" section of the Food
Security Act has centered on its operation in favor of or against buy-
ers of encumbered farm products, because the primary focus of this
article is on the effect of the Federal Act on Arkansas' Uniform Com-
mercial Code. Neither the Official Text of the U.C.C. nor the Arkan-
sas U.C.C., as it read prior to 1986, had anything to say about the
potential liability of persons who act as agents for owners of goods in
conducting sales which violate the rights of secured parties. A
number of cases decided prior to the advent of the Food Security Act
have involved suits brought against such agents to hold them liable
for the value of the goods or the value of the proceeds of the sales on a
theory of conversion; such suits have succeeded at times.2 5 A person
acting as agent for the owner of the goods for the purpose of sale, no
matter how innocently he may act, is not a "buyer" of the goods and
hence cannot be a "buyer in the ordinary course of business," nor
does any other Article 9 rule explicitly protect such an agent. To hold
intermediaries of this sort liable to the secured party for their partici-
pation in unauthorized sales of collateral, even when they have acted
in good faith and without reason to know of the impropriety of the
sales, may seem particularly unjust.2 8 6 A few states had legislation
protecting these intermediaries, or some of them, prior to the enact-
283. See supra note 269.
284. Mr. Sanford also raises the question whether the "clear title" section of the Food
Security Act changes the operation of U.C.C. § 9-318(3), which permits an assignee of an
account or other payment right to notify the obligor that direct payment is to be made to the
assignee and requires the obligor to comply with such notification. He concludes that § 9-318
is unaffected because the Federal Act deals only with security interests in goods, not with such
interests in payment obligations resulting from their sale. See Sanford, supra note 138, at 10-
11. That reading appears correct.
285. See supra note 40. See also Meyer, The 9-307(1) Farm Products Puzzle: Its Parts and
Its Future, 60 N.D.L. REV. 401, 426 (1984).
286. See Uchtmann, Bauer & Dudek, The UCC Farm Products Exception-A Time to
Change, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1315, 1331-32 (1985).
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ment of the Food Security Act.28 7
The extension of the "clear title" section of the Food Security
Act to protect "commission merchants" and "selling agents" from
liability to holders of security interests in farm products they sell for
farmers (if those interests were created by the sellers) 288 is thus under-
standable, even though such agents are not mentioned in the congres-
sional findings explaining the reasons for the enactment of the
section.2 8 9 The rules applicable to commission merchants and selling
agents, defining the circumstances in which they will or will not be
"subject to" a security interest in farm products, almost exactly dupli-
cate those applicable to buyers and present the same problems of in-
terpretation and application,29° with one additional element of
ambiguity. To merit protection against a security interest under the
rule of paragraph (g)(1), the agent must be one who "sells, in the ordi-
287. See id. at 1330-31 (citing Georgia and Nebraska as having done so by amendments to
their U.C.C.s and Louisiana in its own law dealing with security interests in livestock).
288. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(g) (Supp. IV 1986).
289. Id. § 1631(a).
290. The general rule protecting commission merchants and selling agents, as well as the
exceptions to it, all appear in a single subjection of the "clear title" section of the Food Secur-
ity Act, subsection (g). See id. § 1631(g) (Supp. IV 1986).
The first paragraph of subsection (g) is in substance much the same as subsection (d),
which is the general rule protecting buyers who in ordinary course of business buy farm prod-
ucts from persons engaged in farming operations. Under subsection (d) such a buyer "shall
take free of a security interest created by the seller, even though the security interest is per-
fected; and the buyer knows of the existence of such interest." Id. § 1631(d). Under para-
graph (1) of subsection (g) the general rule is that
a commission merchant or selling agent who sells, in the ordinary course of business,
a farm product for others, shall not be subject to a security interest created by the
seller in such farm product even though the security interest is perfected and even
though the commission merchant or selling agent knows of the existence of such
interest.
Id. § 1631(g)(1).
Paragraph (2) of subsection (g) is the counterpart, with respect to commission merchants
and selling agents, of subsection (e), applicable to buyers. Paragraph (2) sets forth the excep-
tions to the rule of paragraph (g)(1), just as subsection (e) provides exceptions to the general
rule of subsection (d). Whereas subsection (e) begins, "A buyer of farm products takes subject
to a security interest created by the seller if...", paragraph (g)(2) begins, "A commission
merchant or selling agent who sells a farm product for others shall be subject to a security
interest created by the seller in such product if .. " Id. § 1631(e) & (g)(2). What follows in
paragraph (g)(2) tracks what follows the introductory language of subsection (e) virtually
word for word, except that the phrase "commission merchant or selling agent" is substituted
for "buyer" wherever "buyer" appears in subsection (e). Thus, for example, paragraph
(2)(A)(v) of subsection (g) requires that a direct notification of a security interest given by a
secured party or seller to a commission merchant or selling agent show "any payment obliga-
tions imposed on the commission merchant or selling agent as conditions for waiver or release
of the security interest." Id. § 163 l(g)(2)(A)(v) (emphasis added). Further, paragraph (2)(B)
requires that the commission merchant or selling agent have performed the payment obliga-
tions in order to avoid being subject to the security interest. Id. § 163 1(g)(2)(B). In subsection
684
"CLEAR TITLE" FOR FARM PRODUCTS
nary course of business, a farm product for others. ' 291 Does this im-
ply, not merely regularity of the form and circumstances of the
transaction, but also that the agent must have been acting in good
faith and without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of the
secured party? There is less basis in the language of the Act or its
history for determining the intended meaning of the phrase "ordinary
course of business," as applied to the conduct of agents for purposes
of sale, than there is for reading the Act as requiring that a buyer, to
qualify as a "buyer in the ordinary course of business" be acting in
good faith.292 But if, as has been argued,2 93 such a requirement is
implied by the latter definition, it seems probable that Congress meant
a similar requirement to apply to commission merchants and selling
agents.
Another potential problem affecting commission merchants and
selling agents is raised by the Federal Act's provision that "[w]hat
constitutes receipt, as used in this section, shall be determined by the
law of the State in which the buyer resides. ' 294 That this rule is in-
tended to apply to notifications sent directly or indirectly to commis-
sion merchants and selling agents is apparent from its inclusion in the
subsection dealing with such agents.29" The commission merchant or
selling agent for whom a notification is intended may reside and do
business in a state other than the state in which the buyer of the goods
resides (in fact, there may be no identifiable buyer at the time the
notification is sent). Yet the question of whether the agent has "re-
ceived" the notification is governed by the law of the state where who-
ever turns out to be the buyer resides, or so the Act seems plainly to
mean. 296 An Agriculture Department interpretive opinion takes this
bull by the horns, by declaring that "buyer," in this context, means
"intended recipient of the notice. ' 297 The courts may not agree with
this reading.298
(e) exactly the same wording appears, except that "buyer" appears in place of the italicized
words above.
Paragraph (3) of subsection (g) duplicates the rule of subsection (f), declaring, "What
constitutes receipt, as used in this section, shall be determined by the law of the State in which
the buyer resides." Id. § 163 1(g)(3).
291. Id. § 1631(g)(1) (emphasis added).
292. Compare discussion supra text accompanying notes 151-54.
293. Id.
294. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(g)(3) (Supp. IV 1986).
295. An identical rule appears in subsection (f), which immediately follows the subsection
dealing with when buyers take subject to security interests. See id. § 1631(f).
296. See Sanford, supra note 138, at 22.
297. 9 C.F.R. § 205.210(c) (1987).
298. See Sanford, supra note 138, at 22.
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III. THE ARKANSAS LEGISLATION
A. Summary of the Legislation
The Federal Act invites the states to enact their own laws setting
up "central filing systems." The Arkansas General Assembly ac-
cepted this invitation in 1986. Act 16 of the Second Extraordinary
Session of that year 2 9 amended sections 9-307300 and 9-40731 of Ar-
kansas' Uniform Commercial Code, with the declared intent of com-
plying with the "clear title" section of the Food Security Act of
1985.302 These Arkansas amendments became effective December 1,
1986.303
Section 1 of Act 16 amended section 9-307 of the U.C.C. by ad-
ding three subsections. The new subsection (4) provides:
A secured party may enforce a security interest in farm products
against a buyer who, in the ordinary course of business, purchases
farm products from, or a commission merchant or selling agent
who, in the ordinary course of business, sells farm products for, a
person engaged in farming operations only where the secured party
has signed and filed with the Secretary of State a form containing
[specified information]. 3"
The form must contain essentially the same information that is re-
quired by the Food Security Act to appear in an "effective financing
statement, ' 30 5 and which is signed by the "debtor" as is also required
by the Federal Act.3"6
The new subsection (5) of section 9-307307 defines the terms
"commission merchant" and "selling agent" identically with the Fed-
eral Act.30 8 The new subsection (6) of section 9-307,309 requiring
amendment of a filing in the event that "a material change occurs," is
299. Act of May 19, 1986, No. 16 (2d. Ext. Sess.) (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-9-
307, -407 (1987) (amended 1987)).
300. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-307 (Interim Supp. 1986) (current version at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-9-307 (1987 & Supp. 1987)).
301. Id. § 85-9-407 (current version at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-407 (1987)).
302. Act of May 19, 1986, No. 16 (2d Ext. Sess.) (short title).
303. Id. § 5 (effective date).
304. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-307(4) (Interim Supp. 1986) (current version at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-9-307(4) (1987 & Supp. 1987)).
305. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(4) (Supp. IV 1986). See also supra text accompanying notes 118-
25.
306. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(4)(C) (Supp. IV 1986).
307. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-307(5) (Interim Supp. 1986) (current version at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-9-307(5) (1987 & Supp. 1987)).
308. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(3), (8) (Supp. IV 1986); see supra note 94.
309. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-307(6) (Interim Supp. 1986) (current version at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-9-307(6) (1987 & Supp. 1987)).
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in substantial accord with the Food Security Act 31 but adds that
"[t]he effectiveness and continuation of the form is to be treated as if
it were a financing statement."
The second section of Act 16 amended section 9-407 of Arkan-
sas' U.C.C. by adding five new subsections, all dealing with the duties
of the Secretary of State in the administration of the central filing
system. Subsection (3) of amended section 9-407311 calls for recorda-
tion of the date and time of filing of each financing statement covering
farm products and compilation of a "master list" of the filings (sub-
stantially in accord with the requirements of the Food Security
Act 312 ). The new subsection (4) of section 9-407313 mandates mainte-
nance of a list of buyers, commission merchants and selling agents
who have registered to indicate interest in receiving the master lists or
portions thereof (as is required by the Federal Act 14). New subsec-
tion (5) of section 9-407315 requires distribution "on a regular basis as
determined by the Secretary" of copies of the master list or portions
of it to registered buyers, commission merchants and selling agents
who have requested such distributions (as is required by the Federal
Act3 16). New subsection (6) of section 9-407 calls for the Secretary of
State, "[u]pon the request of any person [to] provide to such person,
within 24 hours, an oral confirmation followed by a written confirma-
tion of the filing of any effective financing statement filed [under sec-
tion 9-307(4)] and relating to the debtor or seller upon whom such
information has been requested. ' 317 This is similar to the language of
the Federal Act, though the Federal Act requires such a "confirma-
tion" to be given only "to those not registered" as wanting to receive
copies of the master list.318 The new subsection (7) of section 9-407319
prescribes fees to be charged for the several services to be rendered by
the Secretary of State.
310. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(4)(E) (Supp. IV 1986).
311. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-407(3) (Interim Supp. 1986) (current version at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-9-407(3) (1987 & Supp 1987)).
312. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(2)(B)-(C) (Supp. IV 1986).
313. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-407(4) (Interim Supp. 1986) (current version at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-9-407(4) (1987 & Supp. 1987)).
314. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(2)(D) (Supp. IV 1986).
315. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-407(5) (Interim Supp. 1986) (current version at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-9-407(5) (1987 & Supp. 1987)).
316. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(2)(E) (Supp. IV 1986).
317. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-407(6) (Interim Supp. 1986).(current version at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-9-407(6) (1987 & Supp. 1987)).
318. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(2)(F) (Supp. IV 1986).
319. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-407(7) (Interim Supp. 1986) (current version at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-9-407(7) (Supp. 1987)).
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A 1987 Arkansas act supplemented and modified Act 16 of 1986.
It created positions for additional personnel in the office of the Secre-
tary of State to administer the central indexing and reporting sys-
tem, 320 appropriated funds for the operation of the system,32'
regulated disposition of funds collected in the course of the operation
of the system,322 set up reporting requirements regarding expendi-
tures,323 and increased the allowable fees to be charged for services
rendered.324 The 1987 Act also provided, "Livestock buyers and live-
stock sale barns are hereby exempted from the provisions of Act 16 of
the Second Extraordinary Session of the Seventy-Fifth General
Assembly. 325
The Arkansas central filing system was certified by the Depart-
ment of Agriculture as being in compliance with section 1324 of the
Food Security Act "for all farm products produced in [Arkansas]" on
December 22, 1986.326 The certification was amended to exclude
most livestock on February 23, 1987.327
B. Analysis of the Arkansas Legislation
For one accustomed to the straight-forward style of Article 9 of
the U.C.C., the new Arkansas version of section 9-307 sets subtle
traps. Unless the Code language is read with care, and in tandem
with another statute to which it makes no reference, a reader is likely
to come away with a most erroneous impression of the law dealing
with the relation between a holder of a perfected security interest in
farm products and a buyer of those products from the farmer-debtor
who makes an unauthorized sale of the collateral.
The reader is likely to notice, first, that the wording of subsection
(1) of section 9-307 has not been altered. It lays down, as it always
has, a general rule that a buyer in ordinary course of business takes
320. Act of Mar. 3, 1987, No. 108, §§ 1, 2, 1987 Ark. Acts 267 (Adv. Leg. Ser.) (codified at
ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-307, -407 (Supp. 1987)).
321. Id. §§ 3, 4, 9, 10, 1987 Ark. Acts 268-70 (Adv. Leg. Ser.).
322. Id §§ 7, 8, 9, 1987 Ark. Acts 269-70 (Adv. Leg. Ser.) (codified in part at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-9-407(7) (Supp. 1987)).
323. Id § 5, 1987 Ark. Acts 269 (Adv. Leg. Ser.).
324. Id. §§ 7, 11; ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-407(2), (7) (Supp. 1987).
325. Act of Mar. 3, 1987, No. 108, § 6, 1987 Ark. Acts 269 (Adv. Leg. Ser.). This provi-
sion is codified in ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-307(7) (Supp. 1987) as: "Livestock buyers and
livestock sale barns are exempted from the provisions of subsections (4)-(6) of this section."
326. 51 Fed. Reg. 46,887 (1986).
327. 52 Fed. Reg. 6,040 (1987) (giving notice of amended approval "to cover all farm prod-
ucts produced in the State of Arkansas except: Cattle & Calves, Goats, Horses, Hogs, Mules,
Sheep & Lambs").
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free of any security interest created by his seller, but it excepts from
the operation of that rule, as it always has, "a person buying farm
products from a person engaged in farming operations. ' 328 Knowing
that the Code in the past has contained no other provision that would
render the secured party vulnerable to the buyer's claim to the goods,
the reader is likely to conclude that the security interest is enforceable
against the buyer even if he is a buyer in ordinary course of business.
That assumption would be incorrect, and perhaps unforgivable,
because simply by reading on in the same section the reader would
discover that the Code now does contain another provision impairing
the security. The new subsection (4) of section 9-307 provides, "[a]
secured party may enforce a security interest in farm products against
a buyer who, in the ordinary course of business, purchases farm prod-
ucts from ... a person engaged in farming operations only where the
secured party has signed and filed with the Secretary of State a form"
containing specified information and signatures. 32 9 This rule sets up
conditions for enforceability of the security interest against the buyer
which are different from the steps required by the Code for "perfec-
tion" of the security interest, since the filed form must contain infor-
mation and a signature not required in a "financing statement" by
section 9-402,330 and the filing must be with the Secretary of State,
rather than locally, as section 9-401 requires for a Code "financing
statement."
331
Having found this new rule, our reader is likely to deduce that if
the secured party has made a central filing of the sort required by
section 9-307(4) before the sale, he may enforce his security interest
against the buyer. Isn't that the natural reading of the subsection? It
may be, but the conclusion is wrong. It is wrong because the federal
Food Security Act of 1985 provides that "notwithstanding any other
provision of. . .State ...law, a buyer who in ordinary course of
business buys a farm product from a seller engaged in farming opera-
tions shall take free of a security interest created by the seller," except
as otherwise provided in the next subsection;332 and under the next sub-
section a central filing suffices to give the secured party enforceable
rights against the buyer only if the buyer has failed to register with the
328. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-307(1) (Interim Supp. 1986) (current version at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-9-307(1) (1987 & Supp. 1987)).
329. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-307(4) (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).
330. Id. § 4-9-402 (1987). See also supra note 272.
331. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-401 (1987).
332. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
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Secretary of State prior to the purchase.33 3 If the buyer has regis-
tered, the security interest is not enforceable against him unless the
buyer has received direct or indirect notification of the security inter-
est. 334 The Arkansas U.C.C. makes no reference to this Federal Act;
the reader must know of it to avoid a misunderstanding of the law.
Assuming that our reader avoids that trap, he is likely to reason
that, at the very least, subsection (4) of section 9-307 of the Code
teaches that the secured party cannot preserve his rights against a
buyer in ordinary course without filing with the Secretary of State.
Right? Wrong! True, that subsection of the Code says that such a
filing is the "only" way the secured party may preserve his rights,335
but the "clear title" section of the Food Security Act says otherwise.
It makes the buyer "subject to a security interest created by the seller
if... within 1 year before the sale.., the buyer has received from the
secured party or the seller written notice of the security interest" in
proper form.336 This rule operates whether or not the state in which
the farm products were produced has established a central filing sys-
tem, and whether or not the secured party has made a central filing.337
333. Id. § 1631(e)(2).
334. Id. § 163 l(e)(3). Although subsections (5) and (6) of § 9-407 of the Arkansas U.C.C.,
as amended in 1986, require the Secretary of State to supply information about filings with
respect to farm products to registered buyers, commission merchants and selling agents and to
persons who request information about filings as to particular debtors or sellers, neither that
section nor § 9-307 conditions enforceability of the security interest on such information hav-
ing been received by the person against whom enforcement is sought. See ARK. STAT. ANN.
§§ 85-9-307, -407(5), -407(6) (Interim Supp. 1986) (current version at ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-
9-307, -407(5), -407(6) (1987 & Supp. 1987)).
335. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-307(4) (Interim Supp. 1986) (current version at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-9-307(4) (1987 & Supp. 1987).
336. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(1) (Supp. IV 1986).
337. The new subsection (4) which was added to § 9-307 of the Arkansas U.C.C. by Act 16
of 1986 may have been drafted on the assumption that the "clear title" section of the Food
Security Act gave the State the right to "opt out" of the direct notification provisions of the
Federal Act by adopting the indirect notification machinery (ie., by setting up a "central filing
system" complying with the Federal Act), in its place. Indeed, some early commentators on
the Federal Act so read it. See, e.g., Meyer, Agricultural Credit, supra note 150, at 491; Rich-
ards, supra note 17, at 417; Note, Federal Legislation Provides Protection, supra note 74, at 766.
That reading, however, is not consistent with the text of the Act, which provides:
A buyer of farm products takes subject to a security interest created by the seller if-
(1) . . . within 1 year before the sale . . . , the buyer has received from the secured
party or the seller written notice of the security interest . . . , or (2) in the case of a
farm product produced in a State that has established a central filing system... the
buyer has failed to register ... and the secured party has filed an effective financing
statement . . . ; or (3) in the case of a farm product produced in a State that has
established a central filing system, the buyer ... receives from the Secretary of State
of such State written notice [of a filed financing statement covering the farm
products].
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The federal law thus flatly contradicts section 9-307(4) of the Arkan-
sas U.C.C. and overrides the contrary state law.aa'
Another layer of deception lurks in the fact that Arkansas' Act
108 of 1987 exempts "livestock buyers and livestock sale barns" from
the operation of Act 16 of 1986. 339 This type of exemption is presum-
ably permissible under the Food Security Act without invalidating the
entire central filing system. The Department of Agriculture has is-
sued an interpretive opinion that declares:
A State may establish a system for specified products and not
for all. A State establishing a system for specified products and not
for all will be deemed to be "a State that has established a central
filing system" as to the specified products, and will be deemed not
to be such a State as to other products.34
But where does this take us when the collateral is livestock? Sub-
section (4) of section 9-307 is inapplicable, since it was added to the
Arkansas U.C.C. by Act 16 of 1986.14 1 The "central filing system"
rules of the Federal Act 342 are irrelevant, since there is no Arkansas
"central filing system" applicable to security interests in livestock.343
The relevant rule that remains in the Arkansas U.C.C. is section 9-
7 U.S.C. § 163 1(e) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added). The three paragraphs of the subsection
are stated as complete alternatives, and there is no language in the Act suggesting that by
electing to establish a central filing system, the state in which the farm products are produced
nullifies the direct notification provisions of paragraph (1). See Clark, supra note 157, at 1336-
39 (treating the direct notification provisions as applicable whether or not the state in which
the farm products are produced has a central filing system). See also Sanford, supra note 138,
at 26 (asserting that a state law which prohibited direct notification when the state imple-
mented a central filing system would be void but suggesting, without further explanation, that
a state "might ... validly restrict direct notice once a security interest is listed in a master
list").
It is apparently true that a Senate amendment to the House bill which ultimately became
the Food Security Act of 1985 would have given the states such an option, but the Conference
Committee adopted the wording that appears in the enacted statute, without describing it as an
adoption of the Senate's amendment. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 447, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
485-86, 490-91 (1981).
338. See Meyer, Congress's Amendment, supra note 153, at 8.
339. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-307(7) (Supp. 1987).
340. 9 C.F.R. § 205.206(c) (1987).
341. The exclusion has been codified in the Arkansas Code of 1987 as subsection (7) of § 9-
307, providing: "Livestock buyers and livestock sale barns are exempted from the provisions
of subsections (4)-(6) of this section." ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-307(7) (Supp. 1987).
342. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(e)(2) and (3) (Supp. IV 1986).
343. A "central filing system," under the Federal Act, is a system certified by the Secretary
of Agriculture as complying with the Act's requirements for such a system. Id. § 1631(c)(2).
The latest certification relating to the Arkansas central filing system excepts from the approval
coverage of cattle, calves, goats, horses, mules, hogs, sheep and lambs. See supra note 327 and
accompanying text.
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307(1),11 which operates to preserve the enforceability of the security
interest against the buyer, since livestock still qualifies as a "farm
product" under the Arkansas Code as long as it remains in the hands
of a farmer.3 4 5 But, the federal Food Security Act reverses that rule
by providing that "notwithstanding any other provision of ... State
... law, a buyer who in ordinary course of business buys a farm prod-
uct from a seller engaged in farming operations shall take free of a
security interest created by the seller .... 346 The only exception
allowed by the Federal Act is the direct notification device.34 7 Thus,
many, if not most, sales of Arkansas livestock to buyers in ordinary
course of business will be sales free of the security interests created by
the sellers. The Arkansas Code says just the opposite.
All of this discussion assumes that the phrase "buyer in the ordi-
nary course of business" has the same meaning in both the Arkansas
U.C.C. and the "clear title" section of the Food Security Act.34 8 If
that is not so, the language of the Arkansas U.C.C. becomes even
more misleading.
The 1986 amendments to the Arkansas U.C.C. provide some
protection for "commission merchants" and "selling agents," as well
as for buyers, since the new subsection (4) of section 9-307349 ex-
pressly includes them in its rule. However, the section is just as mis-
leading as to the law that really governs where commission merchants
and selling agents are concerned as it is with regard to that applicable
to buyers. It should be noted also that the 1987 Act excluding "live-
stock buyers" from the provisions of the 1986 Act also excludes "live-
stock sale barns."35 That term is undefined, but it probably operates
to place sales agents conducting sales of livestock in "sale barns" in
the same nearly invulnerable position as "livestock buyers. '351
344. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-307(1) (Interim Supp. 1986) (current version at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-9-307(1) (1987 & Supp. 1987)).
345. Neither the 1986 Act amending the U.C.C. (see supra text accompanying notes 299-
319) nor the 1987 Act (see supra text accompanying notes 320-25) changes the definition of
"farm products" that appears in ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-109(3) (Interim Supp. 1986) (cur-
rent version at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-109(3) (1987)). For that definition, see note 59 supra.
346. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added).
347. Id. § 1631(e)(1).
348. See supra text accompanying notes 145-56.
349. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-307(4) (Interim Supp. 1986) (current version at ARK.
CODE ANN. § 4-9-307(4) (1987 & Supp. 1987)).
350. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-307(7) (Supp. 1987).
351. See supra text accompanying notes 339-47. The term "livestock" is undefined as well,
and, as interpreted by the Arkansas Secretary of State, is apparently construed as not including
all farm animals. See 52 Fed. Reg. 6,040 (1987) (indicating that the Secretary of State re-
quested that Arkansas' central filing system be certified as covering all farm products except
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The 1986 amendment of Arkansas' U.C.C. appears to change the
operation of the Code in one area which is not touched by the Federal
Act. The definition of "farm products" in the "clear title" section of
the Food Security Act 352 does not include "supplies used or produced
in farming operations," but the definition of "farm products" in the
Arkansas U.C.C. does.35 3 Since the 1986 and 1987 Arkansas legisla-
tion did not amend the "farm products" definition of the Arkansas
U.C.C., the term "farm products," as used in the new subsection (4)
of section 9-307, presumably includes supplies used or produced in
farming operations. That subsection declares,
A secured party may enforce a security interest in farm products
against a buyer who, in the ordinary course of business, purchases
farm products from, or a commission merchant or selling agent
who, in the ordinary course of business, sells farm products for, a
person engaged in framing operations only where the secured party
has signed and filed with the Secretary of State a form containing
[specified information].35 4
That rule, it seems, can be taken .literally if the collateral is "supplies
used or produced in farming operations" which are in the hands of a
farmer. Thus, as to such collateral, a secured party, even if he "per-
fects" his security interest in those products by the local filing which
Article 9 of the Code calls for, cannot be assured of being able to
enforce his security interest against buyers or against agents who sell
such collateral for the debtor but must file with the central filing of-
ficer for farm products. This is true despite the fact that the substan-
tive provisions of the Federal Act are irrelevant to the security
interest. However, if a central filing is made, that appears to be suffi-
cient in itself to make the security interest enforceable against such
cattle and calves, goats, horses, mules, hogs, sheep and lambs). Fish raised on a fish farm,
poultry and (perhaps) pigs are examples of animals that could be "farm products" but are
within the scope of Arkansas' central filing system, as the Secretary of State and the Depart-
ment of Agriculture envision it. It will be a question for the Arkansas courts whether the
"livestock" exception of the 1987 Act is of such narrow scope. If not, another nice question of
statutory interpretation arises: are the types of livestock which are not excepted from the
scope of the Arkansas central filing system by the terms of the federal certification subject to
the substantive rules of the "clear title" section of the Food Security Act, insofar as those rules
relate to the operation of a central filing system, or are they outside the scope of those rules
because the "State" has not "established" a central filing system for such products?
352. 7 U.S.C. § 1631(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1986). See supra text accompanying notes 142-44.
353. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-109(3) (Supp. 1985) (current version at ARK. CODE
ANN. § 4-9-109(3) (1987)).
354. Id. § 85-9-307(4) (Interim Supp. 1986) (current version at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-
307(4) (1987 & Supp. 1987)).
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buyers and agents,35 5 whether or not the security interest has been
"perfected" under Article 9.356 It seems unlikely that the Arkansas
legislature had any actual intention to create such an anomalous rule,
but it would take some highly creative judicial "construction" of the
statute to avoid the conclusion that the amended version of section 9-
307 calls for such a result.3"
IV. CONCLUSION
If a camel is "a horse planned by a committee" 358 the mind bog-
gles at what two committees could accomplish. The combined efforts
of the United States Congress and the Arkansas General Assembly to
provide "clear title" for farm products may provide an analogy. Even
355. The Arkansas U.C.C., as amended, includes no rules conditioning the secured party's
rights against buyers, commission merchants or selling agents on their having received notice
of the filing of a statement in accordance with subsection (4) of § 9-307. See supra note 334.
356. Section 9-307(4) of the Arkansas U.C.C. is not, in express terms, limited in its applica-
tion to holders of perfected security interests. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 85-9-307(4) (Interim
Supp. 1986) (current version at ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-307(4) (1987 & Supp. 1987)).
357. One commentator on the "clear title" section of the Food Security Act has suggested
that the Federal Act overrides some state laws other than the states' Uniform Commercial
Codes. As an example, he has pointed out that in Arkansas and some other states a landlord's
lien on a tenant's crops for unpaid rent can be enforced against purchasers of the crops, but the
writer asserts that "Congress reversed this rule as well when it provided in section 1324(d):
'Except as provided in subsections (e) and notwithstanding any other provision of Federal or
local law .... " Meyer, Agriculture Credit, supra note 150, at 502 (citing, inter alia, Holmes v.
Riceland Foods, Inc., 261 Ark. 27, 546 S.W.2d 414 (1977)). That is a possible reading of the
Federal Act but certainly not clearly correct. The rule which is laid down as applicable
"notwithstanding any other provision Federal, State or local law" is that a buyer in ordinary
course of business of farm products from a farmer "shall take free of a security interest created
by the seller ...." 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d) (Supp. IV 1986) (emphasis added). The question is
whether a landlord's lien for rent is a "security interest." The Federal Act defines the term as
"an interest in farm products that secures payment or performance of an obligation." Id.
§ 1631(c)(7). Except for being limited to interests in farm products, this is the same language
that is employed in the Uniform Commercial Code to define the term "security interest."
U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1978). But the Code goes on specifically to exclude landlords' liens from
the scope of Article 9, U.C.C. § 9-104(b) (1978), and the scope of the Article is affirmatively
defined as being limited to "security interests created by contract," and "statutory liens" are
specifically excluded. U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (1978). In Arkansas the landlord's lien on crops
grown on the leased premises is statutory. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 51-201 (1971) (current version
at ARK. CODE ANN. § 18-41-107 (1987). The problem of interpretation is whether the Federal
Act definition of "security interest" is meant to adopt the U.C.C. meaning of the term in
Article 9. Since the Federal Act does not say, there is room for treating the Federal Act as
having a broader application than Article 9 of the Code, but since the legislative history clearly
indicates that the Act's target was U.C.C. § 9-307(1), the sounder reading of the Federal Act
definition of "security interest" is that it refers to an interest created by contract and does not
include statutory liens such as Arkansas' landlord's lien. See supra text accompanying note
135.
358. A.K. ADAMS, THE HOME BOOK OF HUMOROUS QUOTATIONS 24 (1969), attributed to
VOGUE MAG. (July 1958).
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if one concedes that the Uniform Commercial Code, as it stood in
most states (including Arkansas) before Congress stepped in, treated
buyers of such products unfairly, and that a congressionally-imposed
reform of the law was justified, the reform that materialized leaves
much to be desired. 59 Further, the attempt to adapt the Arkansas
U.C.C. to this reform has added unnecessary confusion to that cre-
ated by the Congress.
Clear gainers under the "clear title" section of the Food Security
Act of 1985 are buyers of farm products.3 ° Buyers in ordinary course
of business have gained a security of title which was previously denied
them in most states, including Arkansas. It is not a complete secur-
ity, but even the exceptions are more tolerable for buyers than was
their position under prior law. They can now generally be assured of
protection from security interests created by their sellers unless they
have actually received notices of the security interests before they buy,
as well as information that will enable them to locate the secured par-
ties to obtain further information and negotiate lien-free purchases.
This protection comes at a price, however. In any case where the
farm products involved have been produced in a state which has a
federally-approved "central filing system," and it will be up to the
buyer to find out whether that is so, the buyer will have to go to the
trouble of registering with that state's central filing office and will
have to pay for periodic distributions of copies of master lists of filed
359. One of the more vigorous published criticisms of the "clear title" section of the Food
Security Act is that of Professor Charles W. Mooney, Jr., who was chairman of the Uniform
Commercial Code Committee of the American Bar Association's Section on Corporation,
Banking and Business Law in 1986. He wrote:
Although even the most pejorative hyperbole is inadequate to fully express what
section 1324 deserves, the following is a frail attempt: Section 1324 is internally
inconsistent, unintelligible, and unworkable. It was drafted and enacted without ap-
parent knowledge or understanding of present and past systems of public notice and
secured financing. It ignores the issues involved in multistate transactions. It does
not draw upon, acknowledge, or include many matters that are adequately covered in
the U.C.C. and in judicial decisions that treat such U.C.C. provisions. It is a disas-
ter. No buyer or financer of farm products should tolerate such incompetence from
its legal counsel, yet these disgraceful provisions have now been imposed upon agri-
cultural commerce and finance. What is worse, in attempts to set up "central filing
systems" under section 1324, some state legislatures may expand the harm by unnec-
essarily disrupting the existing U.C.C. article 9 filing systems and thereby interfering
with secured transactions unrelated to farm products.
Mooney, Introduction to the Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: Some Observations on
the Past, Present, and Future of the UCC., 41 Bus. LAW. 1343, 1352 (1986).
360. But see Sanford, supra note 138, at 29 (arguing that "the Act does little for buyers,
commission merchants, and selling agents who viewed the U.C.C. as an unfair collection de-
vice for bankers," because they had largely adapted to the U.C.C. "farm products" exception
to § 9-307 before the enactment of the Food Security Act).
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financing statements. Buyers will also have to adopt filing systems of
their own, in order to keep track of master-list copies they receive,
and will have to make their own searches of these lists before buying
farm products. 361 Furthermore, buyers will have to file and examine
any direct notifications of security interests which they receive from
secured parties, and these may be voluminous. 362 These costs will un-
doubtedly affect willingness to buy farm products and have a ten-
dency to hold down prices buyers are willing to pay for them, but this
trade-inhibiting tendency may be considerably less than the effect of
the prior law.
Commission merchants and selling agents are also gainers under
the Federal Act,3 63 and the observations made in relation to buyers
apply to them as well.
Clear losers are the financers of agricultural operations. Their
previous, nearly invulnerable, position vis-d-vis buyers of farm prod-
ucts collateral, when the sales have not been authorized, has been
much eroded. The means left open to them for preserving the en-
forceability of their security interests have saddled them with costs
and risks which are bound to affect their eagerness to make agricul-
tural loans and to increase their charges for such credit.
Secured parties will have to continue to perfect their security in-
terests under the Code, as they have been accustomed to doing. But
they must now, in addition, employ the machinery of the Federal Act
to preserve the effectiveness of their security interests against buyers
of the collateral and agents for the debtors who participate in unau-
thorized sales. If they choose to employ the direct notification
method, they will have to find out what persons are likely to buy the
products and sell them for their debtors, and notices will have to be
delivered to all of them. Even then, the secured parties must bear the
risk of sales to undiscovered or unlikely buyers and sales by undiscov-
ered or unlikely agents. Furthermore, the notices will have to be care-
fully drafted to comply with detailed but ambiguous statutory
requirements, and secured parties, having given such notices, must
remember the one-year time limit on their effectiveness and the need
to deliver amendments in the event of "material changes."
A simpler procedure is to file an "effective financing statement"
with the Secretary of State in the state where the farm products have
been or are to be produced, but this alternative is not available if that
361. See Note, Clear Title, supra note 100, at 87; Fry, supra note 74, at 449.
362. See Meyer, Agriculture Credit, supra note 150, at 496; Fry, supra note 74, at 449.
363. But see supra note 360.
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state does not have a federally-approved "central filing system," as is
true in Arkansas where the collateral is "livestock." And, even if
there is one (as in Arkansas with respect to other "farm products," as
the Federal Act defines that term), the financing statement has to be
carefully drafted to comply with statutory and regulatory require-
ments. Even after it is filed, the secured party is dependent upon the
administrators of the central filing system to get accurate summaries
of the contents of the financing statement into the hands of registered
buyers, commission merchants and selling agents before they partici-
pate in sales of the collateral. Moreover, secured parties who have
filed must remain alert to the possibility of "material changes" occur-
ring which will require the filing of amendments to their filings.
The means for secured parties to protect their security interests
under the Federal Act are so unreliable that secured parties will, as a
practical matter, be compelled to select their farmer-borrowers with
greater care and monitor their handling of farm-products collateral
more closely than they have been accustomed to doing. That, in it-
self, may be quite desirable, but the need for such policing will also
increase the cost of agricultural credit.
How do the farmers fare under this Federal Act? As sometime
buyers of farm products they will share the advantages gained by
other buyers, and conferral of such benefits was a part of the congres-
sional motivation for enacting the law. 3 As sellers of farm products,
farmers gain no perceptible legal advantage. Any changes in the mar-
kets for their products, for good or ill, resulting from the Federal Act
will affect all farmers, not merely those who cannot be trusted to play
fair with their creditors. Whether farmers will now find it easier to
market their products at more favorable prices and, if so, whether
they will find that that benefit outweighs the probable increase in their
costs of obtaining credit and the possible drying up of sources of
credit remains to be seen.365
As to the Arkansas legislative reaction to the Food Security Act,
the evident desire of the Arkansas legislature to give suppliers of agri-
cultural credit the opportunity to take advantage of the grudging pro-
tections which Congress offered through the "central filing system"
device cannot be faulted, though it is not clear why those who finance
production of livestock deserve these protections less than others.
However, the manner in which the adaptation to the new federal law
was made seems almost designed to mislead those who are affected by
364. See supra note 136.
365. But see Note, Federal Legislation Provides Protection, supra note 74, at 773.
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it. The new subsection (4) of section 9-307 of Arkansas' Uniform
Commercial Code simply does not reflect the reality of the applicable
law, and the exclusion of livestock sales from the central filing system
mechanism has been handled in such a way as to hide, rather than
reveal, the impact of the change. It would have been far better to set
up a "central filing system" conforming to the requirements of the
"clear title" section of the Food Security Act, plainly excluding live-
stock collateral from its scope and to amend the Arkansas U.C.C.
only by adding cautions in sections 9-301 and 9-307 that the provi-
sions of these sections are modified in their operation by that federal
legislation.
The greatest gainers from this spate of federal and state legisla-
tion may be the members of the legal profession. Many new opportu-
nities for employment in counseling and litigation have been opened
to the practicing bar.
